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et ego dico tibi quia tu es Petrus et super hanc pe-
tram ædificabo ecclesiam meam.
(Vulgate, Matthew 16: 18)
(Weber and Gryson)
The type upon which the whole was constructed.
(Hill and Topor, 1992, p. 3)

Preface
Unification is one of the central aims of science. More than discovering large num-
bers of facts about the observable universe, scientists aim to establish these facts’
common properties and relations. The strive for unification has several rationales:
far from only promoting cognitive economy and simplicity, unification explains the
success of one theory (or model) in terms of another, establishes their relative con-
sistency, and e↵ects a mutual flow of evidential support between the two theories.
This dissertation makes a contribution to the unificatory project of science.
Its domain of unification constitutes the ontological ‘zoo’ of natural language se-
mantics, cf. (Bach, 1986). This zoo comprises the plethora of objects which are
assumed as the referents of certain classes of linguistic expressions. These include
individuals (e.g. Bill), propositions (Bill walks), properties of individuals (walk-
ing), relations between individuals (finding), and many other kinds of objects.
The aim of this dissertation is to identify a single semantic basis for the abo-
ve classes of objects, and to describe a bootstrapping procedure for them. Monta-
gue’s formal semantics, cf. (Montague, 1970a; 1973), makes a significant con-
tribution to this goal: following Church’s type theory, cf. (Church, 1940), Mon-
tague (1970a) reduces the referents of the small fragment of English from (Mon-
tague, 1973) to constructions out of two basic types of objects: individuals and
propositions. From them, first-order properties of individuals and binary relations
between individuals are constructed as functions from individuals to propositions,
respectively as functions from ordered pairs of individuals to propositions. Yet,
the question remains whether it is also possible to construct the ontological zoo
from a single, rather than two, semantic bases. Recent research on language deve-
lopment (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999; 2005; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990)
points in this direction.
Partee (2006) takes first steps towards a complete unification of the linguistic
ontology. To show the possibility of obtaining the ontological zoo from a single ba-
sic type of object, she sketches how a one-base-type system enables us to obtain
several classes of linguistically relevant objects. However, the nature of her paper
(a short Festschrift contribution) prevents the detailed presentation of this seman-
tics. A proof of its workability is left to the semantic community.
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This dissertation solves Partee’s challenge. In particular, it provides a formal
semantics for Montague’s fragment of English which constructs the referents of all
expressions of the fragment from a single basic type of object. The development of
this semantics illustrates the strict requirements on a single-type semantics. The
semantics based on Partee’s preliminary single-type choice and other intuitively
appealing alternatives fail to satisfy some of these requirements.
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This dissertation is a contribution to the formal semantics of natural language.
Natural languages are human languages like English or Japanese, which are used
by ordinary people in everyday communication. Formal semantics is an approach
to the study of natural language meaning which interprets linguistic expressions
through the use of mathematical and logical models. In virtue of this interpretati-
on, formal semantics explains our ability to derive the meaning of complex expres-
sions (e.g. the meaning of the sentence John loves Mary) from the meanings of their
syntactic constituents (here, John, love, and Mary), formulates truth- and equiva-
lence-conditions for sentences, and characterizes their relation of entailment.
The present chapter provides the linguistic background to this dissertation1,
and introduces its topic and objective: Section 1.1 presents the main ingredients
of formal semantics, indicates their philosophical interest, and sketches a number
of recent developments. Section 1.2 presents a reaction to one such development:
the reduction of prolifering semantic types to a single basic type. Sections 1.2.1,
1.2.2, and 1.4 review di↵erent motivations for the proposed ‘single-type’ seman-
tics. Section 1.3 specifies the aim of this dissertation, and gives an overview over
its contents. Section 1.5 suggests orders of reading for di↵erent audiences.
1.1. Montague’s Formal Semantics
Formal semantics has its origins in the work of Frege, Carnap and Tarski, and was
developed in the early 1970’s by David Lewis, Donald Davidson, and Max Cress-
well. However, its single most important influence is the work of Richard Monta-
gue, cf. (Montague, 1970a; 1970b; 1973).2Montague (1930–1971) was a Cali-
fornia-trained logician and philosopher, who held a pronounced interest in the ma-
thematical treatment of natural language. In particular, Montague believed that
natural languages could be described as interpreted formal systems. This view, cal-
ledMontague’s thesis (Bach, 1986), is expressed in (Montague, 1970b, p. 222):
There is in my opinion no important theoretical di↵erence bet-
ween natural languages and the artificial languages of logici-
1Readers who are familiar with formal semantics may proceed directly to Section 1.2.
2As a result, we will sometimes refer to formal semantics as Montague semantics.
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ans; indeed I consider it possible to comprehend the syntax and
semantics of both kinds of languages within a single natural
and mathematically precise theory.
Montague’s thesis was in stark contrast to the received view of formal and natural
languages at the time: While most generative linguists doubted the appropriate-
ness of logical approaches to semantics, most logicians believed that natural lan-
guages resisted a precise formalization. This belief was motivated by the restric-
tion of traditional logical tools to the apparatus of first-order predicate logic, and
the existence of a mismatch between the grammatical form of disambiguated na-
tural language sentences and the logical form of their predicate-logical translati-
ons.3 To refute this belief, Montague replaced predicate logic by a variant (called
Intensional Logic, IL) of the lambda logic from (Church, 1940), cf. (Henkin,
1950). Since the language of IL allows abstraction over objects of any order, its
terms can take a very similar form to the grammatical form of natural language.
1.1.1. Central Aspects. To introduce the reader to Montague’s formal se-
mantics4, we present some of its central aspects. These include the use of model-
theoretic semantics, the adoption of the method of indirect interpretation, the cen-
trality of the principle of compositionality, and the particular role of type theory.
Model-Theoretic Semantics.Model-theoretic semantics, cf. (Tarski, 1933), is
an approach to the semantics of natural language which interprets linguistic ex-
pressions as elements (objects, sets, or functions) in the domains of mathematical
models. These elements provide the meaning (or semantic value) for every expres-
sion of a given subset of natural language. Expressions are assigned a value by in-
terpretation functions. In particular, these functions send proper names to basic
elements (i.e. individuals), and send intransitive verbs to sets of individuals.
To model intensional and modal phenomena, Montague (1973) enriches his
models with a domain of possible world-time pairs (or indices). This enrichment
enables the interpretation of linguistic expressions as functions from indices to the
expressions’ values at those indices. Thus, declarative sentences are interpreted as
sets of indices at which they are true. Intransitive verbs are interpreted as func-
tions from indices to sets of individuals which witness the denoted property.
As a result of Montague’s interpretation of sentences, a sentence S is true at
a given index w w.r.t. some model i↵ w is a member of the interpretation of S in
the model. Entailment then becomes definable as truth-preservation: The senten-
ce S entails a sentence S0 i↵ S0 is true at all indices at which S is true.
3Thus, the predicate-logical translation of the sentence John finds a unicorn, i.e. 9x.unicorn (x)^
find (x, john), scatters the translation of the NP a unicorn (underlined) over the whole formula.
4Good introductions to formal semantics include (Gamut, 1991), (Dowty et al., 1981), and
(Heim and Kratzer, 1998).
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Indirect Interpretation. To make the model-theoretic interpretation of natu-
ral language more perspicuous, Montague (1973, 1970b) uses an indirect inter-
pretation of natural language, which proceeds via the translation of a subset (or
fragment) of natural language into the language of some logic (here, the language
of IL). The semantic interpretation of natural language thus constitutes a three-
step process, which involves the syntactic formalization of a non-trivial fragment
of natural language (here, the fragment from (Montague, 1973)) (step 1), the de-
velopment of a language (L), domain (F), and interpretation function (I) for the
interpreting logic IL (step 2), and the provision of a set of translation rules sending
linguistic expressions (or logical forms) of the fragment to IL terms (step 3).
Figure 1.1 illustrates the obtaining of the interpretation, I( ), of a linguistic
expression X via its translation into the logical term  . In the figure, ‘LF’ desig-
nates the Logical Form-component of Montague’s fragment.
LF (1) L (2) F (2)
X
  I( )translation (3) I (2)
Figure 1.1. Indirect interpretation in the PTQ model.
Compositionality. To ensure the success of the method of indirect interpreta-
tion, the translation of natural language into the language of IL must adhere to
the principle of compositionality of translations. This principle is a syntactic ver-
sion of the principle of (semantic) compositionality, cf. (Partee, 1984; Janssen,
1986; Hodges, 2001), which requires the existence of an IL translation for every
syntactically basic expression (or word), and the existence of an IL correspondent
(here, functional application) for every syntactic operation (e.g. merging):
Principle of Compositionality: The meaning of an expression is a func-
tion of the meanings of its constituents and their mode of combination.
In Montague (1973), cf. (Montague, 1970b), the compositional translation of
linguistic expressions is made possible by the identification of IL with a variant of
Church’s lambda logic, such that there exists a translation for every linguistically
basic word (including determiners (the, a/some) and quantifiers (every)).
The compositional interpretation of linguistic expressions is enabled by the
interpretation of IL terms as functions from indices to sets of elements in models.
As a result, the meanings of basic non-sentential expressions are identified with
their contribution to the truth-conditions of the sentences in which they occur.
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The meanings of intransitive verbs (e.g. walks) fulfill this function by sending in-
dices to sets of individuals. Thus, the application of an index-specific interpreta-
tion of walk (in a given model) to the interpretation of Bill yields the truth-value
of the sentence Bill walks at the index.
The possibility of obtaining the truth-conditions of molecular sentences (e.g.
the sentence Bill walks and John whistles) at an index is enabled by the identifica-
tion of IL models with set-theoretic models. As a result, the semantic correspon-
dents (\, [,  ) of the familiar logical constants (e.g. ^, _, resp. ¬) are readily
available in IL. For example, since linguistic conjunction is associated with set in-
tersection, the sentence Bill walks and John whistles is interpreted as the intersec-
tion of the sets of indices which interpret the sentences Bill walks and John whistles.
Type Theory. To capture the relations between the interpretations of expres-
sions from di↵erent syntactic categories, Montague casts the structure on a mo-
del’s domains into a type system, cf. (Russell and Whitehead, 1997; Curry,
1934; Church, 1940).5 A type system is a pair of domains and domain construc-
tors, which enables the formation of other, more complex domains (e.g. function
spaces). In particular, the type system of the logic IL assumes two basic types of
objects: individuals (type e) and truth-values (type t). From them, complex types
are formed via the rulesCT and IT (for Church types, resp. for intensional types),
cf. (Montague, 1973). Indices (type s) are introduced through the second rule:
(CT) If ↵ and   are types, then h↵, i is the type for functions from objects of
the type ↵ to objects of the type  .
( IT ) If ↵ is a type, then hs,↵i is the type for functions from indices (type s) to
objects of the type ↵.
The first rule identifies the type he, ti as the type for functions from individuals to
truth-values (or, equivalently, for sets of individuals). The second rule identifies the
type hs, he, tii as the type for functions from indices to sets of individuals. This ty-
pe is associated with the semantic values of intransitive verbs.
The typing of linguistic expressions provides a formal basis for syntactic cate-
gories. As a result, we can use typing to check the well-formedness of linguistic ex-
pressions, and to explain a large number of distributional phenomena. For exam-
ple, since the words John, Mary, and run receive an interpretation in the types e
(for John, Mary) and hs, he, tii (for run), the string John runs Mary does not qua-
lify as a well-formed structure of English.6 Finally, the system only allows predi-
cative constructions, thereby avoiding the usual Russell-style inconsistencies.
5(Muskens, 2011) and (Turner, 1997) are excellent expositions of type theory. The intro-
duction to (Barendregt et al., 2010) contains a motivation of its historical introduction.
6After the interpretation of runs at an index has been applied to the interpretation of Mary,
there is no longer a free type-e argument place for the interpretation of John.
1.1. MONTAGUE’S FORMAL SEMANTICS 5
This completes our presentation of the main ingredients of Montague’s formal
semantics. We next discuss their philosophical interest.
1.1.2. Philosophical Interest. Montague semantics has provided the to-
pics for many philosophical discussions. This is due, in part, to the theory’s philo-
sophical origins7, and to Montague’s close interaction with leading philosophers of
the time.8 However, the last 30 years have seen an active philosophical discussion
of many of Montague’s technical choices (i.e. of the foundations of formal seman-
tics), cf. (Fox and Lappin, 2005). These choices include Montague’s adoption
of the principle of compositionality, his characterization of linguistic meaning, and
the ontology of his type theory. We discuss these three topics in turn:
Compositionality. Montague’s adherence to the principle of compositionality
is a direct consequence of his mathematical view on natural language, cf. (Monta-
gue, 1970b, p. 222): If natural languages are describable as interpreted formal
systems, we expect that they also share the formal properties of these systems
(specifically, the existence of a structure-preserving map between the algebra of
the logical language and the algebra of its semantic interpretations).
Compositionality is consistent with the assumed productivity and systemati-
city of natural languages. However, the last 35 years have produced many putative
counterexamples to compositionality, cf. (Janssen, 1997; Szabó, 2012). These
counterexamples include instances of cross-sentential anaphora, in which the mea-
ning of the relevant complex expression also depends on the expression’s linguistic
context. The identification of productive (or systematic) languages which resist a
compositional treatment has recently questioned the above-cited reasons for com-
positionality, cf. (Werning, 2005). Philosophical interest in compositionality re-
gards the justification of compositionality, its characterization as a theoretical or
as a methodological principle, the role of context in the interpretation of linguistic
expressions, and the reconciliation of compositionality with its counterexamples.
Meaning and Reference. Montague (1973) provides a model-theoretic treat-
ment of natural language meanings which characterizes meanings as intensions,
cf. (Carnap, 1988). The intension of an expression is a function from indices to
the expression’s semantic values at those indices (i.e. to its extensions). An expres-
sion’s extension is obtained by evaluating its intension at the current index.
Montague’s modal treatment of intensionality (via the introduction of indi-
ces into type-theoretic models; cf. Sect. 1.1.1) gives rise to a number of philosophi-
cal questions: What is the metaphysical status of indices? Are individuals identi-
cal across indices, or do they have Lewisian (other-index) counterparts?How is the
7Some origins of Montague semantics are Tarski’s (1944) theory of truth, Carnap’s (1988) the-
ory of intensions and extensions, and Kripke’s (1959) possible world semantics.
8The latter include Benson Mates, David Lewis, Terence Parsons, and David Kaplan.
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counterpart relation defined?Other questions regard the empirical adequacy of in-
tensions: Are intensions su ciently fine-grained to capture speakers’ intuitions
about strict synonymy? Do they enable correct predictions about linguistic entail-
ment? Do they allow the suitable modeling of propositional attitude statements?
Type Theory and Ontology. Natural languages presuppose a rich semantic on-
tology: To interpret the fragment of English from (Montague, 1973) (here, the
PTQ fragment), we require the existence of individuals (e.g. Bill), propositions
(‘Bill walks’), first- and higher-order properties of individuals (‘walks’, ‘is one of
Bill’s properties’), binary relations between individuals (‘find’), and many other
kinds of objects. Montague (1970a) reduces this large set of primitives to con-
structions (via the rule CT) out of two basic types of objects: individuals (type e,
for ‘entities’) and propositions (or functions from indices to truth-values, type
hs, ti).9 First- (or second-)order properties of individuals are then represented as
(functions from) functions from individuals to propositions (to propositions). Bi-
nary relations between individuals are represented as functions from individuals
to functions from individuals to propositions, etc.
The reduction of semantic primitives to individuals and propositions unifies
the semantic ontology of the PTQ fragment, and establishes new representatio-
nal relations between objects of di↵erent types.10 Philosophical interest in Mon-
tague’s type theory further concerns the identity of the basic types, their interch-
angeability with other basic types (which also construct all classes of PTQ referen-
ts), and semantic requirements on these types (e.g. the existence of an algebra on
one type’s domain). The last three topics will be discussed in this dissertation.
1.1.3. Recent Developments. The past 35 years have seen a number of re-
visions and extensions to Montague semantics. The former include the streamli-
ning of Montague’s Intensional Logic to a logic with more desirable proof-theoretic
properties, cf. (Gallin, 1975), and with a simpler (or more easily generalizable)
model theory, cf. (Muskens, 1989). The latter include the improvement of the
empirical adequacy of Montague semantics, cf. (Thomason, 1980), its applica-
tion to other languages like German, cf. (Löbner, 1976), or Japanese, cf. (Bekki,
2010), and its extension to larger fragments of natural language containing, e.g.,
plurals, mass, and kind terms (Link, 1983; Chierchia, 1998), neutral percep-
tion verbs (Muskens, 1989), impredicative constructions (Chierchia and Tur-
9Our adoption of the basic types e and hs, ti (rather than of the types e and t, cf. (Montague,
1973), e, s, and t, cf. (Gallin, 1975), or hs, ei and hs, ti, cf. (van Eijck and Unger, 2010;
Fox et al., 2002)) is motivated by our wish to parallel the syntactic distinction between proper
names and sentences, and by Partee’s choice of the type e as a basic type, cf. (Partee, 2006,
p. 37). We will show in Chapter 3 and Appendix D.1 that a semantics with the basic types e and
hs, ti can still model intensional phenomena (incl. a solution to Partee’s temperature puzzle).
10For example, the representation of first-order properties suggests the possibility of represent-
ing individuals via functions from individuals to the set of indices at which the individuals exist.
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ner, 1988), adverbial modifiers (Dowty, 1979), cf. (Davidson, 1967), scalar
adjectives (Cresswell, 1976), and anaphora (Muskens, 1996; Bekki, 2012).
These adaptations all involve some deviation from Montague’s original type
system. In particular, the semantics from (Thomason, 1980), (Muskens, 1989;
1996), (Dowty, 1979), (Cresswell, 1976), and (Chierchia and Turner, 1988)
enrich the IL type system with types for primitive propositions, situations, regis-
ters, events, states, processes, intervals, degrees, numbers, and kinds. The seman-
tics from (Fox and Lappin, 2005) and (Bekki, 2012) further supplement the
type-forming rule CT with rules for the formation of separation, comprehension,
and polymorphic types, cf. (Curry, 1934; Girard, 1972), and of dependent ty-
pes, cf. (Martin-Löf, 1973).
Since some of the above-proposed types (e.g. Muskens’ type for situations)
constitute generalizations of other types (possible worlds, or indices), the presen-
ted extensions to the Montagovian type system need not all be simultaneously im-
plemented.11Yet, the accommodation of the above phenomena in a single type sy-
stem still induces the adoption of around ten (instead of two or three) basic types.
The extension of the Montagovian type system is a consequence of the institu-
tionalization of contemporary formal semantics as a branch of linguistics, and the
attendant emphasis on practical applications of this system. The availability of a
larger number of ontological primitives facilitates work for the empirical linguist:
In a rich type system, fewer syntactic expressions are interpreted in a complex ty-
pe.12 As a result, the compositional translations of many syntactic structures will
be simpler, and will involve less lambda conversions than their IL counterparts.
But the proliferation of basic types is not an altogether positive development.
Specifically, by centering their attention on the simplicity of application, many
contemporary formal semanticists have lost sight of Montague’s original metho-
dological objective (i.e. the treatment of natural language as a simple and elegant
mathematical theory). In particular, the replacement of Montague’s type system
by systems withmore basic types reduces the number of representational relations
between di↵erent types of objects13, and decreases the resulting unificatory e↵ect
on the semantic ontology. (Situation Semantics, cf. (Barwise and Perry, 1983;
Kratzer, 1989), and Property Theory, cf. (Chierchia et al., 1988a; 1988b),
are pleasant exceptions to this development).
11This is, in particular, due to the characterization of situations as parts of possible worlds (or
as partial possible worlds), cf. (Barwise and Perry, 1983).
12For example, since linguists typically assign degree modifiers (e.g. very) the type for degrees d
(rather than the type for second-order properties hhe, hs, tii, hs, tii), gradable adjectives (e.g. tall)
receive a translation in the type hd, he, hs, tiii, instead of the type hhhe, hs, tii, hs, tii, he, hs, tiii.
13Thus, the treatment of degree modifiers as type-d expressions prevents the identification of
their relation to individuals (type e) and individual-properties (type he, hs, tii; hhe, hs, tii, hs, tii).
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This dissertation inverses the observed explosion of basic types in formal se-
mantics: Instead of extending the IL type system via the introduction of new ba-
sic types, it attempts to reduce its members to a single basic type. This project fol-
lows the impetus of Barbara Partee, cf. (Partee, 2006). To constrain its scope,
we restrict ourselves to Montague’s PTQ fragment (which does not contain mass
terms, neutral perception verbs, impredicative constructions, scalar adjectives, or
cross-sentential anaphora), and neglect arguments for the existence of events, cf.
(Davidson, 1967; Parsons, 1990).
At this point, the specialist reader will enthusiastically interject proposals of
the form Wouldn’t X be a good single-type candidate? (where X is a familiar ty-
pe from the formal semantic analysis of some linguistic phenomenon). In anticipa-
tion of our later results, we answer with Proposition 1.1:
Proposition 1.1 (HYH). The salient candidates prove unsuitable as a single
basic type.
The above fact will be established in Part II, Chapter 4.
1.2. Partee’s Conjecture
This dissertation is an experiment: What happens if we replace Montague’s types
for individuals (e) and propositions (hs, ti) by a single basic type of object? Is this
possible?And, if yes, under what conditions?What does a suitable interpretive do-
main for the single basic type look like?What are its properties?What e↵ects does
this change of type system have on our semantics’ ability to model natural lan-
guage? How does it influence our understanding of the relations between di↵erent
types of objects? Does it make Montague’s type system dispensable?
The assumption behind the above questions, i.e. that the PTQ fragment has
an even simpler semantic basis than the one adopted in (Montague, 1970a), has
first been proposed by Barbara Partee. In particular, (Partee, 2006) makes the
following suggestion about the linguistic type system:
Proposition 1.2 (Single-Type Hypothesis). The distinction between indivi-
duals and propositions is inessential for the construction of a rich linguistic onto-
logy. The PTQ fragment can be modeled through the use of one basic type of object.
To acknowledge its original proponent, we will sometimes call Proposition 1.2 Par-
tee’s conjecture. This conjecture suggests the possibility of obtaining all classes of
PTQ referents from a single basic type (dubbed ‘o’)14, whose objects capture the
semantic content of individuals and propositions. From them, objects of a com-
plex type are constructed via a variant, ST (for single-type rule), of the rule CT:
(ST) If ↵ and   are single-types types, then h↵, i is a single-type type.
14The basic type label ‘o’ has been suggested by Floris Roelofsen.
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In virtue of the neutrality of the type o between Montague’s types e and hs, ti,
any semantics which satisfies Proposition 1.2 (hereafter, single-type semantics15)
will identify basic-type objects with the values of proper names (e.g. Bill; traditio-
nally, type e) and of sentences and complement phrases (e.g. Bill walks, resp. that
Bill walks; traditionally, type hs, ti). As a result, it will also assign the same type,
ho, oi, to common nouns (e.g.man; traditionally, type he, hs, tii) and to complemen-
tizers and sentence adverbs (that, resp. possibly; traditionally, type hhs, ti, hs, tii).
The types of expressions from all other syntactic categories of the PTQ fragment
are obtained by replacing the labels ‘e’ and ‘hs, ti’ by the label ‘o’ in their associ-
ated Montague type.
Partee’s conjecture about the possibility of a single-type semantics suggests
a ‘minimality test’ for the Montagovian type system: If we can formulate a single-
type semantics without reference to Montagovian individuals or propositions, we
will therewith refute the commonly assumed need for two distinct basic types. If
our formulation of a single-type semantics relies on the availability of Montagovi-
an individuals or propositions, the semantics will support Montague’s basic-type
distinction.
However, our interest in single-type semantics is also motivated by many oth-
er considerations: These include empirical considerations (which regard the mo-
deling power of single-type semantics w.r.t. traditional Montague semantics; cf.
(Partee, 2006, Ingredients 4–5, 7)), formal considerations (which regard the pos-
sibility of constructing single-type models; cf. (ibid., Ingredients 1–3, 6)), and oth-
er methodological considerations besides minimality testing. To illustrate possible
applications of a single-type semantics – and to prime the reader’s intuitions ab-
out such a semantics –, empirical and formal considerations are discussed in the
remainder of this section. Methodological considerations, which drive our interest
in single-type semantics, will be the subject of Section 1.4.
1.2.1. Empirical Considerations. Empirical motivations for Partee’s con-
jecture lie in the observation that single-type semantics improves upon the mode-
ling power of traditional Montague semantics. This improvement is a consequence
of the neutralization of the distinction between the semantic types for proper na-
mes and sentences, such that there are fewer same-level constraints on semantic
merging.16, 17
15Since such semantics still assume a type hierarchy over the basic type o, they should more cor-
rectly be referred to as ‘single-base-type semantics’. I owe this observation to Jim Pryor.
16As a result, transitive verbs (e.g. remember; traditionally, type he, he, hs, tiii; now, type ho, ho,
oii) can apply either to a proper name or to a complement phrase (now, both type o).
17Initially, the neutralization of the distinction between the types e and hs, ti reduces the ex-
planatory power of single-type semantics (s.t. this semantics will be unable to explain distribu-
tional phenomena involving proper names, CPs, and sentences). We will restore the explanatory
power of single-type semantics over the course of this dissertation.
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To illustrate the higher modeling power of single-type semantics, we identify a
number of linguistic phenomena which can be accommodated18 in a single-type se-
mantics, but which defy accommodation in the semantics from (Montague, 1973;
1970a) (hereafter, traditional Montague semantics). Such phenomena occur in le-
xical syntax, the syntax of coordination, the semantics of specification, and non-
sentential speech. They include the neutrality of certain classes of expressions bet-
ween an NP or a CP complement, cf. (Kim and Sag, 2005; Sag et al., 2003),
the possibility of coordinating NPs with complement phrases, cf. (Bayer, 1996;
Sag et al., 1985), the existence of specificational sentences with a postcopular
CP, cf. (Potts, 2002), and the use of proper names to assert a contextually salie-
nt proposition about their type-e referent, cf. (Carstairs-McCarthy, 2005;Mer-
chant, 2008).
Below, we discuss these phenomena in turn. Since Partee’s original empirical
motivation for Proposition 1.2, i.e. the evolutionary contingency of the distinction
between noun phrases and sentences, cf. (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999), only wea-
kly supports the possibility of a single-type semantics (via the assumption of a
close relation between syntactic categories and semantic types, cf. (Montague,
1970b)), its presentation is deferred to Appendix B.1.
We start by showing how single-type semantics accommodates the phenome-
non from lexical syntax.
Lexical Syntax. In (Kim and Sag, 2005), cf. (Sag et al., 2003; Kim,
2008), Kim and Sag observe that many verbs select a complement which can be
realized as a noun phrase or a complement phrase. Thus, in (1), the verb remem-
ber can combine either with the name Bill (in (1a)) or with the CP that Bill was
waiting for her (in (1b)). A similar observation can be made for the verbs fear and
notice (in (2), (3)), and for many other factive, cognition, and experiencer verbs.
(1) a. Pat remembered [npBill].
b. Pat remembered [cpthat Bill was waiting for her].
(2) a. Sherlock fears [npMoriarty].
b. Sherlock fears [cpthat Moriarty will destroy him].
(3) a. The librarian noticed [npMoby Dick ].
b. The librarian noticed [cpthatMoby Dick was displayed in the window].
Since traditional Montague semantics assumes a functional relation between syn-
tactic categories and semantic types (s.t. each category is associated with exactly
18Since there are other, more conservative, ways of accommodating these phenomena (cf. pp. 14–
15), these phenomena do not constitute evidence for Partee’s conjecture. As a result, we only un-
derstand empirical motivations for single-type semantics as illustrations of the empirical appli-
cations of this semantics.
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one type), it cannot associate the di↵erent occurrences of the verbs from (1) to (3)
with distinct types (e.g. with the types he, he, hs, tiii and hhs, ti, he, hs, tiii)19. How-
ever, Montague’s di↵erent type-assignment to proper names (type e) and CPs (ty-
pe hs, ti) would require such an association. As a result, traditional Montague se-
mantics is unable to model at least one of the members of the above sentence pairs.
For example, by assigning the verb remember the type he, he, hs, tiii, Montague se-
mantics would preclude the interpretation of sentences of the form of (1b).20
The ‘disabling’ features of Montague semantics for the modeling of the pairs
of sentences from (1) to (3) are summarized below:
Observation 1.1. In Montague semantics, cf. (Montague, 1970a), both of
the following hold:
(i) Proper names receive an interpretation in the domain of the type e. Sen-
tences and complement phrases receive an interpretation in the domain
of the type hs, ti.
(ii) No two occurrences of an expression receive an interpretation in the do-
mains of di↵erent types.
Single-type semantics solves the problem of accommodating NP/CP complement-
neutral verbs by dropping the assumption of di↵erent type-assignments from Ob-
servation 1.1.i. In particular, by replacing the types e and hs, ti by the basic type o,
this semantics enables the same-type interpretation of proper names and comple-
ment phrases. Since the new type of transitive verbs, ho, ho, oii, will thus allow its
expressions to take a name or a CP as its complement, it enables the interpreta-
tion of both members of the sentence-pairs from (1) to (3).
Syntactic Coordination. The same-type interpretation of proper names and
complement phrases further enables single-type semantics to accommodate coor-
dinate structures with a proper name- and a CP conjunct. Such structures include
the results (in (4)–(6)) of coordinating the complements of the occurrences of the
verbs from (1) to (3).21 In the literature on coordination, these structures are des-
cribed as coordinations of unlike categories, cf. (Sag et al., 1985; Bayer, 1996).
(4) Pat remembered [npBill] and [cpthat he was waiting for her].
(5) Sherlock fears [npMoriarty] and [cpthat Moriarty will destroy him].
19For perspicuity, the type of the complement is underlined.
20One could attempt to obtain the required modeling power by introducing a di↵erent lexical
entry for each occurrence of the verbs from (1) to (3), by assigning the di↵erent entries the ty-
pes he, he, hs, tiii, resp. hhs, ti, he, hs, tiii, and by relating their semantic values through the use of
suitable postulates. Yet, since this strategy is a hard-coded variant of the strategy from flexible
Montague grammar (cf. pp. 14–16) – and since this di↵erentiation of entries is not reflected in
lexicographic research (cf. the OED entry for remember) –, we here ignore this strategy.
21For better visibility, we hereafter italicize coordinating conjunctions.
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(6) The librarian noticed [npMoby Dick ] and [cpthat it was displayed in the
window].
In particular, the unified type for proper names and complement phrases, o, allows
the coordination of expressions of unlike basic categories (i.e. NP and CP) under
the satisfaction of the coordinability requirement from (Montague, 1973), cf.
(Partee and Rooth, 1983). This requirement is stated below:
Coordinability requirement. To allow coordination, linguistic expressi-
ons must receive an interpretation in the domain of the same semantic type.
In traditional Montague semantics, the coordination of expressions of unlike cate-
gories is disabled by the interpretation of proper names and complement phrases
in the domains of di↵erent types (cf. Obs. 1.1.i).
Specification. The advantages of single-type semantics over traditional Mon-
tague semantics are further illustrated by the ability of single-type semantics to
model CP equatives.22 The latter are copular sentences of the form of (7), cf.
(Potts, 2002, pp. 67–68), which equate the referents of the two expressions flank-
ing the copula. In contrast to typical equatives (whose arguments are both noun
phrases; cf. (8)), CP equatives take as arguments an NP and a complement phrase.
(7) a. [npThe problem] is [cpthat Mary hates Bill].
b. [npThe discovery] was [cpthat there exists an eighth planet].
(8) [np1The best singer] is [np2Joan].
The assumption of an NP and a CP argument poses a challenge for the inter-
pretation of CP equatives in traditional Montague semantics. This is due to the
fact that the familiar interpretation of the copula – which demands that the copu-
la’s arguments have the same type (i.e. e), cf. (Heycock and Kroch, 1999) –
does not allow its application to a proposition. But this is required for the mode-
ling of the two sentences from (7). The introduction of an alternative interpreta-
tion of the copula (s.t. it allows pairs of type-hs, ti and type-e arguments) or of a
nominalization function on propositions23 (s.t. the CP argument is also interpre-
ted in the type e) is prevented by Observation 1.1.ii.
The interpretation of referential noun and complement phrases in the single
basic type o enables the interpretation of the two sentences from (7).
The merits of single-type semantics in the modeling of phenomena from lexi-
cal syntax, specification, and coordination are complemented by the ability of this
semantics to model genuinely semantic phenomena.These phenomena include the
interpretation of isolated occurrences of proper names in the semantic type for
22I owe this observation to Chris Potts.
23This function, cf. (Potts, 2002, p. 69, cf. pp. 57–58), sends propositions (type hs, ti) to their
individual correlates (type e).
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sentences, and the identification of the semantic values of names in a given context
with propositions which are denoted by salient sentences in this context.
Nonsentential Speech. Recent research in nonsentential speech, cf. (Carstairs-
McCarthy, 2005; Merchant, 2008), has found that syntactically isolated oc-
currences of proper names in a given context can be interpreted as the result of
applying a contextually salient property to the name’s type-e referent. Thus, the
name Barbara Partee – when uttered as a woman is entering the room – is interpre-
ted as the sentence from (9b) (or (9c)) (Merchant, 2008, pp. 9, 25–26), cf. (Stai-
nton, 2006, p. 6), rather than as the individual Barbara Partee:
(9) Context: A woman is entering the room. A linguist turns to her friend,
gestures towards the door, and says (a).
a. [npBarbara Partee]
b. [npBarbara Partee] is (the woman) entering the room.
c. [npBarbara Partee] is arriving.
Similarly, the expression Rob’s mom – when uttered as Mia is lamenting strawber-
ry chunks in her jam – allows an interpretation as the sentence from (10b) (Mer-
chant, 2008, pp. 9, 25), cf. (Stainton, 2006, p. 113):
(10) Context: Mia is lamenting the strawberry chunks in her jam. Her moth-
er nods understandingly and says (a).
a. [npRob’s mom]
b. [npRob’s mom] is responsible for the strawberry chunks in Mia’s jam.
Since traditional Montague semantics does not interpret proper names in the se-
mantic type for sentences (cf. Obs. 1.1.i), it is unable to model the phenomena
from (9) and (10). Single-type semantics, which assigns the type o to both names
and sentences, enables the accommodation of these phenomena.
But the empirical scope of single-type semantics is not restricted to the sen-
tence-type interpretation of names. The semantics further accommodates the pro-
positional behavior of names, which cannot be modeled in Montague semantics.
The same-type interpretation of proper names and sentences in single-type se-
mantics suggests that names display the semantic behavior of sentences in this se-
mantics: If names receive an interpretation in the same domain as sentences, we
expect that names – like sentences – can be evaluated as true or false with respect
to a given set of contextual parameters, and that they may be related24 by seman-
tic equivalence. This is indeed the case. In particular, in the situation from (9),
the announcement (9a) – when the new arrival is, in fact, Angelika Kratzer – is a
false statement, rather than a mere misidentification (Stainton, 2006, pp. 8–10,
24to other names, or to sentences.
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16), cf. (Carstairs-McCarthy, 2005, p. 151). Similarly, if, in (10), the chunks of
strawberries in Mia’s jam cannot be traced back to Rob’s Mom (be it that Rob’s
Mom did not make the jam, or that Rob sneaked in the strawberry chunks when
she was not watching), the utterance of (10a) in that situation is simply false.
In virtue of their truth- and falsity-conditions, names of the above form will,
in a given situation, be equivalent to all true sentences in this situation which car-
ry information about the names’ type-e referent. For example, if the new arrival in
the above-described situation is indeed Barbara Partee, the utterance of the name
from (9a) will be equivalent to the sentence from (9b) (or (9c)) in that situation.
Similarly, if the cause of the strawberry chunks in Mia’s jam is indeed Rob’s mom,
the utterance of (10a) will be equivalent to the sentence from (10b) in the descri-
bed situation.
The obtaining of semantic equivalence relations between sententially interpre-
ted noun phrases and sentences (or CPs) is supported by the assertion of an equi-
valence relation between the noun and complement phrases in the two sentences
from (7). The obtaining of this relation ensures that the replacement of an NP (or
CP) by its CP- (or NP-)equivalent in the complement of an NP/CP complement-
neutral verb does not change the truth-value of the original sentence. For the argu-
ments of the occurrences of the copula from (7a) and (7b) and the verbs from (3)
and (1), this is demonstrated in (11), respectively (12):
(11) a. Chris noticed [npthe problem].
b. Chris noticed [cpthat Mary hates Bill].
(12) a. The philosopher remembered [npthe discovery].
b. The philosopher remembered [cpthat there exists an eighth planet].
Further support for the obtaining of NP/CP equivalences can be found in Appen-
dix B.2.2.
Our expectations on the semantic behavior of proper names in a single-type
semantics are summarized in Proposition 1.3:
Proposition 1.3 (Assertoric interpretation of names). In a single-type se-
mantics, proper names have truth- (and falsity-)conditions (Prop. 1.3.i), and are
semantically equivalent to some contextually salient sentences (Prop. 1.3.ii).
The above-cited phenomena illustrate the advantages of interpreting natural
language in a single-type semantics (as opposed to traditional Montague seman-
tics). However, the reader is admonished to note that these phenomena can also be
accommodated by dropping the assumption of a functional category/type relati-
on from Observation 1.1.ii (Alternative 1), or by explaining the sentence-type be-
havior of proper names with reference to pragmatics (Alternative 2).25 The first
25I owe this observation to Filip Buekens and Markus Werning.
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alternative (adopted in semantic accounts of nonsentential speech, cf. (Merchant,
2008; Culicover and Jackendo↵, 2005; Dalrymple, 2005)) assumes that
certain occurrences of proper names have a non-standard semantic content, which
results from ‘shifting’ the names’ standard interpretation (type e) to the stan-
dard interpretation of sentences (type hs, ti). The second alternative (adopted in
pragmatic accounts of nonsentential speech, cf. (Stainton, 2006; Borg, 2005))
assumes that certain utterances of names have a non-standard asserted content,
which results from attributing names the illocutionary act of making an assertion.
Alternative 1 follows the approach of flexible Montague grammar, cf. (Partee,
1987; Hendriks, 1990). Alternative 2 is inspired by semantic minimalism, cf.
(Borg, 2004; Cappelen and Lepore, 2005). Since this dissertation limits its
scope to the domain of semantics, we will exclude Alternative 2 from our further
discussion. The possibility of accommodating the phenomena from (1) to (12) in
a flexible Montagovian setting (cf. Alternative 1) is discussed below.
Flexible Montague grammar is a variant of traditional Montague semantics
which associates every linguistic expression with a set of types (rather than with
exactly one type; cf. Obs. 1.1.ii). Di↵erent occurrences of the same expression can
then receive an interpretation in the domains of di↵erent types from this set. For
example, instead of interpreting proper names exclusively in the domain of the ty-
pe e, we can provide their interpretation in the domain of any element from the
set {e; he, hs, tii; hhe, hs, tii, hs, tii}. Instead of interpreting transitive verbs only in
the type he, he, hs, tiii, we can give their interpretation in any member of the set
{he, he, hs, tiii; hhhe, hs, tii, hs, tii, he, hs, tiii; . . .}. These interpretations are obtai-
ned from the lowest-rank type of these expressions (for proper names: from the
type e) via a number of type-shifting rules.
Type-shifting rules enable the accommodation of some linguistic phenomena
which cannot be explained in traditional Montague semantics. In particular, the
e-to-he, hs, tii rule ident – which enables the interpretation of names in the type
for functions from individuals to propositions, he, hs, tii – facilitates the use of pro-
per names as count nouns (in (13); cf. (Zi↵, 1977, p. 326)): Once it has been lif-
ted to the type he, hs, tii, the name Napoleon can combine with the determiner a
(type hhe, hs, tii, hhe, hs, tii, hs, tiii) to form a noun phrase (type hhe, hs, tii, hs, tii).
The hhe, hs, tii, hs, tii-to-he, hs, tii rule Be explains the possibility of combining
NPs (type hhe, hs, tii, hs, tii) with adjective phrases (type he, hs, tii) and of coordi-
nating NPs and adjective phrases in the complement of verbs like consider (in (14),
resp. (15); cf. (Partee, 1987, p. 119)). The latter observations are similar to the
observations from (1) to (3), and from (4) to (6):
(13) He is a [npNapoleon].
(14) a. Mary considers John [apcompetent in semantics].
16 1. INTRODUCTION
b. Mary considers John [npan authority on unicorns].
(15) Mary considers John [apcompetent in semantics] and [npan authority on
unicorns].
The extension of the set of name-interpretations via the type for propositions,
hs, ti, and the introduction of other type26-shifting rules involving propositions
(esp. the introduction of e-to-hs, ti and hs, ti-to-e rules) enable the modeling of the
phenomena from (1) to (12). Since NP/CP complement-neutral verbs and the cop-
ula be can then be shifted to the type hhs, ti, he, hs, tiii, they accommodate the ex-
amples from (1) to (3) and (7) (cf. (4)–(6), (11)–(12)).Merchant (2008) has shown
that the interpretation of proper names in the domain of the type hs, ti further
enables the modeling of the phenomena from (9) and (10).
The possibility of accommodating all of the above phenomena in a small ex-
tension of an existing generalization of traditional Montague semantics suggests
the relative weakness of the presented empirical motivation for single-type seman-
tics.27 In Section 1.4, we will give stronger, methodological, reasons for the adop-
tion of a single-type semantics. However, before we do so, we briefly present for-
mal support for the possibility of a single-type semantics (in Sect. 1.2.2) and iden-
tify the objectives of this dissertation (in Sect. 1.3).
1.2.2. Formal Considerations. Clearly, any motivation for single-type se-
mantics is worthless unless we have a rmed the possibility of constructing single-
type models. Partee (2006) makes a first attempt at undertaking this task. In par-
ticular, to provide formal support for Proposition 1.2, she identifies a prelimina-
ry single-type candidate, i.e. properties of Kratzer-style situations, cf. (Kratzer,
1989), and gives its ad hoc model for a miniature fragment of English. This mo-
del interprets the expressions you, a snake, and see into the single-type objects
JyouK, Ja snakeK, and JseeK, respectively (Partee, 2006, p. 40):
JyouK the property of (being) a minimal situation containing you;
Ja snakeK the property of (being) a snake-containing situation;
JseeK a function from two situation-properties p1 and p2 to a property p3
which holds of a situation s3 if s3 contains two situations, s1 and s2,
with the properties p1, resp. p2, where (sth. in) s1 sees (sth. in) s2.
The above enable the compositional interpretation of the sentence You see a snake:
26Since these rules – like Partee’s rule ident – do not correspond to valid inferences in intuitionis-
tic implicational logic, cf. (Lambek, 1958; van Benthem, 1989), we hereafter describe them
as ‘meaning-shifting rules’. A particular instance of the hs, ti-to-e rule is used in (Potts, 2002).
27However, since it obviates the need for e-to-hs, ti and hs, ti-to-e rules, single-type semantics ac-
commodates these phenomena more directly than an extension of flexible Montague semantics.
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JYou see a snakeK the property of (being) a situation in which you see a/the
snake (which is contained in the situation).
Partee’s model supports a type-neutral interpretation of proper names, sentences,
and complement phrases. At the same time, it suggests a strategy for the model’s
extension to larger PTQ-like fragments. However, the nature of Partee’s paper (a
short Festschrift contribution, cf. (Beck and Gärtner, 2009)) prevents a demo-
nstration of this extension. Further, since Partee’s model is only described infor-
mally, and since it only provides a semantics for a very small (i.e. four-word) frag-
ment, it does not provide compelling support for Proposition 1.2.
1.3. Objective and Overview
This dissertation formalizes and systematically extends Partee’s formal evidence
for Proposition 1.2. In particular, it will develop a single-type semantics for the
PTQ fragment which provides formal support for Partee’s conjecture and which
accommodates the semantic behavior of proper names and sentences from Propo-
sition 1.3. The resulting semantics will unify Montague’s linguistic ontology, and
will yield insight into the apparatus of types in formal semantics.
Our development of a single-type semantics proceeds in correspondence with
the conjectures from the previous section in three steps: In particular, Chapters 3,
7, and 8 will present increasingly complex single-type semantics, which accommo-
date Proposition 1.2, Propositions 1.2 and 1.3.i, and Propositions 1.2, 1.3.i, and
1.3.ii, respectively. As a result, these semantics enable the same-type interpretati-
on, the truth-evaluation, and the identification of equivalent name/sentence pairs
(in that order). The single-type semantics from Chapter 8 serves as the ‘intended’
semantics, which exhibits all desired properties.
The distribution of the presentation of this semantics over di↵erent parts of
the dissertation enables us to identify the challenges of providing a single-type se-
mantics, and allows an incremental introduction of the core semantic notions. The
contribution of the individual chapters to the obtaining of a suitable single-type
semantics is discussed below:
To prime the reader’s intuitions – and to identify a first set of challenges for
the development of a single-type semantics –, Chapter 3 (Part I) provides the sim-
plest possible single-type semantics for the PTQ fragment. This semantics inter-
prets all PTQ expressions into constructions28 out of the primitive single basic ty-
pe o from Section 1.2. Since the type o is neutral between Montague’s types e and
hs, ti, proper names, sentences, and complement phrases will all receive an inter-
pretation in this type. Our o-based semantics accommodates the phenomena from
(1) to (7), and supports Partee’s conjecture (Prop. 1.2). However, because of the
28Such constructions are obtained through the use of the type-forming rule ST.
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primitiveness of the type o, the semantics cannot evaluate the truth or falsity of
proper names and sentences (cf. Prop. 1.3.i). Since it is further unable to identi-
fy a name’s sentential equivalents (cf. (9a), (10a); Prop. 1.3.ii), our o-based seman-
tics disqualifies as a suitable single-type semantics for the PTQ fragment.
The remainder of the dissertation attempts to develop an empirically adequ-
ate single-type semantics which accommodates the observations from Propositi-
on 1.3. To this aim, we identify the type o with a complex (non-primitive) Mon-
tague type. We first identify two suitable Montague types which take the role of
the type o from Part I (in Part II). We then define the single-type semantics which
are associated with these two types (in Part III).
Specifically, to find a Montague type which satisfies Proposition 1.3, Part II
introduces a set of semantic requirements which ensure the type’s suitability as a
single semantic basis for the PTQ fragment. The application of these requirements
to the set of Montague types identifies the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii as suitable sin-
gle-type candidates. These types are associated with propositions and with pro-
positional concepts29, respectively. The strictness of the requirements on a suita-
ble single basic type motivates the claim from Proposition 1.1.
Chapter 7 (Part III) presents the single-type semantics of the type hs, ti. This
semantics commands a notion of truth for basic-type terms (Prop. 1.3.i) and iden-
tifies equivalent name-sentence pairs. The latter is made possible by the characteri-
zation of the single basic type as a construction to the truth-value type t, and by
the particular strategy for the representation of individuals and propositions. This
strategy represents propositions (e.g. ‘Barbara Partee is arriving’) by themselves
(i.e. by the set of indices at which Barbara Partee is arriving), and represents in-
dividuals (e.g. Barbara Partee) by the set of indices in which these individuals ex-
ist. As a result, proper names (e.g. the name Barbara Partee from (9a)) will be equi-
valent to their containing simple existential sentences (i.e. Barbara Partee exists).
However, because of the comparative informational poverty of propositions, our
hs, ti-based semantics still fails to identify a name’s contextually salient equiva-
lents (e.g. the sentence Barbara Partee is arriving from (9c); cf. Prop. 1.3.ii). Con-
sequently, this semantics is also excluded as a ‘good’ single-type semantics for the
PTQ fragment.
The single-type semantics from Chapter 8 (Part III) amends the above defi-
ciencies. In this semantics, Proposition 1.3.ii is accommodated by the adoption of
the basic type hs, hs, tii. Objects of this type represent individuals by functions
from indices w to the set of indices at which the designators of all w-true propo-
sitions which carry information about the individuals are true. Propositions are
represented by functions from indices w to the set of indices at which the propo-
29The name propositional concept has been suggested by Jeroen Groenendijk.
1.4. OTHER MOTIVATIONS FOR PARTEE’S CONJECTURE 19
sitions’ designators and all w-true propositions about the propositions’ type-e ar-
guments are true. In virtue of this representational strategy, it holds that, if the
sentence from (9c) is true at an index, the interpretation of the name Barbara Par-
tee at that index is exactly the interpretation of the sentence from (9c) at the in-
dex, such that the former is equivalent to the latter.
Some of the material of this dissertation is rather technical. To make its cont-
ent as accessible as possible, we have taken care to provide all new definitions with
a detailed informal motivation and explanation (cf. esp. Part II). Each formal cha-
pter contains a prose description of its philosophical issues and implications. Most
proofs have been placed in a separate appendix (Appendix C). Many translations
and definitions of logical PTQ forms have been deferred to Appendix D. Appen-
dix A contains a list of abbreviations, notational conventions, and a glossary. Ap-
pendix B presents Carstairs-McCarthy’s arguments for the formulation of a single-
category syntax, cf. (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999; 2005), and provides further
empirical motivations for Partee’s conjecture.
We close the chapter by presenting methodological, or philosophical, reasons
for the adoption of a single-type semantics. A discussion of the principal percur-
sors of single-type semantics and of alternative approaches to this semantics can
be found in Chapter 9.
1.4. Other Motivations for Partee’s Conjecture
Methodological reasons for the adoption of a single-type semantics include the
complete unification of Montague’s semantic ontology (with the expected consequ-
ences), the identification of new representability relations between di↵erent types
of Montagovian objects, and the provision of formal support for Montague’s origi-
nal type system. We discuss these three motivations in their order of mention.
1.4.1. Unification of Types. The interpretation of natural language in a
single-type semantics enables a complete unification of Montague’s semantic on-
tology:Rather than generating all members of the linguistic zoo from individuals
and propositions (cf. Sect. 1.1.2), we will be able to obtain them from a single ba-
sic type of object.
We expect that the unifying semantics for the PTQ fragment will share the
methodological advantages of other unified theories in science. Clearly, in virtue of
its ontological parsimony, single-type semantics will be simpler and will be cogni-
tively more economical than Montague semantics. However, we also expect that
our single-type semantics will improve upon some of the explanatory power of tra-
ditional Montague semantics. This is due to the fact that, in a single-type sys-
tem, names and sentences will share certain semantic properties. This fact helps
us explain the truth-evaluability of proper names, and the obtaining of semantic
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equivalence relations between names and sentences (Prop. 1.3; cf. (9), (10)).
By its ability to accommodate these phenomena, single-type semantics will
potentially30 further display a higher degree of evidential support than Montague
semantics. This is, in particular, due to the fact that the same-type interpretation
of proper names and sentences e↵ects a larger number of probabilistic dependen-
cy relations between the semantic correlates of phrase structure rules. To prevent
a digression from the central topic of this dissertation, we leave a demonstration of
this fact for another occasion. The higher degree of confirmation of a separately-31
over a Montague-typed semantics is shown in (Liefke and Hartmann, 2011).
This completes our discussion of the unificatory power of single-type seman-
tics. The next section emphasizes the ability of single-type semantics to identify
representability relations between di↵erent types of Montagovian objects. This
ability witnesses a weaker kind of unification.
1.4.2. Relations Between Types. The identification of representational
relations between di↵erent types of objects is one of the most remarkable metho-
dological accomplishments of Montague semantics (cf. Sect. 1.1.2): Since n-th or-
der properties of individuals are modeled as (functions from . . .) functions from
individuals to sets of indices (to . . . sets of indices), they can be used to represent
k-th order properties of individuals for every k  n 2 N. For example, we can thus
represent individuals (type e) by type-he, hs, tii functions from individuals to the
set of indices in which these individuals exist, by type-hhe, hs, tii, hs, tii functions
from properties of individuals to the set of indices at which the individuals have
the relevant property, etc. For the representation of Barbara Partee, the latter are
associated with the property of being B. Partee, resp. of being her properties.
Flexible Montague grammar (cf. Sect. 1.2.1) identifies the specific operations
which send objects of a lower Montague type (in particular, objects of the types e
and he, hs, tii) to their representations in a higher type (i.e. in the types he, hs, tii,
resp. hhe, hs, tii, hs, tii), and vice versa. The domains of some of these operations
are given in Figure 1.2 (next page), cf. (Partee, 1987). In the figure, we mark in-
verse images of type-lifting operations by a dashed line.
The operations ident and lift from Figure 1.2 are the representational opera-
tions from the second-to-last paragraph. Thus, the operation ident sends indivi-
duals to the property of being those individuals. The operation lift sends individu-
als to the property of being a property of those individuals.
30The outcome of this analysis depends on the number of phenomena which cannot be explained
in single-type semantics. For English, some of these phenomena are discussed in Chapter 3.4.
31In a separately-typed semantics, the semantic type system preserves all syntactic distinctions.
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e
ident
lift hhe, hs, tii, hs, tii
he, hs, tii
Figure 1.2. Representational relations between objects of the
types e, he, hs, tii, and hhe, hs, tii, hs, tii.
By identifying a single basic type, and by specifying the particular operations
which send Montagovian individuals and propositions to objects of the single ba-
sic type, single-type semantics extends the set of representational relations from
flexible Montague grammar. For the particular single-type candidates from Chap-
ters 7 and 8 (here, labelled ‘o1’ and ‘o2’), the domains whose elements are connec-
ted by these relations are identified in Figure 1.3. Since we expect that basic sin-
gle-type objects also represent Montagovian propositions, we further add a node
for the type hs, ti. To emphasize the new representational relations, we mark the




hhe, hs, tii, hs, tii
he, hs, tii
Figure 1.3. Relations between objects of the types from Fig-
ure 1.2, propositions, and objects of the two single-type types.
We will introduce specific candidates for the e-to-o1- and e-to-o2-shifting functions
from Figure 1.3 in Chapters 7 and 8, respectively.
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1.4.3. Support for Montague Types. The preceding subsections have gi-
ven the methodological rationale behind our interest in single-type semantics: Sin-
ce single-type semantics will be (ideally) simpler, more unifying, and better con-
firmed than traditional Montague semantics, they will be methodologically prefer-
able over this semantics. But the formulation of a single-type semantics also has
another, more abstract, motivation.32This motivation concerns the identification
of the minimal number of types which are required for the interpretation of the
PTQ fragment: If the formulation of a single-type semantics succeeds without re-
ference to Montagovian typing constraints, we take the semantics to refute the
common classification of the PTQ fragment as a fragment whose interpretation re-
quires a minimum of two semantic types. If the successful formulation of a single-
type semantics relies on Montagovian typing constraints, we conclude that the se-
mantics supports the common classification of the PTQ fragment as a ‘two type’-
fragment. Thus, the formulation of a single-type semantics will produce support
for or against Montague’s original type system.
The small single-type model from (Partee, 2006) provides support for the
Montagovian type system in the above sense. This is due to the fact that Partee’s
descriptions of single-type objects still make reference to Montagovian objects.
Thus, Partee describes the single-type interpretation of the pronoun you as “the
property of a minimal situation containing you” (cf. Sect. 1.2.2). But situations
(esp.minimal situations) and individuals (e.g. the individual denoted by you in the
relevant context) do not qualify as members of Partee’s single-type ontology, wh-
ich consists only of properties of situations. As a result, Partee’s semantics still ge-
nerates support for the Montagovian type system. We will show in Parts II and III
that our single-type semantics generates similar support.
This concludes our methodological considerations about a single-type seman-
tics. We close this chapter by recommending di↵erent orders of reading for di↵e-
rent audiences.
1.5. Intended Audience and Order of Reading
The topic of this dissertation lies at the heart of formal semantics:Montague’s dis-
tinction between individuals and propositions is canonical in every university-
level introduction to compositional semantics.33 The historical predecessor of this
distinction, i.e. Frege’s separation of objects from truth-values, cf. (Frege, 1892),
is discussed in every introduction to the philosophy of language.34 As a result, this
32This section was prompted by discussions with Cleo Condoravdi and Seth Yalcin.
33See the textbooks (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, 2000), (de Swart, 1998), and
(Heim and Kratzer, 1998).
34The discussions in (Lycan, 2008), (Stainton, 1996), and (Martinich and Sosa, 2012)
support this claim.
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thesis will be of interest to formal semanticists, and to philosophers of language
and of linguistics. However, the previous section has already suggested a much wi-
der scope of this work. Thus, it will also engage the attention of linguistically in-
clined philosophers of science, logicians, and theoretical computer scientists.
The present section recommends di↵erent orders of reading for researchers
from these disciplines. This is suggested by their di↵erent background knowledge,
and by their interests in distinct aspects of the presented theory. For example,
while all formal semanticists, most theoretical computer scientists, and many phi-
losophers of linguistics will be familiar with the foundations and applications of
Montague semantics, some philosophers of language and many philosophers of sci-
ence may not (fully) command this knowledge. Further, while members of the for-
mer group will have a great interest in the details of the proposed semantics and in
its use in the interpretation of a regimented fragment of English, members of the
latter group will be primarily interested in the philosophical motivation of the pre-
sented theory, and in its general methodological consequences.
The alternative orders of reading for each these audiences are given in Fig-
ure 1.4 (next page). In the figure, unbroken arrows indicate the recommended or-
der of reading for formal semanticists, logicians, and computer scientists. Dotted
and dashed arrows suggest the order of reading for philosophers of science, and
for philosophers of linguistics and of language, respectively. Philosophical (sub-)
chapters are represented by light grey boxes. Formal (sub-)chapters are indicated
by white boxes.
The introduction to Montague semantics from Chapter 1.1 will be of special
interest to philosophers of science, and (depending on their background) to philo-
sophers of linguistics and language, logicians, and computer scientists. It distin-
guishes itself from existing survey articles on the subject35 in its focus on the foun-
dations of Montague’s formal semantics. In virtue of the latter, the chapter will
serve as a point of reference for many discussions in this dissertation.
The formal chapters from Parts I and III will be of special interest to formal
semanticists, logicians, and computer scientists. On the basis of Chapter 1, philo-
sophers of science, of linguistics, and of language can proceed directly to the in-
formal chapters from Part II. Philosophers of linguistics and language will further
be able to jump to the philosophically significant parts of the logical Chapters 2
and 6, and the linguistic Chapters 3, 7, and 8. The conclusion combines all as-
pects of this work.
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Figure 1.4. Alternative orders of reading.
1.6. Sources of Chapters
Part I is based on:
Liefke, Kristina. 2013a. “A Single-Type Logic for Natural Language.” In
Journal of Logic and Computation, special issue for CiE 2010, edited by
Alessandra Carbone, Fernando Ferreira, Benedikt Löwe, and Elvira Ma-
yordomo. [Online first since 01-2013; printed version forthcoming]. http://
logcom.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/01/23/logcom.exs074.
short.
Chapter 4 is based on:
Liefke,Kristina. 2013b. “A Single-Type Ontology for Natural Language.”
In Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des
Achten Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Phi-
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Chapter 7 is based on:
Liefke, Kristina. Forthcoming. “A Single-Type Semantics for the PTQ?-
Fragment.” Accepted for publication in Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeu-
tung 18, edited by Anamaria Fălăuş et al. Semanticsarchive.
Some of the ideas behind Chapter 1.4.1 are developed in:
Liefke, Kristina, and Stephan Hartmann. 2011. “Integrative Reduction,
Confirmation, and the Syntax-Semantics Map” (Manuscript, Tilburg







This part of the dissertation presents the simplest possible single-type semantics
in the sense of Proposition 1.2. This semantics is a theory of meaning for natural
language which interprets sentences, proper names, and complement phrases in
the same unstructured, or ‘pure’, semantic type. All objects in this semantics are
obtained from basic-type objects via a variant of the type-forming rule ST. The
semantics interprets all logical forms from Montague’s PTQ fragment. Further, it
enables the interpretation of NP/CP complement-neutral verbs, name/CP coor-
dinations, and CP equatives. However, as a result of the primitiveness of the sin-
gle basic type, the semantics cannot evaluate the truth or falsity of proper names
and sentences (cf. Prop. 1.3.i), and is unable to identify a name’s sentential equiva-
lents (cf. Prop. 1.3.ii).
To provide the described single-type semantics for the PTQ fragment, we use
Montague’s method of indirect interpretation (cf. Fig. 1.1), which proceeds via the
compositional translation of logical PTQ forms into the language of the simplest
single-type logic, TY0. The plan for this part is then as follows: Chapter 2 presents
a general class of languages and models for the logic TY0 (cf. step 2). Chapter 3
identifies a designated TY0 language and model (cf. step 2), provides a theory of
syntax for the PTQ fragment (cf. step 1), and gives a set of rules for the TY0 tra-
nslation of logical PTQ forms (cf. step 3). The semantic values of these forms are
then obtained via the model-theoretic interpretation of their TY0 translations.

CHAPTER 2
The ‘Pure’ Single-Type Logic TY0
We begin by defining the simplest single-type logic TY0. The latter is a type theo-
ry in the spirit of (Henkin, 1963), cf. (Church, 1940), whose basic type unifi-
es Montague’s types for individuals and propositions. The formulation of this lo-
gic identifies the challenges for the definition of a single-type logic, and displays its
particular syntactic and semantic properties. The chapter is organized as follows:
Section 2.1 specifies the types and terms of the logic TY0. Section 2.2 defines a cla-
ss of general models for the logic TY0, which provide a semantics for TY0 terms.
Section 2.3 discusses the role of metatheory in the formulation of this semantics.
Section 2.4 defines the metatheoretical relation of entailment on basic-type TY0
terms, characterizes its proof-theoretic correlate via a sound Gentzen-style sequ-
ent calculus, and proves the generalized completeness of this calculus via a Model
Existence theorem. To close, we present di↵erent strategies for providing a TY0
truth-definition (in Sect. 2.5).
We begin by defining the types and terms of the logic TY0.
2.1. Types and Terms
The logic TY0 has one basic type, o. For lack of a better name, we refer to objects
of this type as primitive entities (or entities)1. Our choice of this name is motiva-
ted by the description of entities as the most general kind of object which subsu-
mes individuals and propositions, cf. (Chierchia and Turner, 1988; Zae↵erer,
2007; Niles and Pease, 2001)2, and by the neutrality of type-o objects betwe-
en objects of these two types, cf. (Partee, 2006). Since entities cannot be obtai-
ned from objects of a non-TY0 type (e.g. a Montague type) through the applica-
tion of the type-forming rules CT or IT, we call the logic TY0 a ‘pure’ single-type
logic. Di↵erent proposals as to the identity of primitive entities will be discussed
in Chapter 4 (Part II), and in Part III.
1I thank Markus Werning and Dietmar Zae↵erer for suggesting this name.
2In (Zae↵erer, 2007), Montagovian individuals are called ‘inventities’ (for ‘inventory entities’
[of a situation]). In (Chierchia and Turner, 1988), propositions and individuals are named
‘information units’ and ‘urelements’ (or ‘the di↵erence between urelements and information
units’), respectively.
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From the type for entities, o, the types of the logic TY0 are obtained via an
n-ary variant of the type-forming rule ST from Chapter 1.2 as follows:
Definition 2.1.1 (TY0 types). The set 0Type of TY0 types is the smallest set
of strings s.t., for 0  n 2 N, if ↵1, . . . ,↵n 2 0Type, then (↵1 ⇥ · · · ⇥ ↵n) ! o 2
0Type.
Types of the form (↵1 ⇥ · · ·⇥ ↵n) ! o are associated with functions from n-tu-
ples of objects of the types ↵1, . . . ,↵n to primitive entities. Such types are correla-
tes of ST types of the form h↵1, h. . . , h↵n, oiii. As a result, the single-type types
ho, oi, ho, ho, oii, and hho, oi, oi from Chapter 1.2 will be replaced by the TY0 ty-
pes o ! o, (o⇥o) ! o, and (o ! o) ! o, respectively. These types are associated
with functions from entities to entities, with functions from ordered pairs of enti-
ties to entities, and with functions from (functions from entities to entities) to en-
tities.
Our use of the type-forming rule from Definition 2.1.1 is motivated by the fact
that this rule obviates the ‘currying’ of multi-argument functions to unary functi-
ons of a higher type. As a result, this rule yields a simpler single-type semantics.3
Our use of n-ary functional types follows the practice of (Montague, 1970a),
(Orey, 1959), and (Tichý, 1982). Following Tichý, we write (↵1⇥· · ·⇥↵n) ! o
as (↵1 . . .↵n; o), and identify the type (o) with o. We will hereafter call o the basic
(base, or ground) type of the logic TY0, and refer to TY0 types of the form (↵1 . . .
↵
n
; o) where n   1 as complex (or derived) types.
This completes our specification of the TY0 type system. We next define a
class of languages for the presented system.
A language L for the logic TY0 is a countable set [↵20TypeL↵ of uniquely ty-
ped non-logical constants. These include a constant for the absurd (impossible, or
maximal) entity, ,? (cf. Veltman’s (1985) improper fact). For every TY0 type ↵,
we further assume a countable set V
↵
of uniquely typed variables, with ‘[
↵20TypeV↵’
abbreviated as ‘V’. From these basic expressions, we form complex terms induc-
tively with the help of functional application, lambda abstraction, and the non-
logical constant ).= .
Definition 2.1.2 (TY0 terms). Let ↵1, . . . ,↵n,  2 0Type. The set T↵ of







, ,? 2 T
o
;
(ii) If B 2 T( ↵1...↵n;o) and A 2 T  , then (B(A)) 2 T(↵1...↵n;o);
(iii) If A 2 T(↵1...↵n;o) and x 2 V  , then ( x.A) 2 T( ↵1...↵n;o);
(iv) If B,C 2 T
↵1 , then (B ).= C) 2 To.
3For a discussion of the advantages of n-ary functional or relational type logics, the reader is re-
ferred to (Muskens, 1989) and (van Benthem and Doets, 2001).
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as TY0 terms. Clauses (ii) and (iii)
identify the results of functional application and lambda abstraction as TY0 ter-
ms. In particular, the application of a type-( ↵1 . . .↵n; o) termB to a type-  term
A yields the designator, (B(A)) (type (↵1 . . .↵n; o)), of the result of applying the
function denoted by B to the referent of A. Abstraction over the type-  argument
of a type-(↵1 . . .↵n; o) termA yields the designator, ( x.A) (type ( ↵1 . . .↵n; o)),
of a function whose application to some type-  argument d returns the value of A
with x interpreted as d.4 In particular, clause (ii) asserts the possibility of forming
entity-designators (e.g. the term (walk (bill ))) out of the designators of primitive
entities (here, bill ) and functions from entities to entities (here, walk).
Since we do not identify the entity type o with a particular Montague type
(s.t. the logic TY0 will, in particular, not have a designated type, t, for truth-va-
lues), the familiar logical constants for falsum (?, type t) and logical implication
(), type (↵1↵1; t)) are not available in the logic TY0. The non-logical constants
,? and ).= from clauses (i) and (iv) serve as their single-type stand-ins.5 In Sec-
tion 2.2.2, we will introduce a set of meta-level axioms which ensure that ,? and
).= display the same semantic behavior as the logical constants ? and ).
Since we only stipulate that ↵1 2 0Type, clause (iv) describes ).= as a non-uni-
quely typed constant, which applies to pairs of arguments of all TY0 types. As a
result, it appears that the logic TY0 is a variant of the polymorphically typed lam-
bda calculus. To avoid the extension of the TY0 type system by polymorphic ty-
pes, cf. (Girard, 1972; Reynolds, 1974) – and the attendant introduction of ex-
plicit quantification over type variables –, we assume a schematic (or abbreviato-
ry) polymorphism of types. The latter is a syntactic device whereby a metatheore-
tical symbol is used to abbreviate a range of (monomorphic) types. Thus, in (iv),
the type variable ↵1 may be instantiated by any of the elements in 0Type. The
constant ).= then represents a family, {).= (↵↵;o) | ↵ 2 0Type}, of distinct identical-
looking constants, one for each type.6
From ,? and ).= , single-type stand-ins of other truth-functional connectives
and quantifiers are easily obtained. In particular, the TY0 proxies for the constan-
ts >, 8,=,¬,^, and 2 (i.e. ,> ,V, .=, ⇠, .̂ , and 2· ) are obtained by variants of the
definitions from (Henkin, 1950).7 Below, we let x, y (orA),X (B,C ), andY be
variables (resp. constants) of the type ↵, (↵; o), resp. ((↵; o); o), where ↵ 2 0Type:
4Particular rules for the behavior of lambda abstracts will be given in Section 2.4.
5Thomason (1980) and Fox and Lappin (2004) use a similar strategy for the introduction of hy-
perintensional propositional connectives. However, in their logics, the availability of truth-func-
tional connectives enables the formulation of semantic constraints connecting the former with
the latter.
6A polymorphic single-type semantics will be sketched in Chapter 9.5.2.
7We will justify the definitions of these constants in Chapter 7.2.2 (cf. Nota. 7.2.1 and (7.2.1)).
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Notation 2.1.1. We write




























C ) for ⇠(⇠B .̂ ⇠C )




= ,? .̂(x ).= A) 
The single-type stand-ins, 6 .=, !· , $· , W, and 3· , of the familiar symbols for ine-
quality, material implication and biimplication, the existential quantifier, and the
modal diamond operator have their expected definitions.
In the above, the letter ‘L’ ranges over TY0 languages. In Chapter 3, we will
introduce its calligraphic version, ‘L’, as the designator of the particular TY0 lan-
guage which translates Logical Form-constituents of the PTQ fragment.
For notational convenience, we will sometimes subscript TY0 terms by their
logical type. Thus, ‘A
↵
’ indicates thatA is a TY0 term of the type ↵. We take bi-
nary connectives to dominate over unary connectives8, and adopt the usual con-
ventions regarding binding, freedom, and closure. Substitution is defined as usual:




↵20TypeT↵ which sends TY0 variables to same-type TY0 terms. We denote sub-





and y to y (where y /2 {x
i
, . . . ,x
n
}) is written as
{x1 := A1, . . . ,xn := An}.
In the definition of substitution, the symbols = and 6= are metalanguage connec-
tives. As a result, expressions of the form y = x or y 6= x do not qualify as terms
of the logic TY0. The metatheory of TY0 will be sketched in Section 2.3.
This completes our specification of TY0 types and terms. We next turn to the
presentation of TY0 semantics.
2.2. Models
To provide the logic TY0 with a semantics, we first define a class of models which
enable the interpretation of all TY0 terms from Definition 2.1.2 and Notation 2.1.1
(in Sect. 2.2.1). To ensure that the designated TY0 constants ,? , ).= , etc. behave
as advertised, we then impose several constraints on these models (in Sect. 2.2.2).
8Thus, we read the term ⇠A .̂ B as (⇠A .̂ B), and not as ⇠(A .̂ B).
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2.2.1. General Models. A general model for the logic TY0 consists of a
general TY0 frame F , an interpretation function IF for F , and a variable assign-
ment g
F
. In particular, general frames F are defined as hierarchies of typed TY0
domains, where O is the set of primitive entities (type o):
Definition 2.2.1 (General TY0 frames). A general frame for the logic TY0
is a set F = {D
↵
|↵ 2 0Type} of pairwise disjoint non-empty sets such that
D(↵1...↵n;o) ✓ {f | f : (D↵1 ⇥ · · ·⇥D↵n) ! O} for all TY0 types (↵1 . . .↵n; o).
Above, the letter ‘F ’ ranges over general TY0 frames. We will later introduce
the letter ‘F ’ as the designator of the particular TY0 frame whose elements are
associated with the TY0 interpretations of logical forms from the PTQ fragment.
In line with our description of the type o, we call the set O the basic (base, or
ground) domain of the logic TY0. SetsD(↵1...↵n;o) where n   1 will be called com-
plex (or derived) domains. We identify O with the union of the set of possible en-
tities and the absurd entity. The absurd entity is the value of the TY0 constant ,? .
Possible entities are the values of the constants in the set L
o
\ {,? }. The set of pos-
sible entities includes the trivial (necessary, or minimal) entity, which is denoted
by the TY0 constant ,> .
To ensure the recursive axiomatizability of the entailment relation – and the
attendant completeness of the logic TY0 –, we associate complex TY0 domains
with subsets of function spaces.We call a frame general if every setD(↵1...↵n;o) is a
subset of its associated function space. Our use of general frames follows the stra-
tegy from (Henkin, 1950).
The relation between TY0 terms in the language L and their associated ob-
jects in a TY0 frame F is established by means of an interpretation function IF




are defined as follows:
Definition 2.2.2 (TY0 Interpretation). An interpretation function IF : L !
F for a TY0 language L and frame F assigns to each non-logical constant c↵ a









: V ! F are analogously defined.Given an object d 2 D
↵
and variables x,y 2 V
↵
, we define the assigment g
F







(y) if x 6= y. The set of all assignments g
F
with respect to
a given TY0 frame F is denoted by ‘GF ’.
In Definition 2.2.2, the letter ‘I
F
’ ranges over TY0 interpretation functions.
We will later associate ‘IF ’ with the particular function which sends constants in
the language L to their semantic values in the designated TY0 frame F .
The value, I(c ) (or g(x)), of a TY0 term c (resp. x) is called the object deno-
ted by c (or x). Depending on their type, we distinguish two di↵erent kinds of sin-
gle-type objects: entities (type o) and properties of (or relations between) entities
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(type (↵1 . . .↵n; o), with n   1). In Chapter 3, entities will serve as the interpre-
tations of proper names, sentences, and complement phrases. Entity properties
will serve as the interpretations of logical forms of expressions from the remaining
syntactic categories.
The above considerations have prepared the definition of general TY0 models.
However, before we can attend to this task, we first need to specify a way of con-
verting n-ary functions into unary functions. This is required by the polyadic cha-
racter of our TY0 type-forming rule (cf. Def. 2.1.1), and the resulting restriction of
TY0 functions of the type (↵1 . . .↵n; o) to n-tuples of suitably typed arguments.
Slice functions, cf. (Muskens, 1995), allow the application of n-ary functions
to a single argument. To facilitate their definition, we represent n-ary functions in
the domain of the type (↵1 . . .↵n; o) via sets of ordered n+ 1-tuples of the form
hd1, . . . , dn, dn+1i, where di 2 D↵i for each i 2 N, and where dn+1 2 O.
Let f be a function of the type (↵1 . . .↵n; o) and let 1  k  n 2 N. Slice func-
tions code n-ary functions into unary functions of a higher type as follows:
Definition 2.2.3 (Slice functions). The k-th slice function S k
f
of the func-
tion f applies to members of the set D
↵k to yield n  1-ary functions in the do-
main of the type (↵1 . . .↵k 1 ↵k+1 . . .↵n; o).




object d fixes the k-th




 hd1, . . . , dk 1, dk+1, . . . , dn, dn+1i |(2.2.1)
S k
f
(d) = f(d1, . . . , dk 1, d, dk+1, . . . , dn) = dn+1
 
On the basis of the above, we can then define general TY0 models as follows:







i, consisting of a general TY0 frame F , an interpretation
function I
F













and non-logical term A
↵
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In the above, clause (i) summarizes the characterization of the interpretation and
assignment functions from Definition 2.2.2. Since we have identified the single-ty-
pe stand-ins for falsum and logical implication as members of L, the first item of
clause (i) also defines the results of applying V
F
to the pairs hg
F
,,? i and hg
F
, ).= i.
Clauses (ii) and (iii) define the interpretation of application and lambda abstrac-
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tion. In particular, the function V
F
interprets abstraction over the type-  argu-
ment of the term A from Definition 2.1.2.iii as the function whose application to
some object d 2 D
 
yields the type-(↵1 . . .↵n; o) object VF (gF [d/x],A). To en-





,A) (rather than to an ordered n-tuple of objects of the types  ,↵1,
. . . ,↵
n
), the interpretation of the term B(A) from Definition 2.1.2.ii uses the first





This completes our discussion of general models for the logic TY0. To ensure
that the designated single-type constants from Definition 2.1.2 and Notation 2.1.1
emulate the semantic behavior of their associated connectives and quantifiers, we
next introduce a set of non-logical meta-level axioms for these constants.
2.2.2. Constraints on Models. Axioms Ax1 to Ax9 (below) refer to pre-
dicate-logical formulas (in particular, to formulas of the TY0 metatheory; cf. Sect.
2.3). In the axioms, A, B, andC are TY0 terms of the same suitable type. We as-
sume that X is a set of type-identical TY0 terms.
Ax1. (A .̂ A) = A, and (A
.̂
A) = A














Ax4. (A .̂ (A
.̂
B)) = A, and (A
.̂
(A .̂ B)) = A
Ax5. (A .̂ (B
.̂
C )) = ((A .̂ B)
.̂
(A .̂ C )), and
Ax5. (A
.̂






















Ax8. ⇠⇠A = A
Ax9. ⇠,? = ,> , and ⇠,> = ,?
The above axioms induce on the set of entities the behavior of a complete De Mor-
gan algebra. In particular, since we have defined the constants .̂ and
.̂
from the
primitive constants ).= and ,? (cf. Nota. 2.1.1), axioms Ax1 to Ax4 attribute to
the TY0 proxy for logical implication, ).= , the properties of a partial ordering.Axi-
oms Ax6 and Ax9 make ,> and ,? behave like the algebra’s top and bottom ele-
ments. Axioms Ax5, Ax7, and Ax8 characterize the single-type proxy for nega-
tion as De Morgan involution.
Our characterization of the set of entities as a complete De Morgan algebra
will later be motivated by our semantic analysis of the type o from Chapter 4 (Pa-
rt II), and by the algebraic properties of the single-type logics from Part III. How-
ever, since we associate entities with the semantic values of sentences, we can pro-
vide many of the above axioms with an independent rationale.
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In particular, the obtaining of Ax1 through Ax4 is warranted by the need to
capture entailment relations between natural language sentences in a TY0 seman-
tics: A competent speaker of a language can judge, for any two sentences S and
S
0, whether S entails S0, whether S0 entails S, or whether S and S0 fail to be con-
nected by entailment. These relations hold if S contains at least the semantic con-
tent of S0 (s.t. S is the result of combining the content of S0 with the content of
some other sentence), if S contains at most the semantic content of S0 (s.t. S is the
result of joining the content of S0 with the content of some other sentence), and
if neither S nor S0 contains the semantic content of S0, resp.S.
To enable the formal modeling of linguistic entailment, we assume that enti-
ties are also ordered with respect to their semantic content. We identify the trivial
entity and the absurd entity with the semantically ‘poorest’ and the semantically
‘richest’ (or contradictory) element in this ordering, respectively (Ax6). The con-
tradictoriness of the absurd entity is understood as the result of combining ‘too
much’ (eventually conflicting) semantic content. We interpret (A ).= B) as asser-
ting that the entity denoted by A contains the semantic content of the entity de-
noted by B. Correspondingly, we let (A .̂ B) denote the poorest entity which con-
tains the content of bothA and B, and let (A
.̂
B) denote the richest entity which
contains the content of A or B.










Figure 2.1. An entity algebra.
Notably, the semantic meet- and join-operations .̂ and
.̂
are not exhaustively
defined by axioms Ax1 to Ax4. Their behavior is further governed by the laws of
Distributivity (Ax5) and of Top and Bottom (Ax6). AxiomAx6 follows trivially
from the existence of a semantically poorest (,> ) and a richest entity (,? ). The
distributivity of O holds since, intuitively, none of its subalgebras is a pentagon
or a diamond (i.e. a set with one of the structures from Fig. 2.2, next page).
However, the resulting description of the set of entities is still not rich enough
for our purposes. It remains to characterize the behavior of TY0 negation. This
























Figure 2.2. A pentagon (left) and a diamond (right).
Complementation of entities corresponds to the algebra’s 180-degree turn,
such that the algebra’s top and bottom elements will be represented by the ab-
surd, respectively by the trivial entity (Ax9). For reasons having to do with our
particular semantic analysis of entities (cf. Part II, Ch. 4), we do not adopt axi-
oms for consistency ((A .̂ ⇠A) = ,? ) or Excluded Middle ((A .̂⇠A) = ,> ; ab-
breviated ‘LEM’). To obtain a weaker notion of complementation, we replace the-
se two axioms by the De Morgan laws (here, the complete De Morgan laws; Ax7)
and the law of Double Negation (Ax8). The completeness of the entity algebra is
reflected in the possibility of interpreting the conjunction and disjunction of any
pair of natural language sentences. The uniqueness of negation is ensured by the
distributivity of semantic meet and join (Ax5).
This completes our motivation of the non-logical axioms for the TY0 const-
ants .̂ ,
.̂
, ⇠, ,> , and ,? . Their use in the definitions of the constants .=, !· , $· ,V
,
W
, 2· , and 3· (cf. Nota. 2.1.1) also constrains the behavior of these constants.
Since we have identified the type o as the only basic type of the logic TY0,
and since we have defined TY0 types as constructions to the type o (Def. 2.1.1), we
know that all TY0 domains inherit the algebraic structure on the set of entities.
This observation is captured below:
Theorem 2.1. Every TY0 domain is a complete De Morgan algebra.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the one in (Landman, 1991, p. 285–287).
On the basis of the above, we identify TY0 models with algebraic (or De Morgan)
models. These models are defined as follows:
Definition 2.2.5 (Algebraic TY0 models). An algebraic model (or aDe Mor-
gan model) for the logic TY0 is a general model MF for TY0 where every domain
in the frame F is the carrier of a complete De Morgan algebra.
This ends our discussion of the constraints on TY0 models. In Section 2.4, we will
provide a definition of TY0 entailment. However, before we do so, we briefly note
a di culty regarding the truth-evaluation of basic TY0 terms, and emphasize the
role of metatheory in the provision of a TY0 semantics. Di↵erent strategies for the
provision of a TY0 truth-definition will be presented in Section 2.5.
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2.3. The Role of Metatheory
We have seen in Section 2.1 that the familiar truth-functional connectives and qu-
antifiers are not available in the logic TY0. To compensate for this shortcoming,
we have introduced a set of designated non-logical TY0 constants (in Def. 2.1.2,
Nota. 2.1.1), and have enforced their desired behavior through the use of non-lo-
gical axioms (in Sect. 2.2.2).
Since the logic TY0 lacks a type for truth-values
9 – such that TY0 terms defy
an easy truth-evaluation – we are unable to constrain the set of TY0 models in the
object theory. We solve this problem by constraining the set instead in the logic’s
metatheory. The metatheoretical characterization of logical models is quite com-
mon: see (Smith, 1984; Turner, 1992; Fox and Lappin, 2004). For the par-
ticular case of the logic TY0, this method involves the formulation of a set of axi-
oms which restrict the class of TY0 models to models satisfying these axioms in
the metatheory. We identify this theory with an extension of the logic TY0 via the
type for truth-values t.10 As a result, models of this logic can reference concepts
(like truth and entailment), which are not available in the TY0 object theory.
For the present purposes, we need not worry about the particular properties of
the TY0 metatheory. It su ces to know that the behavior of the designated TY0
constants ,? , ).= , etc. will be preserved in this theory. Following the specification
of the semantic content of entities (cf. Ch. 4, Part II), we will give a detailed pre-
sentation of our single-type metatheory in Chapter 6 (Part III).
On the basis of the above, we can pursue our definition of TY0 semantics.
2.4. Entailment and Proof Theory
The De Morgan algebra on the set of entities induces an entailment structure on
TY0 domains. However, since entailment is a relation of the type (↵↵; t) (where
↵ 2 0Type), the notions of TY0 entailment and equivalence require a definition in
the TY0 metatheory. Specifically, TY0 entailment is defined through the partial
ordering, ✓, on TY0 domains as follows:
Definition 2.4.1 (TY0 entailment). A set of TY0 terms   = {  |   2 To} en-
tails a set of TY0 terms   = {  |   2 To} in the TY0 metatheory, i.e.   |=g  , if,



















9This holds unless o := t, which we will exclude in Part II, Chapter 4.2.2.
10As a result, the TY0 metatheory will be an n-ary variant of Church’s Simple Theory of Types,
where the type for propositions is interpreted as t, and where the type for individuals, ◆, is re-
placed by our type o. Types of this logic then have the form (↵1 . . .↵n; o) or (↵1 . . .↵n; t). The
logic’s language and models are defined in analogy to the relevant concepts of the object theory.
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According to Definition 2.4.1, the set   entails   i↵ the combination of the sem-
antic values of all terms in the set   is included in the union of the values of all
terms in the set   under the ordering ✓.
The easy definability of TY0 entailment (vis-à-vis truth) supports Partee’s
observation about the centrality of entailment relations in single-type semantics,
cf. (Partee, 2006, p. 40).
Definition 2.4.1 enables the definition of TY0 equivalence in terms of mutual
entailment:
Definition 2.4.2 (TY0 equivalence). A TY0 term Ao is equivalent to a TY0
term B
o
in the metatheory, i.e. |=
g
A = B, if A |=
g
B and B |=
g
A with respect
to all general TY0 models and assignments.
In the above definition, the collapse of mutual equivalence to semantic (metathe-
oretical) identity is warranted by the antisymmetry of the relation ✓.
In the above, the subscript ‘g’ of the entailment relation refers to the genera-
lity of TY0 models (cf. Def. 2.2.4) and the attendant recursive axiomatizability of
the metalogical entailment relation. We call a TY0 term   g-valid if |=g   in the
metatheory with respect to every general TY0 model and assignment.
To enable a proof-theoretic characterization of TY0 entailment, we use the
symbol for metalogical implication, ). Its use enables the formulation of the fol-









are sets of basic TY0 terms:
Theorem 2.2 (Deduction theorem for TY0). The set   entails the set   if






Proof. The proof, which proceeds inside the TY0 metatheory, is standard.
An expression which asserts the deducibility of a set of conclusions from a set of
premises is called a sequent. We characterize the proof-theoretic correlate, ), of
|=
g





are sets of basic-type terms for all i 2 {1, . . . , n+ 1}.
(2.4.1)
 1 )  1 . . . n )  n
 
n+1 )  n+1
The fraction notation in (2.4.1) is interpreted as a conditional. Thus, the sequents
 1 )  1, . . . , n )  n are the antecedent conditions of the sequent rule in (2.4.1);
the sequent  
n+1 )  n+1 is the consequent of this rule. If n = 0, the set of a rule’s
conditions is called empty, and the relevant rule axiomatic. In Table 2.1 (next pa-
ge), R is an axiomatic rule.
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We next provide some terminology: A sequent   )   is TY0-provable, i.e.
  `TY0 , if there are finite sets  0 and  0, with  0 ✓   and  0 ✓  , such that
 0 is deducible from  0, where  0 is a sequent rule or follows by a rule from a
term occurring earlier in the proof.
A TY0 model MF for the language L refutes a sequent   )   of L if |=g  
for all   2   and 6|=
g
  for all   2   in M
F
. A sequent is g-valid if it is not re-
futed by any model. (Barendregt and Barendsen, 2000)
For convenience, we will often drop the ‘TY0’-subscript of the provability re-
lation and brackets ‘{’ , ‘}’. We abbreviate sets of TY0 terms by capital Greek let-
ters, and let A,B,C, and x be TY0 constants, resp. a TY0 variable of suitable
type. Table 2.1 provides the structural rules for the logic TY0:
R
A ) A









Table 2.1. Structural rules for TY0.




=, ⇠, .̂ , 2· , and 3· are
given in Table 2.2 (next page).
Notably, the logic TY0 behaves ‘rather’ classically. Its only di↵erence with re-
spect to classical type theory (Church, 1940), cf. (Henkin, 1950; Gallin, 1975),
regards the unavailability of the left introduction rule for Boolean negation (in






To provide a suitable syntactic characterization of the relation of logical consequ-
ence, we replace the rule from (2.4.2) by the weaker pair of rules ⇠L and ⇠R from
Table 2.2. These rules are variants of the negation rules from (Blamey, 1986).
The rules ext,  L, and  R assert the identity of semantically indiscernible ob-
jects (Extensionality) and the substitutability of  ⌘-equivalent TY0 terms. From
the rules  L and  R, we can derive the usual rules of lambda conversion:
↵
 x.A )  y.A{x := y}
if y is free for x in A
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 
( x.A)(B) ) A{x := B} ⌘ x.A(x) ) A
if x is free for B in A if x is not free in A.
The rules ↵,  , and ⌘ allow the renaming of bound variables (here, the renaming of
x as ‘y’), functional application (here, the application of ( x.A) toB), and the id-
entification of co-extensional functions, respectively. In particular,  -conversion
enables the substitution of all free occurrences of a variable in a formula with a sui-
tably typed argument (here, the replacement of ‘x’ by ‘B’ in A). ⌘-conversion en-
ables the replacement of  x.A(x) by A whenever x does not occur free in A.11
11For an introduction to the lambda calculus, the reader is referred to (Barendregt and Bar-
endsen, 2000), (Hindley and Seldin, 2008), and the interactive (Barker, 2014).
,? L
 ,,? )  
 ,A )  ,B ).= R
  )  , (A ).= B)





  )  ,A {x := c} V
R
  )  , (Vx.A)
where c is fresh
 , ,A
.





= B ) C {x := B}
.
= R
  )  ,A .= A
⇠  )   ⇠L⇠  )  
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.̂ R
  )  , (A .̂ B)
D
 ,2· A )  ,3· A
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x.A (x)$· B (x)  ) A .= B
if x is not free in A or B
Table 2.2. Logical rules for TY0.
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By the rule of ↵-conversion, the term  z u.find (z,u) (where find is a type-
(o o; o) constant, and where z and u are basic-type variables) will denote the same




.find (y,x). By  -conversion, the result, x
o
.find (bill,




.find (y,x) to the type-o constant bill will be




.find (y,x)(bill).12 The rule of ⌘-con-





Our translation of logical PTQ forms into TY0 terms (in Chapter 3) will em-
ploy a large number of  -conversions. In that chapter, we will often use ↵-conver-
sion to avoid the obtaining of non-equivalent TY0 terms by ‘variable collision’. For
example, to avoid obtaining the term  x.find (x,x) from the application of the
predicate  y x.find (y,x) to the argument x (s.t. the lambda operator now wro-
ngfully binds two variables), we rename the bound variable x in  y x.find (y,x)
as ‘z’. Subsequently, we will not use the TY0 term  y x.find (y,x), but its alpha-
betic variant  y z.find (y, z). The application of this variant to the argument x
then yields the ‘correct’ term  z.find (x, z).
In virtue of the above and of Notation 2.1.1, the sequent rules for ,> and 6 .=,
and for
.̂
, !· , $· , and W are easily derivable (cf. Appendix C.1). The De Mor-
gan laws (DM1, DM2), the rules of Double Negation (DNI, DNE), and the rule of
Contraposition (CP) are also derivable. These rules are listed in Table 2.3:
  )  , (⇠A .̂⇠B)
DM1
  )  ,⇠(A .̂ B)
  )  , (⇠A .̂ ⇠B)
DM2
  )  ,⇠(A .̂B)
DNI
A ) ⇠⇠A DNE⇠⇠A ) A
  )  
CP⇠  ) ⇠ 
Table 2.3. Some derived rules for TY0.
We close this section by identifying some meta-mathematical properties of the
logic TY0. These properties include the soundness of the presented sequent cal-
culus. This property is stated in Theorem 2.3:




Proof. The proof is included in Appendix C.2.
We prove the generalized completeness of the logic TY0 – together with its com-
pactness and the Löwenheim-Skolem property – via a Model Existence theorem,
12To ease readability, Chapter 3 will often place arguments in square brackets. The TY0 term
 y x.find (y, x)(bill) will then appear as ‘ y x.find (y, x)[bill ]’.
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cf. (Smullyan, 1995). This theorem takes the following form:
Theorem 2.4 (Model Existence). Let L and C be TY0 languages s.t. L\C =
;, where every set C
↵
is countably infinite. Assume that P is a sound provability
property w.r.t. L[C, and that ⇧ is a sequent in L. If ⇧ /2 P, then ⇧ is refutable
by a countable TY0 model.
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix C.2.
From Theorem 2.4, we can show that the following holds, where ⇧ is as abo-
ve, and where ⌃ ranges over sequents in L [ C:
Corollary 2.1 (Generalized Compactness). For all TY0 sequents ⇧ and
TY0 models M , if, for all finite ⇧0 ✓ ⇧, M |=g ⇧0, then M |=g ⇧.
Proof. The set {⌃ |M |=
g
⌃0 for some finite ⌃0 ✓ ⌃} is a sound provability
property. ⇤
Corollary 2.2 (Generalized Löwenheim-Skolem). For all TY0 sequents ⇧,
if M 6|=
g
⇧, then ⇧ is refutable by a countable TY0 model.
Proof. The set {⌃ |M |=
g
⌃} is a sound provability property. ⇤
Corollary 2.3 (Generalized Completeness). For all finite sets  ,  of TY0
terms, if   |=
g
 , then   `TY0  .
Proof. The set {⌃ |⌃ is TY0-provable} is a sound provability property. ⇤
We close the chapter with an attempt to supply truth-conditions for basic-type
TY0 terms.
2.5. Ways to Truth
In Section 2.3, we have observed the di culty of providing a truth-definition for
basic-type terms of the logic TY0. We have attributed this di culty to the una-
vailability of a TY0 type t for truth-values (at the level of the object theory).
The present section identifies three strategies for the truth-evaluation of type-
o terms.13 These strategies include the specification of a homomorphism from en-
tities to (functions from indices to) truth-values, the representation of indices via
complex objects in the metatheory, and the identification of entities with their ev-
aluating indices. The strategies are derived from the evaluation of proposition-de-
noting formulas in Thomason’s (1980) Intentional Logic [sic], in Pollard’s (2008)
constructed worlds theory, and in Fine’s (1982) theory of worlds as facts. We dis-
cuss the three strategies in turn. In this discussion, we will first specify the origi-
nal formulation of these strategies. We will then adapt them for our purposes. We
close by assessing the usability of the resulting truth-definitions.
13This section was prompted by discussions with Daisuke Bekki, Markus Werning, and Dietmar
Zae↵erer.
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2.5.1. Truth-Homomorphisms. Intentional Logic (Thomason, 1980), cf.
(Chierchia and Turner, 1988; Fox and Lappin, 2004; Muskens, 2005), is a
theory of formal semantics which replaces Montagovian propositions (type hs, ti)
by semantically primitive propositions (type p). To enable the truth-evaluation of
proposition-denoting formulas, Thomason retains the truth-value type t. A homo-
morphism from primitive propositions to truth-values determines a formula’s tru-
th or falsity at the current index. By supplementing a basic type for indices, s, and
by adapting the homomorphism to a function from primitive propositions toMon-
tagovian propositions (type hs, ti), Muskens (2005) generalizes Thomason’s homo-
morphism to other indices. As a result, formulas in Intentional Logic have their
usual truth- and falsity-conditions.
Since Thomason’s primitive propositions compare to entities in our TY0-bas-
ed single-type semantics, Intentional Logic suggests a strategy for the truth-eva-
luation of basic-type TY0 terms. This strategy involves the adoption of the addi-
tional basic types s and t in the TY0 object theory, and the specification of a fun-
ction from entities to Montagovian propositions (Strategy (1a)). However, since
the resulting semantics assumes three basic types o, s, and t, it violates Partee’s
conjecture from Proposition 1.2.
The confinement of the types s and t to the TY0 metatheory, and the delega-
tion of truth-evaluation to models of this theory (Strategy (1b)), solves the above
problem. The resulting truth-definition then proceeds analogously to the defini-
tion of TY0 entailment from Section 2.4. A variant of this strategy is adopted in
(Fox and Lappin, 2005, Ch.5), cf. (Fox and Lappin, 2004; Turner, 1992).
However, it remains questionable whether the assumption of a homomorphism be-
tween elements of the object theory and elements of the metatheory is methodolo-
gically admissible. The extension of the metatheoretical type system by the type o
(Strategy (1c)) also solves this new problem. However, this extension would requ-
ire the introduction of a metatheory which is even more complex (and more richly
typed) than the proposed metatheory from Section 2.3.
(1) (2) (3)
z }| { z }| {
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b)
Object th’y types o, s, t o o o, t o o
Metatheory types o, s, t s, t o, s, t o, t o, t o, t
Table 2.4. Strategies for obtaining TY0 truth.
2.5. WAYS TO TRUTH 47
The di↵erent ‘Thomasonian’ strategies for the evaluation of TY0 truth are
summarized in the three leftmost columns of Table 2.4 (previous page).
2.5.2. Constructed Worlds. The semantics of constructed worlds from
(Pollard, 2008), cf. (Fox and Lappin, 2005; Pollard, 2005), improves upon
Strategy (1) by dispensing with the need for an index type s, and by waiving the
requirement of a homomorphism between primitive and Montagovian objects. To
achieve this, Pollard (2008) replaces indices by constructed (possible) worlds. The
latter are ultrafilters in the set of propositions, which are associated with a subset
of the set of objects of the type hp, ti, cf. (Veltman, 1981; Scott, 1982; Land-
man, 1985). The type for constructed worlds inverses the familiar relation bet-
ween propositions and worlds. Thus, in constructed worlds semantics, a proposi-
tion-denoting formula ' is true at a constructed world w if ' 2 w (not if w 2 ',
as is the case in Montague semantics).
The replacement of primitive propositions (type p) by primitive entities (ty-
pe o) adapts Pollard’s truth-definition to our single-type semantics. Naturally, the
compliance of our revised single-type semantics with Partee’s conjecture prevents
the introduction of the truth-value type t (and thus, of the type for constructed
worlds (o; t)) into the TY0 object theory (Strategy (2a)). The adoption of the ty-
pe t into the type system of the metatheory (Strategy (2b)) complies with Par-
tee’s conjecture and with our description of the TY0 metatheory from Section 2.3.
However, the proposed semantics obfuscates the truth-contribution of sentential
constituents (cf. Ch. 1.1.1): the semantic values of basic non-sentential expressi-
ons (e.g. of (in-)transitive verbs) can only be indirectly identified with their con-
tribution to the truth-conditions of the sentences in which they occur. We will see
in Part III that there exist other single-type semantics which do not rely on the
coding of worlds as ‘new’ metatheoretical objects.
The two middle columns of Table 2.4 summarize ‘constructed worlds’ strate-
gies for the evaluation of TY0 truth. We finish our presentation of di↵erent truth-
evaluative strategies with an alternative to Strategy (2).
2.5.3. Worlds as Entities. Fine’s theory of ‘worlds as facts’ (Fine, 1982),
cf. (Barwise and Perry, 1983; Kratzer, 1989; 2011), constitutes a variant
of constructed worlds semantics which represents indices without the use of the
truth-value type t. In particular, Fine regards possible worlds as “very big facts”
(Fine, 1982, p. 43) (in our theory, semantically very ‘rich’ entities), which are ob-
tained by combining the information of all true facts (i.e. a subset of our possible
entities) at a constructed world. As a result, Fine’s theory enables the definition
of truth at a type-o world via inclusion in the world. Thus, a type-o term A is
true at a world w if w ✓ A. The term A is false at w if w contains the De Mor-
gan complement of the entity denoted by A (i.e. if w ✓ ⇠A).
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Because of its particular definition of possible worlds, Fine’s theory obviates
the need to adopt the type t in the TY0 object theory. However, the definition of
truth in terms of inclusion of semantic content again requires the adoption of the
type t in the metatheory (Strategy (3)). As a result, this strategy will share the
merits and limitations of the constructed worlds approach (2b) from Section 2.5.2.
The above considerations have shown the high methodological cost of a truth-
evaluation for TY0 terms: While Strategy (1) assumes a homomorphism between
entities and propositions, Strategies (2) and (3) require the additional coding of
worlds. But this contradicts the alleged greater simplicity of single-type semantics
(cf. Ch. 1.1.3, 1.4.1).We will see in Part III that the interpretation of the type o
as a particular Montague type obviates the need for any of these additional com-
plications.
2.6. Summary
This chapter has introduced the ‘pure’ single-type logic TY0. This logic is a vari-
ant of Henkin’s Theory of Propositional Types, whose basic type, o (for entities),
remains unanalyzed. Types of this logic are obtained from o via a generalized vari-
ant of the type-forming rule ST. We have specified terms, frames, and models of
the logic TY0, have defined the relation of entailment on TY0 terms, and have
provided the logic with a sound and complete Gentzen-style sequent calculus.
Its single-typing lends the logic TY0 a number of special properties. In parti-
cular, since the truth-value type t is not available in the TY0 type system, the lo-
gic TY0 requires single-type proxies for many familiar connectives and quantifi-
ers, disables an easy truth-definition, and constrains the proxies’ semantic beha-
vior through the use of meta-level axioms. The notions of TY0 entailment, equi-
valence, and provability are all defined in the metatheory. As a result, the availa-
bility of these notions places non-trivial conditions on Partee’s conjecture.
We will see in the next chapter that the particular properties of the logic TY0
render its models inadequate as a single-type semantics for the PTQ fragment.
CHAPTER 3
TY0-Based Single-Type Semantics
The present chapter provides a TY0-based single-type semantics for Montague’s
PTQ fragment. This semantics is a theory of meaning for the subset of English
from (Montague, 1973), where all meaning is represented by constructions out
of primitive entities (type o). Since the type o is neutral between Montague’s ty-
pes e and hs, ti, proper names, sentences, and complement phrases all receive an
interpretation in this type (Prop. 1.2). As a result, the semantics accommodates
NP/CP complement-neutral verbs (cf. Ch. 1.2.1, (1)–(3)), NP/CP coordinations
(cf. (4)–(6)), and CP equatives (cf. (7)) and accounts for the sentence-type inter-
pretation of proper names (cf. (9), (10)).
The previous chapter has developed a general class of languages and models
for the single-type logic TY0. To enable the compositional interpretation of logi-
cal PTQ forms into TY0 objects (along the lines of Ch. 1.1.1, Fig. 1.1), we further
need to identify a designated TY0 language L, frame F , and interpretation func-
tion IF (cf. step 2), provide a theory of syntax for the PTQ fragment (cf. step 1),
and specify the translation of logical PTQ forms into TY0 terms (cf. step 3).
The present chapter takes on this task. Its organization is as follows: Secti-
on 3.1 identifies the lexicon and syntax of the PTQ fragment. To enable the inter-
pretation of PTQ expressions into objects of the logic TY0, Section 3.2 introduces
a set of translation rules, which define the translation of logical PTQ forms into
TY0 terms. The translation of all PTQ words will then enable an inductive trans-
lation of all logical PTQ forms. In virtue of their translation into terms of the lo-
gic TY0, PTQ forms will display equivalence and entailment relations to other
structures. Section 3.3 defines the notion of logical consequence on expressions of
the fragment, and points out some striking semantic properties. The chapter clo-
ses by observing the di culty of explaining syntactic well-formedness in a TY0-
based single-type semantics (in Sect. 3.4).
3.1. A Syntax for the PTQ Fragment
We start by presenting a rudimentary framework of PTQ syntax which gives the
source of our TY0 translations. To keep the framework as simple as possible, we
allow the syntax of our fragment to overgenerate considerably. However, since we
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are only interested in providing a precise syntactic terminology, overgeneration
does not constitute a particular problem. For the present purposes, we assume a
reduced variant of the Government and Binding theory from (Chomsky, 1981),
cf. (Muskens, 1996; Roelofsen, 2008). The prominence of generative grammar
in syntactic theory makes this adoption representative.1
Following Chomsky, we assume four levels (or ‘components’) of syntactic re-
presentation, called Deep Structure (D-Structure, or DS), Surface Structure (S-
Structure, or SS), Logical Form (LF), and Phonological Form (PF). The first three
components are defined as sets of trees or labelled bracketings, which are connec-
ted by movement rules. We assume that S-Structure is definable from D-Structure
via wh-Movement, and that Logical Form is definable from S-Structure by Quan-
tifier Raising. Phonological Form is also definable from S-Structure. The relation




Figure 3.1. The relation between DS, SS, LF, and PF.
The trees of our syntax’ DS-component can be generated by the phrase structure
rules (PS 1–11) from Table 3.2 (next but one page) and the lexical insertion rules
(LI 1–12) from Table 3.1 (next page). To enable the interpretation of the senten-
ces (1), (2), (7a), and (9) from Chapter 1.2.1, we extend the PTQ fragment by the
names Pat, Sherlock, Moriarty, and Barbara Partee, the common nouns problem and
room, the intransitive verbs wait and arrive, the transitive verbs remember, fear, de-
stroy, hate, and enter, and the preposition for. For technical reasons (cf. Ch. 4.2),
we further extend the fragment with the intransitive verb exist and the sentence
adverb possibly. In Table 3.1, non-PTQ words are written in grey font.





1Anna Szabolcsi has suggested the better suitability of Distributed Morphology as a syntax for
single-type semantics. Distributed Morphology is introduced in (Harley, forthcoming) and in
(Harley and Noyer, 2003). However, to avoid the introduction of a new syntactic framework
in addition to a new semantics, we here refrain from adopting this option.
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Label Rule Traditional Name
(PS 1) S  ! NP VP Sentence
(PS 2) S  ! SAV S Sentence
(PS 3) NP  ! DET N Noun Phrase
(PS 4) CP  ! C S Complement Phrase
(PS 5) VP  ! IV Verb Phrase
(PS 6) VP  ! TV NP Verb Phrase
(PS 7) VP  ! SCV CP Verb Phrase
(PS 8) VP  ! ADV IV Verb Phrase
(PS 9) VP  ! VP PP Verb Phrase
(PS 10) VP  ! IV ICV Verb Phrase
(PS 11) PP  ! P NP Prepositional Phrase
Table 3.2. Phrase structure rules for the generation of Deep Structures.
We next turn to the definition of S-Structure. Trees of the latter are understood
as acceptable forms of English which will be interpretable in our semantics. S-str-
uctures are connected to D-structures by a rudimentary version of wh-Movement.
The latter is an operation whereby a wh-element (e.g. the relative pronoun [npwho])
is moved from the position where it was generated to some S-node at a higher po-
sition in the tree. The moved element receives a binder index n, which is adjoin-
ed to it in superscript (e.g. [npwho]3), and leaves a trace tn (here, t3), with which
it becomes coindexed. Wh-Movement is formally defined as follows:
[sX [npwh] Y ] ) [s[npwh]n [sX tn Y ]] (wh-Movement)(3.1.4)
The tree in (3.1.5) follows from (3.1.3) by wh-Movement:
[np[deta][nwoman]][s[npwhom]
1[s[np[detevery][nman]][vp[tvloves] t1]]](3.1.5)
As a result, S-Structure is definable as the smallest set of trees which contains D-
Structure and which is closed under wh-Movement (s.t. DS ✓ SS).
Since phonology exceeds the scope of this dissertation, we do not attempt to
give a serious definition of Phonological Form. For the present purposes, we simp-
ly assume that phonological forms are obtained from surface structures through
the deletion of all brackets, indices, and traces. Thus, (3.1.6) is the phonological
form associated with (3.1.5):
(3.1.6) A woman whom every man loves
We finish our discussion of the di↵erent components of syntactic representati-
on with a definition of Logical Form. The latter is the component of grammar whi-
ch is interpreted by our TY0 semantics. The motivation for having a Logical Form-
component in syntax is entirely semantic in nature: Traditional grammar only of-
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fers a single syntactic structure for sentences involving di↵erent quantifiers or in-
tensional operators. Thus, on the level of S-Structure, the sentence Every man loves
a woman only has a single representation, i.e. (3.1.7), in which the subject (every
man) c-commands (or takes scope over) the object (a woman). This representation
matches the left-to-right order of the quantifiers.
(3.1.7) [s[np[detevery][nman]][vp[tvloves][np[deta][nwoman]]]]
Semantic ambiguity is an expected feature of S-Structure. However, we want to
account for the di↵erent readings of (3.1.7), paraphrased in (3.1.8) and (3.1.9):
Every man loves some (poss. di↵erent) woman (from every other man).(3.1.8)
There is a woman whom every man loves.(3.1.9)
From (3.1.7), the reading in (3.1.9), which ‘inverts’ the scope of the subject and
object (s.t. a woman c-commands every man), is obtained through Quantifier Rai-
sing. The latter is an operation due to (May, 1977), cf. (Lako↵, 1970; May,
1985; Heim and Kratzer, 1998; Reinhart, 2006), whereby a noun phrase is
adjoined to a sentence:
[sX [npZ] Y ] ) [s[npZ]n [sX tn Y ]] (Quantifier Raising)(3.1.10)




We define Logical Form as the smallest set of trees which contains S-Structure and
which is closed under Quantifier Raising (s.t. SS ✓ LF). Thus, Quantifier Raising
(like wh-Movement) is an optional rule. However, in contrast to (3.1.3), structures
like (3.1.7) and (3.1.11) receive a semantic interpretation.
3.2. A TY0 Semantics for the PTQ Fragment
We next specify a set of rules which govern the translation of the LF constitutents
of Montague’s PTQ fragment into terms of the logic TY0.
3.2.1. From LF Constituents to TY0 Terms. For reasons of simplicity,
we opt for a type-driven translation of logical forms, as proposed by Klein and Sag
(1985). The use of such a general translation procedure will spare us the stipula-
tion of a separate semantic rule for each syntactic rule along the lines of (Mon-
tague, 1973). In particular, the specification of the TY0 translations of logical
PTQ forms proceeds in two steps, by first defining the translation of lexical ele-
ments (or words) of the fragment, and then defining the translation of non-lexical
elements compositionally from the translation of their constituents.
Below, we let X,Y and A,B be logical forms and TY0 terms of the appropri-
ate category, respectively type.
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Definition 3.2.1 (Type-driven translation). The translation relation  is
the smallest relation between trees and TY0 terms which conforms to the rules
(T0) to (T5):
(T0) If X is a word and A its translation, then X  A. (Base Rule)
(T1) If X  A, then [X] A. (Copying)
(T2) If X  A and Y  B, then, if A(B) is well-formed, (Application)
[XY ] A(B); otherwise, [XY ] B(A).
(T3) If X  A and Y  B, then, (Quantifying In)
if A( v
n
.B) is well-formed, [XnY ] A( v
n
.B).
(T4) If X  A and A is reducible to B, then X  B. (Reduction)
(T5) If X  A and A shifts to B, then X  B. (Type-Shifting)
Rule (T0) constitutes the ‘base rule’ of type-driven translation. This rule specifies
the translation of lexical elements of the PTQ fragment, such that their instances
are sent to TY0 terms. Rules (T1) to (T5) specify how the translation of complex
logical forms depends on the translation of their daughter nodes. In particular, ru-
les (T1) and (T2) specify the translation of mothers of a single, and of two daugh-
ters. While mothers of a single daughter simply inherit their daughter’s translati-
on, mothers of two daughters are translated as the result of the functional appli-
cation of the translation of one to the translation of the other daughter. Rule (T3)
handles quantifying-in. Rules (T4) and (T5) enable the simplification and type-
shifting of translations. The former employs the usual rules,↵,  , ⌘, of lambda con-
version. Thus, we say that a TY0 termB follows by reduction from a termA if we
can obtain B from A by a finite number of lambda conversions. Some type-shift-
ing rules will be introduced below. In all of the above clauses, translation is accep-
ted modulo logical equivalence (s.t. X  B if X  A and A = B).
Notably, the relation is neither functional nor total. As a result of the for-
mer, a single logical form may be ambiguous between several non-equivalent TY0
translations (cf. (T5)). As a result of the latter, some forms may lack a TY0 trans-
lation (s.t. they are uninterpretable). We exclude uninterpretable forms from our
further considerations.
3.2.2. Fixing L and F . To enable the specific translation of the Logical
Form-constituents of Montague’s PTQ fragment, we first define a particular TY0
language L and frame F . The members of L are specified in Table 3.3 (next page).
Our conventions for the use of TY0 variables are introduced in Table 3.4. Since





, and 2· ) will figure in our translation of logical PTQ
forms, we assume their membership in L.
To give a general interpretation of the Logical Form constitutents of Mon-
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Constant TY0 Type
⇠ ((↵1 . . .↵n; o)↵1 . . .↵n; o)
.̂ ,
.̂




).= , .=, 6 .=, !· , $· (↵↵; o)
,> ,,? , john,mary, bill,ninety, sherlock,moriarty, o
pat,partee,w
2· ,3· ,man,woman,park,fish,pen,unicorn, room, (o; o)
problem
run,walk, talk,wait,arrive,E (o; o)
find, lose, eat, love,date, remember, fear,destroy, (o o; o)
hate, enter, believe, assert
temp,price, rise, change ((o; o); o)
rapidly, slowly, voluntary,allegedly, try,wish ((o; o) o; o)
in, for (o (o; o) o; o)
seek, conceive (((o; o); o) o; o)
about (((o; o); o) (o; o) o; o)
Table 3.3. L constants.
Variable TY0 Type Object
x,x1, . . . ,xn,y, z o entity
p,p1, . . . ,pn, q, r o entity
P,P1, . . . ,Pn (o; o) 1st-order property of entities
Q,Q1, . . . ,Qn ((o; o); o) 2
nd-order property of entities
L,L1, . . . ,Ln (((o; o); o) o; o)
Table 3.4. TY0 variables.
tague’s PTQ fragment, we let the TY0 frame F be very large, such that it con-
tains possible semantic values of all elements in L. The designated interpretation
function IF sends all constants of L to their associated semantic values in F . In
particular, we let IF be the most general function which respects the way in which
di↵erent content words are conventionally related.2 The specific role of the inter-
pretation function IF will be discussed in Part III (cf. Ch. 7.2.2, 8.2.2).
3.2.3. Translations of Atomic Logical Forms. We next translate the
lexical elements of the fragment.
Definition 3.2.2 (Basic TY0 translations). The translation rule (T0) associ-
ates the lexical elements from Table 3.1 with the following TY0 terms:
2Thus, IF is such that IF ( x.bill
.
= x) ✓ IF (man), where  x.bill
.
= x and man are the TY0
translations of the verb phrase be Bill and the common noun man, respectively (cf. Def. 3.2.2).
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John  john ; Mary  mary ;
Bill  bill ; ninety  ninety ;
Pat  pat ; Barbara Partee  partee ;
Sherlock  sherlock ; Moriarty  moriarty ;
man  man ; who(m)/which   P.P ;
fish  fish ; woman  woman ;
park  park ; unicorn  unicorn ;
pen  pen ; temperature  temp ;
price  price ; fears   Q x.Q( y.fear (y,x));
problem  problem ; hates   Q x.Q( y.hate (y,x));
room  room ; finds   Q x.Q( y.find (y,x));
waits  wait ; loses   Q x.Q( y.lose (y,x));
arrives  arrive ; eats   Q x.Q( y.eat (y,x));
runs  run ; loves   Q x.Q( y.love (y,x));
walks  walk ; dates   Q x.Q( y.date (y,x));
talks  talk ; destroys   Q x.Q( y.destroy (y,x));
exists  E ; remembers   Q x.Q( y.remember (y,x));
rises  rise ; enters   Q x.Q( y.enter (y,x));
changes  change ; is   Q x.Q( y.x .= y);
seeks  seek ; believes   p Q.Q( x. believe (p,x));
conceives  conceive ; asserts   p Q.Q( x.assert (p,x)) .̂ p ;
about  about ; in   Q P x.Q( y.in (y,P,x);
allegedly  allegedly ; for   Q P x.Q( y.for (y,P,x);
that   p.p ; slowly   P x.slowly (P,x) .̂ P (x);
tries to  try ; rapidly   P x.rapidly (P,x) .̂ P (x);
wishes to  wish ; voluntarily   P x.voluntary (P,x) .̂ P (x);







, for each n ; a   P1 P
W












y.(P1(y)$· x .= y) .̂ P (x)
In the third-to-last line from Definition 3.2.2, t
n
represents the trace of a moved
constituent in a logical form that is translated as a free variable, x
n
.
In line with Partee’s conjecture (cf. Ch. 1.2), Definition 3.2.2 assigns same-
type translations to common nouns, intransitive verbs, complementizers, and sen-
tence adverbs (all type (o; o)). Determiners and quantifiers are translated through




, .̂ , !· , .=, and $· . In all other res-
pects, our single-type translations are very similar to the translations from (Mon-
tague, 1973), cf. (Gallin, 1975).
To support Definition 3.2.2, we show that the logic TY0 translates the exam-
ple sentences from (Montague, 1973, Sect. 4). We begin by translating the logi-
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cal form of the sentence Bill walks:
The base rule of type-driven translation assigns the proper name Bill and the
intransitive verb walks the type-o constant bill and the type-(o; o) constant walk,
respectively. Thus, the name Bill is interpreted as a primitive entity. The verb wal-
ks is interpreted as a function that applies to entities (e.g. to the entity denoted
by the TY0 translation of Bill) to yield entities (i.e. the entity denoted by the TY0
translation of Bill walks).
The sentence Bill walks is translated in (3.2.1). In the translation, steps (3)




4. [s[npBill][vp[ivwalks]]] walk (bill)
The translations of the logical forms of the sentences A man walks, Every man wal-
ks, The man walks, A price rises, and The temperature rises, cf. (Montague, 1973,
pp. 266, 268), are given in (3.2.2) to (3.2.6):
[s[np[deta][nman]][[ivwalks]]] 
_
x.man (x) .̂ walk (x)(3.2.2)
[s[np[detevery][man]][[walks]]] 
^





y.(man (y)$· x .= y) .̂ walk (x)(3.2.4)
[s[[deta][nprice]][ivrises]] 
_






P1.(temp (P1)$· P .= P1) .̂ rise (P)
The translations of the logical forms from (3.2.5) and (3.2.6) assume a meaning-
shifting rule for the determiners a and the. This rule is definable by a TY0 term,
as we show in Appendix D.1. This appendix also contains detailed derivations of
the translations from (3.2.5) and (3.2.6), and of the translations of the sentences
The temperature is ninety (3.2.21) and Ninety rises (D.1.1). These translations are
instrumental in our solution to Partee’s temperature puzzle (cf. Sect. 3.3).
In our translations of transitive verbs from Definition 3.2.2, the relevant ty-
pe-(o o; o) constant (e.g. the constant find (=
⌘
 y x.find (y,x))) reflects the stru-
cture of transitive verbs in English. By (PS 6), these verbs combine with their di-
rect object (here, translated ‘y’) before combining with their subject (‘x’). As a
result, the TY0 translation of the verb finds is interpreted as encoding the infor-
mation that x finds y. This fact is reflected in the translation of the logical form
of the sentence John finds a unicorn, cf. (Montague, 1973, p. 266):




x.unicorn (x) .̂ find (x, john)
To enable the TY0 translation of the result of merging a transitive verb (type
(((o; o); o) o; o)) with a proper name (type o), we introduce a variant of Partee’s ty-
pe-shifting rule ‘lift’ from (Partee, 1987, p. 362). This variant is defined below:
Definition 3.2.3. The function lift :=  x P.P (x) sends entity-denoting
TY0 terms to the designators of functions from (functions from entities to entities)
to entities (type ((o; o); o)).
Our translation of proper names into basic-type TY0 terms (and, hence, the need
for the function lift) is motivated by the interpretation of sentences and comple-
ment phrases in the basic type, and by our wish (in correspondence with Partee’s
conjecture) to interpret names in the semantic type of sentences.
The function lift enables the translation of the logical form of the sentence
John finds Mary as follows:
1. [npMary] mary(3.2.8)
2. [tvfinds]  Q x.Q( y.find (y,x))
3. [vp[tvfinds][npMary]]  Q x.Q( y.find (y,x)) [lift (mary)]
=  Q x.Q( y.find (y,x)) [ x P.P (x)(mary)]
=  Q x.Q( y.find (y,x)) [ P.P (mary)]




5. [s[npJohn][vp[tvfinds][npMary]]] find (mary, john)
The function lift also enables the translations of the logical forms3 of the senten-
ces (1a) and (2a) from Chapter 1.2.1:
[s[npPat][vp[tvremembers][npBill]]]  remember (bill,pat)(3.2.9)
[s[npSherlock][vp[tvfears][npMoriarty]]]  fear (moriarty, sherlock)(3.2.10)
However, our TY0-based semantics is not restricted to the translation of one par-
ticular class of complements of transitive verbs (by (PS 6), to [[tv][np]]-forms). It
also enables the translation of the results of combining some transitive verbs with
complement phrases (cf. (1b), (2b)). This observation is captured below:
3Since it is not currently relevant, we neglect the tense and aspect of the original examples.
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Proposition 3.1 (NP/CP neutrality). A ‘pure’ single-type semantics enables
the interpretation of (both guises of ) NP/CP complement-neutral expressions.
The possibility of interpreting [[tv][cp]]-structures in a ‘pure’ single-type seman-
tics is witnessed by the TY0 translations (in (3.2.11), (3.2.12)) of the logical forms
of the sentences (1b) and (2b) from Chapter 1.2.1. To accommodate structures of
this form, we introduce the additional phrase structure rule (PS 12):
(PS 12) VP  ! TV† CP Verb Phrase,
where TV† 3 remember, fear, be, etc.
The sentences (1b) and (2b) then have the following translation:
[s[npPat]













We will see below that our TY0-based semantics also accommodates NP/CP coor-
dinations and CP equatives (cf. Ch. 1.2.1; (4)–(6), (7a), (7b)). However, before we
show this, we first translate the logical forms of some other PTQ sentences.
The translation of the narrow-scope reading of the sentence John seeks a uni-
corn (in (3.2.13)), cf. (Montague, 1973, p. 266), is obtained analogously to the






x.unicorn (x) .̂ P (x)], john
 
The rule of Quantifier Raising enables the translation of the sentence’s wide-scope
reading as follows:
1. [tvseeks] seek =  Q x.seek (Q,x)(3.2.14)





3. [s[npJohn][vp[tvseeks] t0]] seek
 


















Translations of the object narrow- and wide-scope readings of the sentences John
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talks about a unicorn and A woman loves every man, cf. (Montague, 1973, pp. 267,












x.unicorn (x) .̂ about
 














x.woman (x) .̂ love (y,x)
 
The logical forms of the sentences Bill is Mary, Bill is a man, and The temperature
is ninety, cf. (Montague, 1973, pp. 267, 268), have their expected translations:
















P. temp (P) .̂ y
.
= P (w)
 $· x .= y  .̂ x .= ninety
Notably, because of its same-type interpretation of proper names and complement
phrases, our single-type semantics also enables the interpretation of CP equatives.
The translation of the logical form of (7a) is given below. This translation involves
the application of the function lift to the TY0 translation of a complement phrase:
1. [cp[cthat][s[npMary][vp[tvhates][npBill]]]] hate (bill,mary)(3.2.22)
2. [tvis]  Q x.Q( y.x .= y)
3. [vp[tvis][cp[cthat][s[npMary][vp[tvhates][npBill]]]]]
  Q x.Q( y.x .= y) [lift (hate (bill,mary))]
=  Q x.Q( y.x
.
= y) [ P.P (hate (bill,mary))]






























y.(problem (y)$· x .= y) .̂ x .= hate (bill,mary)
This completes our translation of PTQ words and atomic sentences into terms
of the logic TY0. The next section discusses the TY0 translation of molecular sen-
tences from Montague’s PTQ fragment (e.g. of the sentence John finds and eats a
unicorn, cf. (Montague, 1973, p. 269)). We will see that the same-type interpre-
tation of proper names and complement phrases in our o-based semantics enables
an accommodation of the coordination phenomena from Chapter 1.2.1.
3.2.4. Translations of Molecular Logical Forms. To enable the compo-
sitional translation of coordinated logical forms, we only need to specify the TY0
translations of the linguistic connectives from the PTQ fragment. For complete-
ness, we also supply the TY0 translation of the adverb of negation not (or of the
expression it is not the case that). These translations are provided in Definition
3.2.4. In the definition, R and R1 are variables of the type (↵1 . . .↵n; o), where
↵1, . . . ,↵n 2 0Type and 0  n 2 N. We assume that X1, . . . ,Xn (abbrev. ~X) is a
sequence of variables of the types ↵1, . . . ,↵n.
Definition 3.2.4 (TY0 translations of PTQ connectives). The rule (T0) asso-
ciates the linguistic connectives and, or, and not with the following TY0 terms:
(i) and   R1 R ~X.R (~X ) .̂ R1(~X ) (Conjunction);
(ii) or   R1 R ~X.R (~X ) .̂R1(~X ) (Disjunction);
(iii) not   R ~X.⇠R (~X ) (Negation)
The TY0 translations from Definition 3.2.4 are flexible, such that they are defined
for the TY0 translations of expressions from di↵erent syntactic categories. Thus,
the conjunction and connects sentences and complement phrases (e.g. Bill walks
and Mary talks, that Bill walks and that Mary talks), proper names (Bill and Mary),
(in-)transitive verbs (walks and talks, finds and eats), and many other kinds of ex-
pressions. The coordination of proper names and quantified NPs (e.g. Bill and eve-
ry woman) is enabled by the type-shifting operation lift (cf. Def. 3.2.3).
Items (3.2.23) and (3.2.24) (next page) illustrate the use of the conjunction
and in the coordination of the sentences Bill walks and Every man finds a unicorn,
and of the verbs finds and eats:
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x.unicorn (x) .̂ find (y,x)
 
3. [conjand]  q p.p .̂ q
4. [[conjand][s[np[detevery][nman]][vp[tvfinds][np[deta][nunicorn]]]]]



















x.unicorn (x) .̂ find (y,x)
  
1. [tvfinds]  Q x.Q( y.find (y,x))(3.2.24)
2. [tveats]  Q x.Q( y.eat (y,x))
3. [conjand]  L1 L Q x.L (Q,x) .̂ L1(Q,x)
4. [[conjand][tveats]]
  L1 L Q x.L (Q,x) .̂ L1(Q,x) [ Q1 z.Q1( y.eat (y, z))]
=  L Q x.L (Q,x) .̂ [ Q1 z.Q1( y.eat (y, z))](Q,x)
=  L Q x.L (Q,x) .̂ Q ( y.eat (y,x))
5. [tv[tvfinds][[conjand][tveats]]]
  L Q x.L (Q,x) .̂ Q ( y.eat (y,x))
  L Q x.[ Q1 z.Q( y.find (y, z))]
=  Q x.[ Q1 z.Q( y.find (y, z))](Q,x) .̂ Q ( y.eat (y,x))
=  Q x.Q( y.find (y,x)) .̂ Q ( y.eat (y,x))
=  Q x.Q( y.(find .̂ eat)(y,x))
6. [np[deta][nunicorn]]  P
_
x.unicorn (x) .̂ P (x)
7. [vp[tv[tvfinds][[conjand][tveats]]][np[deta][nunicorn]]]
  Q z.Q( y.(find .̂ eat)(y, z)) [ P
_
x.unicorn (x) .̂ P (x)]
=  z.[ P
_
x.unicorn (x) .̂ P (x)]( y.(find .̂ eat)(y, z))
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=  z
_
x.unicorn (x) .̂ ( y.(find .̂ eat)(y, z))(x)
=  y
_




x.unicorn (x) .̂ (find .̂ eat)(x, john)
The neutrality of the type o between Montague’s types e and hs, ti enables the
translation of coordinations with a proper name- and a CP-conjunct. In particu-
lar, Definition 3.2.4 allows the translation of the results (in (4), (5)) of coordina-
ting the name and the CP in the complements of the occurrences of the verb rem-
embers from (3.2.9) and (3.2.11) (cf. (1a), (1b)), and of the verb fears from (3.2.10)
and (3.2.12) (cf. (2a), (2b)):
[s[npPat]



















The possibility of extending coordination to proper names in our TY0-based
semantics is captured in Proposition 3.2:
Proposition 3.2 (NP/CP coordinability). A ‘pure’ single-type semantics can
model logical forms which contain coordinations with a proper name- and a CP-
conjunct.
The use of the connective ⇠ in the translation of the logical form of the sen-
tence John does not find a unicorn is demonstrated below:
1. [vp[tvfind][np[deta][nunicorn]]]  y
_
x.unicorn (x) .̂ find (x,y)(3.2.27)
2. [advdoes not]  P x.⇠P (x)
3. [vp[advdoes not][vp[tvfind][np[deta][nunicorn]]]]
  P y.⇠P (y) [ z
_
x.unicorn (x) .̂ find (x, z)]
=  y.⇠
 _





x.unicorn (x) .̂ find (x, john)
 
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This completes our translation of logical PTQ forms. To evaluate the ability
of our ‘pure’ single-type semantics to model the phenomena from Proposition 1.3,
we next define the notion of equivalence on logical forms of the fragment.
3.3. PTQ Equivalence and Consequence
The possibility of identifying semantically equivalent PTQ expressions in our
TY0-based semantics is warranted by the interpretation of these expressions into
elements of TY0 models. In particular, since all logical PTQ forms allow a syste-
matic translation into TY0 terms, we can define the equivalence of logical PTQ
forms in terms of the mutual entailment of their TY0 translations.




be the TY0 translations of
the logical forms X, respectively Y , such that X  A and Y  B. The semantic
equivalence of X and Y is then defined as follows:
Definition 3.3.1 (TY0-based linguistic equivalence). The form X is equiva-
lent to Y in the TY0 metatheory w.r.t. the TY0 model MF and assignment gF ,
i.e. means
MF (Y,X), if |=g A = B in all relevant4 metatheoretical models and
assignments.
The above definition supports our intuitions about linguistic equivalence. For ex-
ample, the equivalence of the TY0 terms remember (bill,pat) and ⇠⇠remember
(bill,pat) in the metatheory of the logic TY0 supports the equivalence of the logi-
cal forms of the sentences Pat remembers Bill and It is not the case that Pat does not
remember Bill. An analogous observation can be made with respect to the equiva-
lence of the logical form of the negation of the sentence Pat remembers Bill and
that Bill waits for her and of the logical form of the sentence Pat does not remember
Bill or does not remember that Bill waits for her.
Since our TY0-based semantics interprets proper names in the basic type o,
Definition 3.3.1 extends the definition of linguistic equivalence to names. As a re-
sult, we expect that it be possible, for every pair of names – or for every pair of a
name and a sentence (or CP) –, to determine whether its members are equivalent.
However, in practice, the relation of TY0-based equivalence is restricted to
pairs of logical forms of same-category expressions whose members receive an in-
terpretation as ‘algebraically related’ objects (in the sense of Ch. 2.2.2; cf. Ch. 2.4).
Examples of such pairs are the pairs of logical forms from the second-to-last pa-
ragraph, and pairs consisting of forms like Bill and Bill and (Bill or John). The res-
triction of TY0-based equivalence to pairs of this form is due to the semantic pri-
mitiveness of entities. As a result, unless we have full knowledge of the ordering
4The relevance of meta- for object-theoretic models concerns the identification of models of the
object theory with restricted models of the metatheory, whose frames and interpretation functi-
ons are limited to TY0 terms and objects. This relation will be further discussed in Ch. 7.2.1.
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on O in the designated model, we do not know whether the informativeness rela-
tion obtains between ‘algebraically unrelated’ entities in this model (e.g. between
the name Barbara Partee and the sentence Barbara Partee enters the room, or Bar-
bara Partee arrives5). But our accommodation of Proposition 1.3.ii requires exact-
ly the equivalence of ‘algebraically unrelated’ logical forms from these di↵erent ca-
tegories.
The consequence of the above observation is summarized in Proposition 3.3:
Proposition 3.3 (Absence of sentential name-equivalents). A ‘pure’ single-
type semantics is unable to identify equivalence relations between proper names
and sentences.
Because of the di culty of obtaining truth- (or falsity-)conditions for basic-type
TY0 terms (cf. Ch. 2.5), our TY0-based semantics further does not easily accom-
modate Proposition 1.3.i:
Proposition 3.4 (TY0 truth-inaptness of names). In a ‘pure’ single-type se-
mantics, names and sentences do not have (obvious) truth- and falsity-conditions.
The inability to model the above phenomena is a significant impediment of
the presented single-type semantics, which we will attempt to resolve in the remai-
nder of this dissertation. However, before we do so, we briefly specify the relation
of logical consequence on PTQ forms. We will show that, as a result of the defini-
tion of TY0 consequence, our single-type semantics blocks the generation of Par-
tee’s temperature puzzle from (Montague, 1973, pp. 267–268).
Since the notion of logical consequence is inherently linked to sentences – and
since we are unaware of any evidence for sentential entailments of proper names –,
we restrict our definition of linguistic entailment to the syntactic category S. The
entailment relation on logical sentence forms is defined below. In the definition, we
let ⌅ = {X |X   } and ⌥ = {Y |Y   } be sets of sentences which are trans-
lated into the sets of TY0 terms   = {  |   2 To} and   = {  |   2 To}.
Definition 3.3.2 (TY0-based linguistic entailment). The set of logical forms
⌅ entails the set of forms ⌥ in the TY0 metatheory w.r.t. the TY0 model MF and
assignment gF , i.e. followMF (⌥, ⌅), if |=g   )   in all relevant metatheoretical
models under all relevant assignments.
Definition 3.3.2 supports our intuitions about the validity of linguistic inferences.





are TY0-deducible from the term remember
  





, the inference from the logical form of the sentence Pat remembers Bill
and that Bill is waiting for her (cf. (4)) to the logical forms of the sentences Pat re-
members Bill (cf. (1a)) and Pat remembers that Bill waits for her (cf. (1b)) is valid.
5For simplicity, we again neglect the aspect of the original examples (cf. (9b), (9c)).
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A similar observation holds for the validity of the inference from the conjunction
of the sentences Bill is the man and The man walks (cf. (3.2.4)) to the sentence Bill










y.(man (y)$· x .= y) .̂ walk (x)
walk (bill)
Our TY0 translations of intensional intransitive verbs (e.g. rise, change) and com-
mon nouns (temperature, price) prevent the generation of Partee’s ‘temperature
puzzle’ in our TY0-based semantics, cf. (Montague, 1973, pp. 267–268). Specifi-
cally, since the TY0 translations of the logical forms of the sentences The tempera-
ture is ninety (cf. (3.2.21)) and The temperature rises (cf. (3.2.6)) attribute the pro-
perties ‘is ninety’ and ‘rise’ to temperature-objects of the types o and (o; o), res-
pectively, the TY0 translation of the sentence Ninety rises cannot be obtained by
replacing the type-(o; o) temperature-object P by the entity ‘ninety’ in the trans-







P. temp (P) .̂ y
.
= P (w)




P1.(temp (P1)$· P .= P1) .̂ rise (P)W
P.rise (P) .̂ P (w)
.
= ninety
/ / / / / / / / / /
This completes our discussion of the notions of TY0-based PTQ equivalence
and entailment. We close the chapter with an observation about the explanatory
power of the presented single-type semantics.
3.4. Explanatory Power of ‘Pure’ Single-Type Semantics
The last two sections have demonstrated the ability of our TY0-based semantics
to accommodate NP/CP complement-neutral verbs, CP equatives, and name/CP
coordinations. We have attributed this ability to the neutralization of the distinc-
tion between Montague’s basic types e and hs, ti, and to the resulting existence of
fewer typing constraints on semantic merging. However, the greater tolerance of
merging reduces the suitability of TY0 types as a formal basis for syntactic cate-
gories (cf. Sect. 1.1.1).
In Section 3.2.3, we have already suggested that the same-type interpretation
of proper names and complement phrases precludes the semantic distinction bet-
ween verbs which select only NPs and verbs which select only CPs as their com-
6For better readability, we will hereafter adopt a sequence-like notation, where the symbol ) is
replaced by a horizontal line. Terms above (resp. below) this line are the conjuncts of the ante-
cedent (resp. the consequent) of the inference.
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plement.7 Consequently, unless we restrict the phrase structure rule (PS 12) to a
proper subset of the category TV, we will no longer be able to explain the ill-for-
medness8 of the expression from (16b):
(16) a. Bill eats [npa unicorn].
b. ⇤ Bill eats [cpthat a unicorn exists].
Worse yet, the same-type interpretation of proper names, sentences, and com-
plement phrases blocks a semantic motivation of most phrase structure rules from
Table 3.2. Thus, in a ‘pure’ single-type semantics, we will be unable to provide a
semantic explanation for the ill-formedness of the expressions from (17b), (18b)
or (18c), and (19b) (cf. (PS 7), (PS 1), resp. (PS 2)), or of the expressions from (20b)
and (21b) or (21c) (cf. (PS 4), resp. (PS 11)):
(17) a. Bill asserts [npthat Mary talks].
b. ⇤ Bill asserts [npMary].
(18) a. [npBill] exists.
b. ⇤ [cpThat Bill walks] exists.
c. ⇤ [sBill walks] exists.
(19) a. Possibly [sBill walks].
b. ⇤ Possibly [npBill].
(20) a. John proves that [sGoldbach’s Conjecture is correct].
b. ⇤ John proves that [npGoldbach’s Conjecture].
(21) a. John talks about [npa unicorn].
b. ⇤ John talks about [cpthat he finds a unicorn].
c. ⇤ John talks about [she finds a unicorn].
Figure 3.2 (next page) illustrates the ‘mismatch’ between syntactic categories
and ‘pure’ single-type semantic types.9 In the figure, the coarser grain of semantic
distinctions with respect to their syntactic counterparts is represented by the th-
ickness of the vertical (light and dark grey) bars. These bars cover members of the
same category, respectively type.
7Sag et al. (2003) attribute members of these di↵erent subclasses the lexical types v -np-tr and
v -s-tr, respectively. Verbs which select both NPs and CPs as their complement are attributed the
lexical type v -nominal-tr.
8Below, ill-formed (or ungrammatical) expressions are marked by an asterisk, ‘⇤’.
9Notably, expressions of the categories C and SAV also have a same-type interpretation in the
Montagovian system. Thus, our semantics only distinguishes itself w.r.t. the interpretations of
sentences and proper names, resp. of common nouns and complementizers (or sentence adverbs).
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(GB) Syntax S NP N C SAV · · ·
TY0 Semantics · · ·
(Object theory)
o (o; o)
Figure 3.2. Syntactic categories and TY0 types.
The simplest solution to our inability to explain the ill-formedness of (17b) to
(21b) (and of (18c) and (21c)) in our ‘pure’ single-type semantics would be to dis-
miss a semantic motivation for syntactic categories, and to delegate the explana-
tory claim of our semantics to the level of syntax. This solution involves the adop-
tion of a traditional theory of syntax (with distinct categories for noun phrases,
CPs, and sentences; cf. Sect. 3.1), and the restriction of the arguments of TY0 tra-
nslations of lexical elements to translations of logical forms of expressions from the
‘right’ (or admissible) syntactic category. To block the formation of forms like (17b)
to (21b) (cf. (18c), (21c)), we thus restrict the arguments of the TY0 translations
of non-neutral verb phrases and prepositions to TY0 translations of noun phrases,
and restrict the arguments of the TY0 translations of non-neutral sentence adver-
bs and complementizers to translations of the logical forms of sentences.
Yet, the concession of explanatory power to the level of syntax undermines
Montague’s assumption of the primacy of semantics (cf. Ch. 1.1.1). In Chapter 8.3
(cf. Ch. 7.4), we will present an alternative, semantic solution to the above prob-
lem which uses a variant of Montague’s account of well-formedness. Since the sin-
gle-type semantics from Chapter 8 shares the full empirical scope of Montague se-
mantics, it combines the explanatory power of the semantics from Section 3.2 (cf.
Ch. 1.2.1) with the greater modeling power of the Montagovian system.
3.5. Summary
This chapter has shown that Partee’s conjecture from Proposition 1.2 is (almost
trivially) supported by a ‘pure’ single-type semantics which interprets the transla-
tions of logical PTQ forms into constructions out of primitive entities: Since this
semantics replaces Montague’s types for individuals and propositions by the sin-
gle basic type o, proper names, sentences, and complement phrases all receive an
interpretation in this type. The resulting semantics further accommodates NP/CP
complement-neutral verbs, NP/CP coordinations, and CP equatives.
However, the chapter has also demonstrated the (methodo-)logical cost of the
restriction to a single basic type: In particular, the neutralization of the distinc-
tion between the semantic types for proper names and sentences reduces the ex-
planatory power of the presented single-type semantics (w.r.t. the explanatory po-
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wer of Montague semantics). The absence of the truth-value type t in the TY0 ty-
pe system blocks the use of the familiar quantifiers and logical connectives, disab-
les an easy TY0 truth-definition, and, thus, prevents the truth-evaluation of pro-
per names and sentences. As a result, our ‘pure’ single-type semantics fails to ac-
commodate Proposition 1.3.i. Because of the primitiveness of the single basic ty-
pe (s.t. the type o is not identified with any particular Montague type), our sem-
antics further proves unable to identify a name’s semantically equivalent senten-







The previous chapter has demonstrated the inability of our ‘pure’ single-type se-
mantics to provide easy truth- and falsity-conditions for logical PTQ forms of the
basic type (cf. Prop. 3.4) and to identify semantic equivalence relations between
proper names and sentences (cf. Prop. 3.3). The remainder of this dissertation at-
tempts to compensate for these shortcomings. To this aim, we will first identify a
suitable Montague type (as introduced in Ch. 1.1.1) which interprets the type o
from Part I (step 1). We will then adapt all relevant definitions from Part I to ob-
jects of this type (step 2). The present part is concerned with the implementation
of step 1. Step 2 will be implemented in Part III.
The rationale behind our particular strategy for the accommodation of Propo-
sition 1.3 is as follows: As we have shown in Chapters 2 and 3, the inability of our
TY0-based semantics to specify an LF’s truth- or equivalence-conditions is a con-
sequence of the primitiveness of the single type o (in particular, of the non-identity
of o with a construction to the type t; cf. Ch. 2.5). This observation leads us to ex-
pect that any Montague type of the form h↵1, h. . . , h↵n, tiii which enables a prin-
cipled10 representation of individuals and propositions will therewith also model
the semantic behavior of proper names and sentences from Proposition 1.3.
The adoption of an ‘o-defining’ Montague type will further help justify the al-
gebraic structure on the domain of the single basic type, and will obviate the me-
tatheoretic axioms for the behavior of the single-type stand-ins for the familiar
truth-functional connectives and quantifiers. In our definition of general single-ty-
pe models from Section 2.2, we have already observed that some axioms (esp. the
axioms for the behavior of negation) rely on the particular semantic analysis of the
type o. The identification of suitable single basic types from Chapter 4 provides
two such analyses.
Beyond formal reasons, the identification of the type o with a concrete Mon-
tague type lends our new semantics intuitive content. From a didactic point of
view, it often helps to understand the new in terms of the old (or familiar). Thus,
Partee (2006) associates her single basic type p with the type for properties of
Kratzer-style situations, and describes the single-type correspondents of indivi-
duals and propositions as the property of being the minimal situation containing
that individual, respectively as the property of being a minimal situation at which
the proposition’s designator is true (cf. Ch. 1.2.2).
This part of the dissertation prepares two versions of a Partee-style single-ty-
pe semantics which interpret the single basic type as a particular Montague type.
The part is organized as follows: To enable a particular interpretation of the type o
from Part I, Chapter 4 identifies a suitable single basic type (or types), and descri-
bes the representation of Montagovian individuals and propositions in these types.
10Below, principled will be defined as satisfying the semantic requirements from Chapter 4.1.
74
The metaproperties of these types and several associated methodological issues
will be discussed in Chapter 5.
To give a conceptual motivation for our single-type choice(s) – and to avoid lo-
sing the reader in a blizzard of technical details –, Chapters 4 and 5 will have a
largely informal character. As a result, many semantic notions (e.g. an individu-
al’s existence in an index, and a proposition’s aboutness with respect to a given in-
dividual) will be understood in their intuitive pre-theoretical sense. Formal defini-
tions of these notions, which capture the notions’ intuitive content, will be provi-
ded in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 4
Histoire d’o
This chapter identifies a suitable Montague type for the interpretation of the PTQ
fragment along the lines of Part I. To narrow down our choice of single-type candi-
dates, we first introduce a set of requirements which ensure the type’s suitability
as a single semantic basis for the PTQ fragment (in Sect. 4.1). The application of
these requirements to the simplest Montague types (in Sect. 4.2) identifies the ty-
pes hs, ti and hs, hs, tii as suitable single basic types. The chapter closes by com-
paring these two types to Partee’s original single-type choice.
4.1. Single-Type Requirements
As one would expect, not all types which are obtained from the types e and hs, ti
through the type-forming rule CT (hereafter called Montague types) are equally
suitable as a single semantic basis for natural language. To identify the best (or
most promising) single-type candidate, we require that this candidate satisfies the
Properties (i) to (iv), below:
(i) Familiarity: The single basic type figures in the formal semantic analy-
sis of some linguistic phenomenon.
(ii) Algebraicity: The single-type domain has an algebraic structure.
(iii) Representability: All types of Montagovian objects can be represented
via single-type objects.
(iv) Simplicity: Given its satisfaction of Properties (i ) to (iii), the single ba-
sic type is obtained from the basic Montague types through the least num-
ber of CT-applications.
Property (i) ensures the proximity of our single-type semantics to mainstream the-
ories of formal semantics. Property (ii) allows the interpretation of linguistic con-
nectives as algebraic operations. Property (iii) enables the bootstrapping of repre-
sentations of all Montagovian objects from objects of the single basic type. Prop-
erty (iv) guarantees the low semantic complexity of single-type objects.
In virtue of their conceptual simplicity, the requirements from Properties (i)
and (iv) do not demand further discussion. The requirements from Properties (ii)
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and (iii) are discussed in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. The reader will note that the re-
quirement from Property (ii) is semantically more general than the requirement
from Property (iii). In fact, we will see in Section 4.2 that the property of repre-
sentability is intimately connected to the semantics of a single basic type. Thus,
our discussion of single-type requirements will give us a feel for what is necessary
and what is possible in single-type semantics.
We start with a discussion of the requirement of algebraicity (Property (ii)).
4.1.1. Algebraicity. Algebraicity is the most general requirement on any
single basic type. The obtaining of this property is demanded by the need to pro-
vide ‘natural’ interpretations of linguistic connectives (instead of the proxies from
Ch. 2.1), and to give a formal basis for the relation of linguistic entailment. Many
linguists have suggested that the English words and, or, and not act as algebra-
ic operators between expressions of the same syntactic category.1 But this inter-
pretation of connectives is only possible if their domains have an algebraic struc-
ture. Further, since all single-type candidates are, by definition, the only basic ty-
pe in their associated semantics, the algebraic structure of derived single-type do-
mains depends entirely on the structure of the base domain. Thus, domains of a
derived type only form an algebra if the set of basic-type objects forms an algebra.
We next present the representability requirement on single-type objects (Pro-
perty (iii)).
4.1.2. Representability. The representability requirement on single-type
candidates is a direct consequence of Partee’s claim that it is possible to model the
PTQ fragment through the use of a single basic type (Prop. 1.2). The requirement
demands that objects of any suitable single basic type enable us to bootstrap re-
presentations of objects of all Montague types. The requirement of representabi-
lity is expressed more formally below:
(iii)0 Representability: Assume that a Montague type ↵ is related† to some
single-type type   if there exists, for every type-↵ object a exactly one
type-  object b which represents a, s.t. the objects a and b are one-to-one
related. Then, one of the following holds for every Montague type ↵:
(a) The type ↵ is related† to the single basic type o;
(b) The type ↵ is related† to some derived type ( 1 . . . n; o), where  1,
. . . , 
n
are (basic or derived) single-type types.
Given the existence of a unique single basic-type representation for every indivi-
dual and for every proposition (cf. clause (a)), Church’s type-forming ruleCT en-
1Thus, the word and coordinates sentences (e.g. John sings and Mary dances), noun phrases (John
and a unicorn), verb phrases (sings and dances), adjectival phrases (rhythmic and musical), prepo-
sitional phrases (on screen and in the real world), and many others.
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sures the existence of a unique single-type representation for every Montagovian
object of a derived type (cf. clause (b)). As a result, it su ces for a demonstration
of the satisfaction of Property (iii) to show that (a) obtains. We will see concrete
examples of the success and failure of the representability of single-type objects
in Section 4.2.2, resp. 4.2.3. In Section 4.2.3 (cf. Prop. 4.1, 4.2), we show that our
paradigmatic representable single-type candidates enable us to identify semantic
equivalence relations between proper names and sentences.
Note that Property (iii) does not demand a bijective correspondence between
individuals or propositions and their representations in the single basic type. In-
stead, it only demands an injective map between objects of each of these two ty-
pes. This leaves open the existence of basic single-type objects which do not re-
present an individual or a proposition, and which represent both an individual and
a proposition. As a result of the former, the function from individuals or proposi-
tions to their single-type representations may be non-surjective. As a result of the
latter, the functions from the union of the sets of individuals and propositions
to the set of basic single-type objects may be non-injective. We will see in Sec-
tion 4.2.3 that the non-injectivity of the second function is a necessary condition
for the accommodation of Proposition 1.3.ii.
The definition of representability from (iii)0 comprises two di↵erently deman-
ding requirements on single-type objects. These requirements are given below:
(iii.1) There exists a su ciently large set, O, of basic single-type objects;
(iii.2) There exists an injective map from Montagovian objects to their associ-
ated single-type objects.
In particular, we demand for the satisfaction of requirement (iii.1) that the cardi-
nality, |O|, of the basic single-type domain be at least as large as the cardinality,
|Dhs,ti|, of the set of Montagovian propositions (s.t. |Dhs,ti|  |O|). For the satis-
faction of requirement (iii.2), we demand the specification of an injective function
from individuals and from propositions to basic single-type objects. The first de-
mand is motivated by our considerations from the previous paragraph, and by the
common assumption that there are more propositions than individuals. The sec-
ond demand is motivated by the impossibility of identifying the single-type rep-
resentation of a Montagovian object in the absence of such a function. Since the
satisfaction of the requirement from Property (iii.1) does not imply the satisfac-
tion of the requirement from Property (iii.2), the large cardinality of the basic sin-
gle-type domain is not a su cient criterion for the satisfaction of Property (iii).
We will return to the di↵erent representability requirements in Section 4.2.2.
This completes our discussion of the semantic requirements on the single ba-
sic type. We next show how these requirements can be used to identify a suitable
single-type candidate (or candidates).
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4.2. Identifying Suitable Candidates
Our introduction to this chapter has suggested a successive identification of suit-
able single-type candidates: From the set of Montague types, we pick out types on
the basis of their ability to satisfy Properties (i) to (iv). Types which satisfy these
properties are regarded as ‘good’ single-type candidates, which can serve as the
foundation of our semantics.
We identify the domain of our search for witnesses of Properties (i)–(iii) with
the set of the simplest Montague types, whose members are obtained through at
most two applications of the type-forming rule CT. This restriction is justified
by the existence of suitable single-type candidates in the resulting set (as we will
see below), and by our adoption of the simplicity requirement on the single basic
type from Property (iv). To identify the simplest possible single basic type, we re-
place the Montague types e and hs, ti by the types e, s, and t. This move corres-
ponds to the adoption of a streamlined variant of Montague’s type theory, which
is due to Gallin (1975).
The application of the rule CT to the types e, s, and t yields the single-type
candidates from Figure 4.1:
Darkest right-side partition: ‘Dashed’ right-s. partition:
Algebraic candidates (pass (ii)), ⇤ Algebraic cand’s (pass (ii)),
Representational candidates (pass (iii)) ⇤ Local rep. cand’s (fail (iii))
hhs, ti, ti hs, ti hs, hs, tii
hhe, ti, ti he, hs, tii hs, he, tii
he, he, tii
hs, ei he, ti
e s t
he, ei ht, ei he, si hs, si ht, si ht, ti
hhe, ei, ei hhs, ei, ei hht, ei, ei hhe, ei, si hhs, ei, si hht, ei, si hhe, ei, ti hhs, ei, ti hht, ei, ti
he, he, eii hs, he, eii ht, he, eii he, he, sii hs, he, sii ht, he, sii he, he, tii hs, he, tii ht, he, tii
hhe, si, ei hhs, si, ei hht, si, ei hhe, si, si hhs, si, si hht, si, si hhe, si, ti hhs, si, ti hht, si, ti
he, hs, eii hs, hs, eii ht, hs, eii he, hs, sii hs, hs, sii ht, hs, sii he, hs, tii hs, hs, tii ht, hs, tii
hhe, ti, ei hhs, ti, ei hht, ti, ei hhe, ti, si hhs, ti, si hht, ti, si hhe, ti, ti hhs, ti, ti hht, ti, ti
he, ht, eii hs, ht, eii ht, ht, eii he, ht, sii hs, ht, sii ht, ht, sii he, ht, tii hs, ht, tii ht, ht, tii
Left-side partition: Big right-side partition:
Non-algebraic candidates (fail (ii)), Algebraic cand’s (pass (ii)),
Non-representational candidates (fail (iii)) Non-rep. cand’s (fail (iii))
Figure 4.1. Single-type candidates and their suitability.
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Sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.3 identify single-type candidates on the basis of their abi-
lity to satisfy Properties (ii) (cf. Sect. 4.2.1) and (iii) (cf. Sect. 4.2.2, 4.2.3). The de-
corations in Figure 4.1 summarize the reasons for the persistence or drop-out of
each candidate. In the figure, Montague types which violate the requirement of fa-
miliarity (Property (i)) are printed in grey font.
4.2.1. Identifying Algebraic Types.The availability of an algebraic struc-
ture (cf. Property (ii)) constitutes one of the most e↵ective criteria for the identifi-
cation of potential single-type candidates in the set of types from Figure 4.1. This
criterion relates to the greater ease of interpreting linguistic connectives in alge-
braic domains. In the introduction to this part, we have already suggested that
the domain of the type t has an algebraic structure, such that all domains of some
type h↵1, h. . . , h↵n, tiii inherit this structure through the lifting of operations on
the set of truth-values. As a result, all candidates from the right-side partitions of
Figure 4.1 are suitable single basic types from the point of view of Property (ii).
On the basis of Property (ii), candidates from the left-side partition of Figure
4.1 disqualify as suitable single-type candidates. This is a result of the absence of
an algebraic structure on the domains of individuals and indices in traditional
Montague semantics, and the attendant non-algebraicity of all domains of some
type h↵1, h. . . , h↵n, eiii or h↵1, h. . . , h↵n, siii. Since types of this form constitute
two thirds of the types from Figure 4.1, the algebraicity requirement already en-
ables us to exclude most of the candidate types as suitable single basic types.
Admittedly, the assumption of an algebraic structure on the domains of the
types e and s (along the lines of (Link, 1983) and (Kratzer, 1989)) would pre-
vent the fast exclusion of types h↵1, h. . . , h↵n, eiii and h↵1, h. . . , h↵n, siii as suit-
able single-type candidates. As a result, individuals, indices, and individual con-
cepts (type hs, ei) would still qualify as single-type candidates on the basis of Pro-
perty (ii). In the left partition of Figure 4.1, these types are printed in black font.
The idea of representing individuals and propositions in the type for indices,
s, is supported by Kratzer’s conception of situations as objects which contain in-
dividuals and facts, where facts are the truth-makers of propositions (Kratzer,
1989, pp. 612–613), cf. (Partee, 2006). The idea of representing individuals and
propositions in the type for individuals, e, has its origins in Frege’s characteriza-
tion of truth-values asGegenstände [‘objects’], cf. (Frege, 1891). The latter repre-
sentation has been proposed by some semanticists2 as an obvious single-typing
strategy.However, the required extension3 of the set of individuals with the type-e
correlates of some propositions violates our restriction to traditional Montague
2Proponents include Chierchia and Turner (1988), and Zoltán Gendler Szabó (p.c.).
3This extension is made necessary by the assumption that there are more propositions than indi-
viduals, and by the cardinality requirement on single-type domains (cf. Property (iii.1)).
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(or Gallin) types – in particular, our adoption of Montague’s type-e domain. Sin-
ce the result of this extension would further be very similar to the semantics from
Part I, an e-based single-type semantics will be unable to identify equivalence re-
lations between proper names and sentences (cf. Prop. 3.3). An analogous argu-
ment prevents the adoption of a single-type semantics based on indices. We will
argue in Section 4.2.2 that algebraic individual concepts constitute an equally un-
suitable single basic type. On the example of individual concepts, this section will
also contain a detailed illustration of the above problems.
This completes our identification of algebraic types in the set of single-type
candidates from Figure 4.1. We next turn to the identification of representational
algebraic types.
4.2.2. Excluding Non-Representational Types. The ability of represen-
ting Montagovian individuals and propositions is a more elusive criterion for the
identification of suitable single-type candidates than algebraicity. This is due to
the impossibility of inferring a type’s satisfaction of Property (iii) from its super-
ficial type structure. As a result, we need to check the representability of the re-
maining candidates from the big right-side partition in Figure 4.1 one-by-one. We
do this by attempting to specify an injective function from individuals and from
propositions to objects of the candidate type (cf. Sect. 4.1.2, (iii.2)): If the specifi-
cation of such a function succeeds, we conclude the suitability of this type on the
basis of Property (iii). If the specification of such a function proves di cult, we as-
sume the type’s potential4 unsuitability on the basis of Property (iii).
Below, we will first consider a single-type candidate (i.e. the type t) whose do-
main contains too few objects for an injective representation of Montagovian indi-
viduals or propositions (s.t. this candidate does not satisfy Property (iii.1)). We
will then consider a number of candidates (i.e. the types he, ti, he, he, tii, hs, he, tii,
he, hs, tii, hhe, ti, ti, and hhs, ti, ti) which lack a salient strategy for the injective re-
presentation of individuals or propositions (s.t. it is uncertain whether these can-
didates satisfy Property (iii.2)). In Section 4.2.3, we identify two candidates (i.e.
the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii) whose salient strategy enables the representation of
Montagovian individuals and propositions along the lines of Property (iii.2).
We start our elimination of non-(saliently) representational types with t:
Members of the domain of the type t (i.e. truth-values) do not enable the re-
presentation of Montagovian objects. This due to the small cardinality of the set
of truth-values (i.e. 2) and to the comparatively large cardinality (i.e. 2|Ds|, with
4Notably, our inability to identify an injective function from individuals or propositions to ob-
jects of the single basic type does not imply the non-existence of such a function: We can only in-
fer the non-salience of this function. The presented argument for the identity of a suitable single
basic type is thus only suggestive, not compelling.
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| > 2) of the domain of propositions. As a result, the representation of proposi-
tions via truth-values will associate di↵erent objects of a particular Montague ty-
pe with the same single-type object. But this violates our assumption of an injec-
tive map between the domains of these two types. Admittedly, the replacement of
the set {T, F} by a countably infinite set of truth-degrees would establish the desi-
red relation.However, since there does not exist a principled relation between pro-
positions and truth-degrees (along the lines described below), and since the inter-
pretation of t in a domain other than {T,F} violates our restriction to traditional
Montague (or Gallin) types, the type t is ruled out as a suitable single basic type.
Since they do not allow an easy representation of basic Montagovian objects,
extensional properties of individuals (type he, ti) and binary relations between in-
dividuals (type he, he, tii) are also precluded from our further considerations. This
is due to the fact that their salient representation strategy does not give an injec-
tive representation of propositions. Consider the case of extensional properties of
individuals: Their adoption as basic single-type objects suggests the representati-
on of individuals via their singleton sets. Since every individual a is bijectively re-
lated to the set {a}, this strategy satisfies the injectivity requirement for indivi-
duals. However, there does not exist a comparable strategy for the representation
of propositions. This follows from the fact that few propositions attribute to their
individual a uniquely identifying property (Fact 1) and that many propositions
encode information about more than one individual (Fact 2).
As a consequence of Fact 1, the representation of propositions of the form Fa
(where F denotes a property of individuals, type he, hs, tii) via the set in (4.2.1)
may be ambiguous between the results of attributing the property F to any of the
individuals which also have the property F at the current index @, such that the
representation is not injective.
{x
e
| x has the property F at @}(4.2.1)
For example, if, at @, the property ‘walks’ holds of John, Mary, and Bill, the type-
he, ti representation of ‘Bill walks’, i.e. {x
e
| x walks at @} = {John,Mary,Bill},
will be ambiguous between the representations of the propositions ‘Bill walks’,
‘Mary walks’, ‘John walks’, and their conjunctions and disjunctions. But this con-
tradicts our assumption of a one-to-one mapping between propositions and basic
single-type objects. Since most individuals will, at the current index, have more
than one property, the extension of the restrictor on the set from (4.2.1) by the
conjunct ‘x = a’ (here, by ‘x = Bill’) (in (4.2.2)) does not rectify this situation.
{x
e
| x has the property F at @ and x = a}(4.2.2)
As a consequence of Fact 2, a single proposition can have di↵erent represen-
tations in the type he, ti, such that its representation is also not functional. For
example, since the proposition ‘John loves Mary’ contains information about John
82 4. HISTOIRE D’o
(namely, his loving Mary) as well as Mary (namely, her being loved by John), it can
alternatively be represented by the sets {x
e
| x loves Mary at @} or {x
e
| x is loved
by John at @}. The representation of ‘John loves Mary’ via the union of the above
sets, i.e. {x
e
| x loves Mary or is loved by John at @}, ensures the functionality of
the representation relation on propositions. However, the result is, again, ambigu-
ous between the representations of di↵erent propositions (e.g. the propositions
‘John loves Mary’, ‘Someone loves Mary or is loved by John’) and is, thus, non-
injective. Since analogous observations hold for the representation of propositions
in the type for binary relations between individuals, we exclude, next to the type
he, ti, also the type he, he, tii from our further considerations.
The generalization of the representation strategy from (4.2.2) across indices
(in (4.2.3)) – and the assumption that, for each pair of individuals and for each
property, there exists an index at which only one of the individuals carries the pro-
perty5 – remedy the non-injectivity of the representations of propositions Fa in
the type for intensional properties of individuals (or for functions from indices to
extensional properties of individuals, type hs, he, tii). This is due to the possibility
of restricting the carriers of the property F at every index to the individual a (if





i | x has the property F at w and x = a (4.2.3)
As a result, the characteristic function of the set from (4.2.3) will attribute to each
pair, hw, xi, of an index w and individual x the value T if x has the property F at
w and x is a, and will attribute the value F if x lacks the property F at w or if x
is not a. Let us return to the example from the previous page: Since we assume
that, at some indices, Bill walks, but Mary does not walk, and that, at other in-
dices, Bill walks, but John does not walk, the representation strategy from (4.2.3)
excludes the representations of the propositions ‘Mary walks’ and ‘John walks’.
Despite its merits, the representation strategy from (4.2.3) still fails to ensure
the functional representation of relational propositions like ‘John loves Mary’. Of





x loves Mary or is loved by John at w} to John or Mary. However, since the re-
sult remains ambiguous between the representations of ‘John loves Mary’, ‘Mary
loves herself or is loved by John’, etc., the strategy from (4.2.3) is not suitable for
the representation of propositions in the type hs, he, tii.
Note that the unsuitability of the representational strategy from (4.2.3) does
not imply the general unsuitability of the type hs, he, tii as single-type candidate:
For example, the representation of propositions ' via the characteristic function






i | w 2 ' 
5The strength of this assumption is another reason for the rejection of the presented strategy.
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However, since the less complex type hs, ti enables an equivalent representa-
tion of propositions (as we will see in Sect. 4.2.3, cf. (4.2.9)), the type hs, he, tii
(and, analogously, the type he, hs, tii) does not satisfy the requirement of simplici-
ty from Property (iv). As a result, the types hs, he, tii and he, hs, tii are also exclu-
ded from our further considerations. A similar observation can be made with re-
spect to the type for generalized quantifiers over indices, hhs, ti, ti.
Our discussion of the types he, ti and hs, he, tii from the last two pages has sug-
gested the possibility of representing Montagovian individuals and propositions
via sets of type-he, ti objects (i.e. via generalized quantifiers over individuals, type
hhe, ti, ti). Every individual a can then be represented via the set of its extensional
properties (in (4.2.5)):
{Phe,ti | a 2 P}(4.2.5)
{Phe,ti | a 2 P} [
 {x
e
| x has the property F at @} (4.2.6)
The representation of individuals from (4.2.5) suggests the possibility of represen-
ting propositions via the union of the type-hhe, ti, ti representation of the propo-
sitions’ type-e argument(s) and the singleton containing the arguments’ attribu-
ted property. In (4.2.6), this strategy is formulated for propositions of the form Fa.
Yet, since the result has similar defects as the representation of propositions in the
types he, ti and hs, he, tii, we drop the type hhe, ti, ti from our considerations.
We finish our exclusion of non-saliently representing single-type candidates by
showing the unsuitability of the type hs, ei as a single basic type.
Our assumption of a hypothetical algebraic structure on the domain of indi-
viduals (Sect. 4.2.1) has suggested the possibility of interpreting the PTQ frag-
ment in the type for individual concepts, hs, ei. The adequacy of the type hs, ei as
a single basic type is supported by its comparative simplicity (cf. Property (iv)),
by the prominence of this type in the ontology from (Montague, 1973) (cf. Pro-
perty (i)), and by the greater cardinality (i.e. |D
e
||Ds|) of the set of individual con-
cepts with respect to the cardinality (i.e. 2|Ds|) of the set of propositions (cf. Pro-
perty (iii.1)).
These desirable properties notwithstanding, we will disregard the type hs, ei
as a single basic type. This is due to the impossibility of predicting a name’s intui-
tively equivalent sentences in a given context (cf. Prop. 1.3.ii). To represent Mon-
tagovian objects in the type for individual concepts, one could extend the set of
individuals via the type-e correlates of T and F (cf. Sect. 4.2.1), represent every
individual a by a constant function from indices to a (cf. the graph in (4.2.7)),
and represent every proposition ' by a function from indices w to the individual





i | x = a (4.2.7)





i | x is the type-e correlate of '(w) (4.2.8)
However, as we have pointed out in Section 4.2.1, an extension of the set of indi-
viduals with correlates of the two truth-values violates our restriction to Monta-
govian individuals. Since the representation of propositions as functions to non-
Montagovian individuals renders the function from the union of individuals and
propositions to their single-type representations injective (s.t. no individual con-
cept represents both an individual and a proposition), it further prevents the id-
entification of equivalence relations between names and sentences (cf. Prop. 3.3).
To avoid these problems, one could identify the type-e correlates of the truth-
values T and F instead with di↵erent Montagovian individuals. However, besides
the di culty of determining which individuals should double as truth-values, the
resulting single-type semantics would make counterintuitive predictions about the
above-mentioned equivalence relations.
Consider the type-hs, ei representation of the proposition ‘John runs’ at an in-
dex, @, which is inhabited by three individuals: John, Mary, and Bill. Assume
that, at @, the proposition ‘John runs’ is true. Assume further that Mary serves as
the individual correlate of T, and that Bill serves as the individual correlate of F.
Then, since ‘John runs’ is evaluated ‘T’ at @, the type-hs, ei representation of
‘John runs’ will send @ to Mary. Since the pair h@, Maryi is further a member of
the type-hs, ei representation of Mary (by the strategy from (4.2.7)), the sentence
John runs is semantically equivalent to the proper name Mary at @ in this seman-
tics. But this goes against the intuitions described in Chapter 1.2.1.
The interpretation of proper names as partial functions from indices to indi-
viduals (which fail to output an individual at some indices) may, in some cases,
prevent the derivation of the above-asserted equivalences: If it so happens that, in
the situation from the previous paragraph, Mary does not exist in @, we will not
be able to interpret John runs as the semantic value of Mary at @ in our hs, ei-bas-
ed single-type semantics. However, since the equivalence of two expressions at an
index cannot, in principle, be excluded, the partialized representation strategy is
also unsuitable for the representation of individuals and propositions in the type
hs, ei. As a result, we also exclude the type hs, ei from our further considerations.
This completes our excursus on the possibility of an hs, ei-based single-type se-
mantics. We next show the representability of the remaining single-type candida-
tes from Figure 4.1.
4.2.3. Identifying Representational Types. Since the types hs, ti and
hs, hs, tii enable the injective representation of Montagovian individuals and propo-
sitions (see below), they both constitute promising single-type candidates. We be-
gin by describing the salient representational strategy of the type hs, ti.
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Our discussion of the type hs, he, tii from the previous section has already in-
dicated the possibility of representing individuals and propositions in the type for
functions from indices to truth-values, hs, ti. This type enables the representation
of every individual a by the characteristic function of the set of all indices in which
this individual exists, and enables the representation of every proposition ' by the
characteristic function of the set of all indices at which the proposition’s designa-
tor is true. In a single-type semantics based on the type hs, ti, propositions will,
thus, be represented by ‘themselves’ (cf. the representation of ' in (4.2.9), below).
In the type-hs, ti representation of individuals (in (4.2.10)), an individual’s ex-
istence in an index is understood as the individual’s ‘being in an index’ (i.e. as the
individual’s inhabitance of that index). This understanding of existence corres-
ponds to our pre-theoretical intuitions about existence, and to the understanding
of concreteness (i.e. the occupancy of a spatio-temporal position) in fixed-domain
quantified modal logic, cf. (Linsky and Zalta, 1994). As a result of the former,
an individual either exists or does not exist in each index. As a result of the latter,
the same individual can exist in di↵erent indices (i.e. individuals can exist across
indices). In Chapter 6.1, the described behavior of existence will be captured in
the axioms Ax10 and Ax11, respectively.
{w
s
| w 2 '}(4.2.9)
{w
s
| a exists in w}(4.2.10)
To ensure the injectivity of the individual-representations from (4.2.10) (s.t. no
two individuals are represented by the same set of indices), we postulate that, for
every pair of individuals, there is an index at which one, but not the other indi-
vidual exists. This assumption – which will be captured in axiom Ax12 – is com-
mon in Situation Semantics, cf. (Muskens, 1995, pp. 70–71), and in the seman-
tics of quantified modal logic. It will receive further justification and discussion
in Chapter 6.1.
Since the characteristic functions of the sets from (4.2.9) and (4.2.10) repres-
ent every individual a in the same single-type object as the proposition ‘a exists’,
their union is non-injective. This observation motivates the following claim:
Proposition 4.1 (Weak Single-Type Hypothesis). In an hs, ti-based single-
type semantics, the representations of individuals are identical to the result of at-
tributing them an existence property.
In virtue of the strategy from (4.2.10), the representations of individuals in
the type hs, ti carry only very weak semantic information, such that they cannot
encode information about an individual’s contextually salient properties besides
existence. By itself, the informational poverty of type-hs, ti representations of in-
dividuals and propositions is unproblematic. However, we will see in Part III that
an hs, ti-based single-type semantics fails to identify a name’s contingent senten-
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tial equivalents (cf. Prop. 1.3.ii).
To accommodate Proposition 1.3.ii, we provide a semantically richer represen-
tation of individuals and propositions. This representation proceeds in the type
for functions from indices to propositions, hs, hs, tii. In analogy with the name for
type-hs, ei objects (which are called individual concepts), we refer to functions of
the type hs, hs, tii as propositional concepts.6
The particular representation strategy of propositional concepts follows the
strategy for the representation of individuals and propositions in the type hhe, ti, ti
(cf. (4.2.5), (4.2.6)). Only, rather than representing every individual a via the set
of its extensional properties at the current index @, we represent this individual
via the set of indices at which all true propositions at @ which carry information
about the individual are true. To facilitate the introduction of this new represen-
tation strategy, we first consider representations of individuals at the current in-
dex. These representations proceed in the familiar type for Montagovian proposi-
tions, hs, ti. Propositional concepts (type hs, hs, tii) will only be required for the
generalization of this representation strategy across indices.
At the index @, every individual a is represented by the characteristic func-
tion of the set of indices from (4.2.11) (below). In the restrictor of this set, the
aboutness of a proposition p with respect to an individual a is defined as follows:
Definition 4.2.1 (Aboutness). A proposition p is about the individual a i↵
p is equivalent to a formula of the form Fa (with F a type-he, hs, tii constant).
For example, since the logical correlates, Rj and Rm, of the sentences John runs
and Mary does not run contain the correlates, i.e. j and m, of the names John and
Mary as constituents, the propositions ‘John runs’ and ‘Mary does not run’ will be
about John, resp.Mary. Similarly, since the correlates of the sentences John loves
Mary and John runs and Mary does not run both contain the correlates of the names
John and Mary, the propositions denoted by these sentences will both be about
John and Mary. We will see in Chapter 6.1 that the behavior of the aboutness pre-
dicate can be derived from the small set of axioms from (Perry, 1986, p. 129).
(4.2.11) {w
s
| for all phs,ti, if @ 2 p and p is about a, then w 2 p}
Axiom Ax12 ensures the injectivity of type-hs, ti individual-representations:
Since there is, for every pair of individuals, an index at which one, but not the oth-
er individual exists, no two individuals will, at @, be represented by the same set
of indices. This even holds of individuals which have exactly the same properties
at @ (including the property ‘exists in @’): For two such individuals b and c, the
aboutness-relevant @-true propositions ‘b exists’ (resp. ‘does not exist’) and ‘c ex-
ists’ (resp. ‘does not exist’) will, by Ax12, never be true at the same indices.
6This name has been suggested by Jeroen Groenendijk.
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For brevity, we will hereafter denote the type-hs, hs, tii representation of an
individual a at the index @ from (4.2.11) by ‘a†@’.
To aid the reader’s understanding of our strategy for the type-hs, hs, tii repre-
sentation of individuals, we illustrate this strategy by means of an example: Con-
sider the representation, j†@, of John at @ in a universe consisting of three indices,
@, w1, and w2, and two individuals: John (abbreviated j) and Mary (m). Assume
that Mary exists in all indices, s.t. the proposition ‘Mary exists’ (Em) is true at @,
w1, and w2, and that John exists in the indices @ and w1, s.t. the proposition
‘John exists’ (Ej) is true at @ and w1.
7 Assume further that, at the current index,
the propositions ‘John runs’ (Rj) and ‘Mary runs’ (Rm) are true (s.t.Ej, Em,
Rj, and Rm obtain at @), that, at the index w1, the propositions ‘John runs’ and
‘Mary doesn’t run’ (Rm) are true (s.t. Ej, Em, Rj, and Rm obtain at w1), and
that, at the index w2, the propositions ‘John doesn’t run’ and ‘Mary runs’ are















@ w1| {z } w2 j
†
@
for all w 2 j†@ : w 2 (Ej \Rj)
Figure 4.2. An hs, hs, tii-representation of John at @.
Then, by our definition of aboutness, ‘John exists’ and ‘John runs’ are the only
true propositions at @ which carry information about John. As a result, we repre-
sent John at @ by the subset of the set {@, w1, w2} at whose members John exists
and runs. We identify this subset with the set {@, w1} (underbraced in Fig. 4.2),
which encodes the information that John, who exists, runs.
To enable the type-hs, hs, tii representation of individuals at other indices –
and, thus, to enable the identification of equivalence relations between proper na-
mes and sentences at those indices (cf. Prop. 1.3.ii) –, we generalize the represen-
tation strategy from (4.2.11) to the strategy from (4.2.12):
(4.2.12)
 hw1, wi | for all phs,ti, if w1 2 p and p is about a, then w 2 p
 
7The non-existence of John in w2 (s.t. {ws | John exists in w} 6= {ws | Mary exists in w}) wit-
nesses the requirement from Ax12.
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The above is equivalent to a function from indices to the rich type-hs, ti represen-
tation of the individual a at those indices. In line with our earlier conventions, we
will sometimes denote the object from (4.2.12) by ‘a†’.
Objects of the described form are familiar from intensional, indexical, and dy-
namic semantics. Thus, in Landman’s Data Semantics, cf. (Landman, 1984), in-
dividuals in an information state   are represented via the sets of true propositi-
ons at   which carry information about them. In Kaplan’s semantics for indexical
expressions, cf. (Kaplan, 1989), character is described as a function from situati-
onal contexts (type s) to semantic contents (type e, or hs, ti). In Muskens’ (1996)
type-theoretic formulation of Discourse Representation Theory, discourse repre-
sentation structures are treated as functions from states to propositions.
On the basis of the above, we next turn to the type-hs, hs, tii representation of
propositions.
The most straightforward strategy for the representation of propositions lies
in the identification of propositions with (the characteristic function of) the set of
all indices at which they are true (cf. (4.2.9)). This set can be lifted to the type for
propositional concepts by taking the constant function from indices to this set:
(4.2.13)
 hw1, wi | w 2 '
 
However, representations of the form from (4.2.13) violate our intuition that the
single-type representations of propositions are semantically at least as rich as the
representations of the individuals about which they carry information (hereafter,
the propositions’ aboutness subjects). As a result, the representation of propositi-
ons by objects of the form from (4.2.13) blocks the identification of the represen-
tations of contextually salient propositions with the representations of their about-
ness subjects (Prop. 1.3.ii).
To accommodate a semantically richer representation of propositions, we rep-
resent the truth-value of every proposition ' at the current index @ via the inter-
section of the set of indices at which ' is true (cf. (4.2.9)) and (the intersection of)
the type-hs, hs, tii representation(s) of '’s aboutness subject(s) at @ (cf. (4.2.11)):
{w
s
|w 2 '} \  
\








| w 2 ' and, for all phs,ti, if @ 2 p and,
{w
s
| for some x
e
, ' is about x and p is about x, then w 2 p}
We will sometimes denote the resulting set by ‘'†@’.
We also illustrate our strategy for the type-hs, hs, tii representation of propo-
sitions by means of an example: Consider the representation of the proposition
‘John loves Mary’ (Lmj) at @ in a universe consisting of three indices, @, w1, and
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w2, and three individuals, John (j), Mary (m), and Bill (b). Assume that Mary
exists in all indices, that John exists in @ and w1, and that Bill only exists in @.
Assume further that, at the current index and at the index w1, the proposition
‘John loves Mary’ is true (s.t. Ej, Em, Eb, and Lmj obtain at @, and Ej, Em,
Eb, and Lmj obtain at w1) and that, at the index w2, the proposition ‘John loves
















@ w1| {z } w2 (Lmj)
†
@
for all w 2 Lmj†@ : w 2 (Lmj \ (Ej \ Em))
Figure 4.3. An hs, hs, tii-representation of ‘John loves Mary’ at @.
Then, ‘John loves Mary’, ‘John exists’, and ‘Mary exists’ are the only true propo-
sitions at @ which carry information about the aboutness subjects (i.e. John and
Mary) of the proposition ‘John loves Mary’. As a result, we represent the truth-
value of the proposition ‘John loves Mary’ at @ by the subset of the set {@, w1,
w2} at whose members the propositions ‘John loves Mary’, ‘John exists’, and ‘Ma-
ry exists’ are true. This subset is the set {@, w1} (underbraced in Fig. 4.3).
The representation strategies from (4.2.11) and (4.2.14) lead us to expect the
following for an hs, hs, tii-based single-type semantics:
Proposition 4.2 (Strong Single-Type Hypothesis). If a proposition is true at
a given index w, its type-hs, hs, tii representation at w is equivalent to (the inter-
section of ) the representations of the proposition’s aboutness subject(s) at w.
For example, since the proposition ‘John loves Mary’ is true at the index w1 from
Figure 4.3, its type-hs, hs, tii representation at w1 (in (4.2.15)) is exactly the inter-
section (in (4.2.16)) of the type-hs, hs, tii representations of its aboutness subjects,
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Note that, if a proposition is false at the current index, the intersection of its
index set with the representation of its aboutness subjects at @ will be empty. As
a result, the representation of the proposition ' at @ will be identified with the
representation of all propositions which fail to be true at @. To ensure that such
cases do not disable the injective representation of propositions, we generalize the
representation strategy from (4.2.14) to the strategy from (4.2.17):
 hw1, wi | w 2 ' and, for all phs,ti, if w1 2 p and,(4.2.17)  hw1, wi | for some x, ' is about x and p is about x, then w 2 p
 
We will sometimes denote objects of the above form by ‘'†’.
This completes our identification of single-type candidates on the basis of their
salient satisfaction of Property (iii). We close the chapter by discussing one fur-
ther requirement on suitable single basic types.
4.2.4. Partializing the Suitable Types. Our previous considerations have
presupposed a traditional Montagovian interpretation of indices as possible worlds
(cf. Sect. 1.1.1). Since possible worlds are totally defined, we assume that the de-
signator of every proposition p will be either true or false at each world w (s.t.
w 2 p or w 2 ¬p). However, the identification of indices with possible worlds yie-
lds undesirable consequences for the single-type semantics of the types hs, ti and
hs, hs, tii.
In particular, since we have identified an individual’s type-hs, hs, tii represen-
tation at an index w with the representations of all true propositions at w which
carry information about the individual (cf. Prop. 4.2), every name a will, at each
index, be equivalent to the result of merging the name with the designator, F (or
¬F ), of (the complement of) every identifiable property: If w 2 Fa, then Fa will
be judged equivalent to a; if w 2 ¬Fa, then ¬Fa will be judged equivalent to a
in our hs, hs, tii-based semantics. But this contradicts the empirical findings from
Chapter 1.2.1, where the sets of admissible name-equivalents are typically very
small.
For instance, in Chapter 1.2.1, only (equivalents of) the sentences Barbara Par-
tee is entering the room (cf. (9b)) and Barbara Partee is arriving (cf. (9c)) are judged
to be equivalent to the name Barbara Partee from (9a). However, if it is also true
(or false) at the relevant index8 that Barbara Partee is thinking about semantics,
our representation strategies from (4.2.12) and (4.2.17) also predict the equiva-
lence of the name Barbara Partee with (the negation of) the sentence Barbara Par-
tee is thinking about semantics. But this violates our intuitions about the equiva-
lence relations between proper names and sentences from Chapter 1.2.1.
8The relevant index is here understood as a possible world w of which the descriptions from (9)
are true (s.t. Barbara Partee is arriving at w by entering the room).
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The intuitive non-equivalence of the above expressions is illustrated by the
possibility (in (22c), below) of negating the names’ predicted sentential equiva-
lents without the loss of consistency. This possibility suggests that the semantic
information encoded in the sentence Barbara Partee is thinking about semantics is
not contained in the information of the name Barbara Partee:
(22) Context: A woman is entering the room. A linguist turns to her friend,
gestures towards the door, and says (a).
a. [npBarbara Partee]
b. ⇤ [npBarbara Partee] is not entering the room.
c. [npBarbara Partee] is not thinking about semantics.
Since – granted the context from (9) – the negation of (9b) (in (22b)) generates a
contradiction, it suggests that the semantic information encoded in the sentence
Barbara Partee is entering the room (and, similarly, for the sentence Barbara Partee
is arriving) is contained in the information of the name Barbara Partee.
Below, we will first explain our intuitions behind the restrictions on the equi-
valence set of the name Barbara Partee from (9a). We will then present a strategy
for the accommodation of these intuitions in an hs, hs, tii-based semantics.We will
see that this strategy also explains the small size of the equivalence sets in the
other examples from Chapter 1.2.1.
In (9), the small size of the equivalence set of the name Barbara Partee is jus-
tified by the name’s context of use. We identify this context with a part of the cur-
rent index (called a partial possible world, or a possible situation; cf. (Barwise
and Perry, 1983; Kratzer, 1989)). Partial possible worlds only determine the
truth or falsity of a proper subset of the set of true or false propositions at @. As
a result, the designators of some propositions p will be neither true or false at a
situation w (s.t. w /2 p and w /2 ¬p).
Common grounds (Stalnaker, 1978), visual scenes (Barwise, 1981), and
information (or knowledge) states (Veltman, 1996) are good candidates for par-
tial possible worlds. For example, in the situation from (9), the relevant partial
world can be identified with the visual scene of Barbara Partee entering the room.
We assume that the two participants of the situation are presented this scene (s.t.
they both witness Partee’s entering the room at approximately the same time).
Then, since (equivalents and entailments of) the sentence Barbara Partee is ente-
ring the room are the only true sentences about Barbara Partee at the shared sce-
ne, the individual Barbara Partee will be represented via the proposition ‘Barbara
Partee is entering the room’ in an hs, hs, tii-based single-type semantics. As a re-
sult, (equivalents of) the sentence Barbara Partee is entering the room will be the
only sentential equivalents of the name Barbara Partee at the presented scene in
an hs, hs, tii-based single-type semantics.
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Notably, the presented strategy for the restriction of a name’s sentential eq-
uivalents is only applicable if the designators of some propositions p are neither
true nor false at some situations w (s.t. w /2 p and w /2 ¬p). But this is only pos-
sible if we extend the set of truth-values, {T,F}, via the undefined truth-value N
(neither-true-nor-false). Since we can represent the resulting elements true, false,
and neither-true-nor-false by the sets of truth-values {T}, {F}, and ;, respective-
ly, we will hereafter refer to these elements as truth-combinations. The possibility
of evaluating a sentence as ‘N’ at a situation enables the exclusion of this senten-
ce from the set of true (or false) sentences at this situation (s.t. the truth or falsi-
ty of this sentence is not decided by the situation). By our strategy for the repre-
sentation of individuals from (4.2.12), this sentence will then disqualify as the sen-
tential equivalent of any proper name at that situation. For example, since the
sentence Barbara Partee is thinking about semantics receives the truth-combination
‘N’ at the visual scene from (9), it does not qualify as a semantic equivalent of the
name Barbara Partee at this scene.
Beyond the above, the partialization of the set of truth-values is motivated by
our wish to preserve the standard behavior of negation in the type-hs, ti represen-
tation of individuals. Conservative semantics, cf. (Russell, 1905), evaluate both
the result, Fa, and the negation, ¬Fa, of the result of attributing a contextually
salient property F to an individual a at an index w where a does not exist as ‘F’.
For example, since Vulcan does not exist in the actual world, such semantics eva-
luate both the sentence Vulcan is a planet and the sentence It is not the case that
Vulcan is a planet (or Vulcan is not a planet) as false. However, this violates the fa-
miliar axioms for negation.9 Since the truth-combination N is uncomplemented
(s.t. N = N), the evaluation of both Fa and ¬Fa at w as ‘N’, cf. (Strawson,
1950), preserves the familiar behavior of negation. (Strawson, 1950)
This completes the presentation of our strategy for the restriction of name/
sentence-equivalences to intuitively admissible equivalences. We close the section
by justifying our partialization of type-s and -t objects, and by adapting our re-
presentation strategies from (4.2.12) and (4.2.17) to these partial objects.
Our generalization of worlds and truth-values to situations and truth-combi-
nations is justified by the fact that functions from situations to truth-combinations
(type hs, ti) are equivalent (up to coding) to functions from (functions from worlds
to truth-values) (i.e. from total sets of worlds) to functions from truth-values to
truth-values (i.e. to total sets of truth-values) (type hhs, ti, ht, tii), and by the fact
that functions from situations to (functions from situations to truth-combinations)
(i.e. functions to partial sets of situations; type hs, hs, tii) are equivalent to func-
tions from total sets of worlds to functions from worlds to total sets of truth-values
(i.e. to partial sets of worlds) (type hhs, ti, hs, ht, tiii).
9According to the axiom of Top and Bottom (cf. Ax9), if Fa(w) = F, then ¬Fa(w) = T.
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The possibility of coding situations as total sets of worlds10 is enabled by a
corollary11 of Stone’s Theorem (Stone, 1936), cf. (Davey and Priestley, 2002).
For our present purposes, this corollary is interpreted as stating that every situati-
on w can be coded by the set of all worlds w1 which maximally extend the seman-
tic information encoded in w. This is the case if the designators of all propositi-
ons p which receive a classical truth-value at w (s.t. p(w) = T or p(w) = F) pre-
serve their truth-value at w1. Total sets of worlds of the above form (called possi-
bilities) are a standard tool in formal semantics and epistemic logic, cf. (Groenen-
dijk and Stokhof, 1991; Groenendijk and Roelofsen, 2009).
The possibility of coding truth-combinations as total sets of truth-values12 is
enabled by the fact that the domain of the type ht, ti has four total functions as
its members. The descriptions and the characteristic sets of these functions are
given below: (1991)
(i) the function which outputs its input: {T}
(ii) the function which outputs the complement of its input: {F}
(iii) the function which outputs F for every input: ;
(iv) the function which outputs T for every input: {T,F}
Since the characteristic sets of the functions from (i) to (iii) correspond to the tru-
th-combinations true-and-not-false, false-and-not-true, and neither-true-nor-false,
respectively, they provide a ‘natural’ coding of these combinations. Since our re-
presentation strategy does not require a fourth truth-combination (typically, both-
true-and-false, ‘B’), we neglect the function from (iv).
The possibility of coding the types for functions from situations to truth-com-
binations and from situations to (functions from situations to truth-combinations)
in terms of traditional Montague (or Gallin) types justifies our association of the
types s and t with sets of possible situations and truth-combinations, which are
not traditionally used in Montague semantics. To remind the reader of our partial
interpretation of these types, we will hereafter sometimes refer to the types s and t
as partial types. (2009)
As a result of our replacement of total by partial Gallin types, it may happen
that the designator of a proposition ' may be neither true nor false at the repre-
senting situation w1. To compensate for such occurrences, we require that ' be
true at every member of its type-hs, hs, tii representation at w1 (cf. the first con-
10This possibility regards the coding of the underlined types on the left of the arrows from
hs, ti ,! hhs, ti, ht, tii and hs, hs, tii ,! hhs, ti, hs, tii to the underlined types on the right of the
arrows.
11This corollary states that every filter in a distributive lattice is the intersection of all prime fil-
ters extending that filter.
12This possibility regards the coding of the underlined types left of the arrows from hs, ti ,!
hhs, ti, ht, tii and hs, hs, tii ,! hhs, ti, hs, ht, tiii to the underlined types on the right of the arrows.
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junct in the representation scheme from (4.2.14)). Thus, (4.2.14) expresses an up-
date on the available information at w1 via the information encoded in the pro-
position '.
Our replacement of total by partial Gallin types even requires an adaptation
of the representational strategies of the type hs, hs, tii from (4.2.12) and (4.2.17).
This is due to the fact that we associate the type hs, ti with partial sets of situ-
ations. In Section 4.2.3, we have specified that the restrictor on the set of ordered
pairs from (4.2.12) (i.e. ‘for all p, if w1 2 p and p is about a, then w 2 p’) will be
satisfied by all indices w where all true propositions at w1 which carry information
about a are true, and whose false propositions either fail to be true at w1 or fail
to carry information about a. But this excludes the possibility of representing an
individual at a partial situation via a proper extension of this situation which con-
tains ‘new’ information about the represented individual. This is the case if an ab-
outness-relevant proposition whose truth-value is undefined at the original situ-
ation receives a classical truth-value at the representing situation.
Consider the following partial variant13 (in Fig. 4.4) of the example from Fi-
gure 4.2. In particular, we now consider the representation of John at the partial
situation @ in a universe consisting of the situations @, w2, and w3, and the indi-
viduals John (j) and Mary (m). We again assume that Mary exists in all situati-
ons, and that John exists in the situations @ and w3. We further assume that, at
the situation w3, the proposition ‘John runs’ is true, and that, at the situation w2,
the proposition ‘Mary runs’ is true. As a result, Ej and Em obtain at @, Ej, Em,









@ w3| {z } w2 j
†
@
for all w 2 j†@ : w 2 Ej
Figure 4.4. An hs, hs, tii-representation of John at partial @.
Since the proposition ‘John exists’ is the only true proposition at @ which carries
information about John, we expect that, at @, John will be represented by the set
of the situations @ and w3 (underbraced in Fig. 4.4). However, this set does not
satisfy the representation strategy from (4.2.12). In particular, in the example
13To avoid a confusion of variables, we have changed the name of the index w1 from Figure 4.2.
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from Figure 4.4, some false proposition at w3 (i.e. Rj) is neither false at the situ-
ation @, nor does it fail to carry information about John.
To solve this problem, we replace the material conditional ‘if . . . , then . . .’
from (4.2.12) and (4.2.17) by the ‘starred’ conditional ‘?if . . . , ?then . . .’ (cf. (4.2.18),
(4.2.19), below). The conditional ‘?if . . . , ?then . . .’ is interpreted as the defined-
ness relation on partial objects, which orders these objects with respect to their
encoded information. In particular, for propositional constants ' and  , the con-
ditional ‘?if ', ?then  ’ asserts that the proposition denoted by  contains at least
as much information as ', such that  is true if ' is true, and is false if ' is false.
As a result, the conditional from (4.2.18) will be true of w if all true propositions
at w1 which carry information about a are true and if all false propositions at w1
which carry information about a are false.
(4.2.18)
 hw1, wi | for all phs,ti, ?if w1 2 p and p is about a, ?then w 2 p
 
 hw1, wi | w 2 ' and, for all phs,ti, ?if w1 2 p and,(4.2.19)  hw1, wi | for some x, ' is about x and p is about x, ?then w 2 p
 
It is easy to see that the intuitive representation of John from Figure 4.4 follows
this strategy.
In virtue of the above, the representation of some individual a whose existence
is the only available information at the current situation is exactly the type-hs, ti
representation of a from (4.2.10). This observation is captured in Proposition 4.3:
Proposition 4.3. If all true propositions at @ which carry information about
a are (equivalent to) the proposition ‘a exists’, then a†@ = {ws | a exists in w}.
The application of Proposition 4.3 to the single-type semantics of the types hs, ti
and hs, hs, tii will be captured in Chapters 7.3 and 8.3 (Part III).
Notably, the strategy from (4.2.18) also enables the representation of indivi-
duals which do not exist in the current situation. This is due to the fact that exis-
tence is a bivalent property, such that the existence or non-existence of each indi-
vidual is decided at every situation. If the non-existence of an individual a is the
only true proposition about a at the current situation, we represent a at @ via the
set of all situations in which it does not exist.14 Thus, at the situation w2 from
Figure 4.4, we represent John by the set of situations from (4.2.20):
(4.2.20) {w
s
| w 2 ¬Ej}
14Clearly, to apply this strategy to individuals (e.g. the round square) which do not exist in any
situation, we would need to extend the set of situations via impossible situations (Hintikka,
1975), cf. (Rantala, 1982; Barwise, 1997; Zalta, 1997). However, since the PTQ fragment
does not contain designators of the critical individuals, we refrain from adopting this strategy.
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The assumption of individual-discerning situations (s.t. there is, for every pair of
individuals, a situation at which one, but not the other individual exists; cf.Ax12),
again preserves the injectivity of this representation.
The specification of information updates (i.e. ‘w 2 '’) in the strategy from
(4.2.19) enables the modeling of information growth. To see this, consider the re-
presentation of the proposition ‘John runs’ at the situation @ from Figure 4.4 (in
(4.2.21)). This representation is obtained by extending the set of true propositions
about John at @ by the information encoded in the proposition ‘John runs’. This
extension corresponds to the elimination of those situations (i.e. @ and w2) from
the set of John-representing situations at @ at which the proposition ‘John runs’






| John runs at w} \ j†@(4.2.21)
= {w
s
| John runs at w} \ {w
s
| John exists at w}
6= j†@
The above strategy suggests the representation of properties of individuals at a
given situation by functions from the local representation of individuals in the pro-
perty’s domain (here, the @-specific representation of John from Fig. 4.4) to the
local representation of the result of attributing the property to the individuals
(e.g. the @-specific representation of ‘John runs’ from (4.2.21)). The latter repre-
sentation corresponds to the result of obtaining the representation of John at the
better-defined index w3, which distinguishes itself from @ at most with respect to
the obtaining of the proposition ‘John runs’.
This completes our identification and description of suitable single basic ty-
pes. We close by comparing our new single basic types with Partee’s preliminary
single-type choice, and by summarizing the main results of this chapter.
4.3. Single-Type Candidates and Partee’s Conjecture
The introduction to this dissertation (cf. Ch. 1.2.2) has presented Partee’s attem-
pt at supporting Proposition 1.2 through the use of extensional properties of Krat-
zer-style situations (Kratzer, 1989), cf. (Partee, 2006, p. 40). The considerati-
ons from this chapter disclose three interesting facts about this basic-type choice:
(1) The type for extensional properties of situations (type hs, ti) is a suitable
single basic type which satisfies Properties (i) to (iv), and which accom-
modates Propositions 1.2 and 1.3.i.
(2) Partee places more constraints on single-type objects than necessary.
Granted her disregard of the behavior of names and sentences from Pro-
position 1.3, properties of possible worlds (i.e. total objects of the type
hs, ti) are equally suitable.
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(3) Partee neglects an alternative type (for propositional concepts, type hs,
hs, tii). This type accommodates Proposition 1.2 and its consequences
from Proposition 1.3 (including Proposition 1.3.ii).
The observations from items (1) to (3) partly support Partee’s basic-type choice.
However, they emphasize the need to carefully consider competing candidates (3),
and stress the possibility of adhering more closely to Montague’s original semantic
ontology (cf. the adoption of possible worlds, (2)). The possibility of representing
partial situations via sets of their extending possible worlds (cf. Sect. 4.2.4) em-
phasizes the role of semantic operations and representational strategies in ontolo-
gy. The failure of an hs, ti-based single-type semantics to accommodate Proposi-
tion 1.3.ii will be the subject of Chapter 7 (Part III).
4.4. Summary
This chapter has identified the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii as suitable types for the
interpretation of the single basic type o from Part I. These types are associated
with propositions and with propositional concepts, respectively. Objects of these
two types are familiar from existing work in formal semantics, have an algebraic
structure, and enable an injective representation of Montagovian individuals and
propositions. In virtue of their specific representational strategy, the types hs, ti
and hs, hs, tii further describe the propositional content of the correlates of indi-
viduals in a single-type system.
We have seen that the di↵erent representational strategies of the types hs, ti
and hs, hs, tii yield single-type objects of di↵erent semantic complexity. Thus, the
type hs, hs, tii represents individuals as the result of attributing them a contextu-
ally salient property (Prop. 4.2, cf. Prop. 1.3.ii). The type hs, ti can only represent
individuals as the result of attributing them an existence property (Prop. 4.1).
The existence of two di↵erently informative single-type semantics for the
PTQ fragment will be the subject of discussion in the next chapter. That chapter
will also investigate the distinction between the object- and the metatheory of our




The previous chapter has identified a list of semantically desirable properties for
any suitable single basic type. The present chapter describes the suitable types’
meta-properties, and discusses a number of related methodological issues. Meta-
properties include the equivalence (up to coding) of representations of Montago-
vian objects in the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii with their representations in higher-
rank types (Sect. 5.1.1), the existence of two ‘brands’ of di↵erently informative
single-type semantics (Sect. 5.2.1), and the distinction between an object theory
and a metatheory of single-type semantics (Sect. 5.3.1). Methodological issues in-
clude the robustness of our semantics with respect to their particular single-type
choice (Sect. 5.1.2), the natural classification of single-type theories according to
their informational strength (Sect. 5.2.2), and their decomposition into di↵erently
elementary constituents (Sect. 5.3.2). The distinctions between an object- and a
metatheory of single-type semantics and between a weak and a strong represen-
tation of Montagovian objects will structure the remainder of this dissertation.
5.1. Robustness in Single-Type Semantics
Our considerations from Chapter 4 have identified the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii as
the most promising interpreting types for the type o from Part I. This is due to the
fact that the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii satisfy the requirements from Properties (i)
to (vi), such that their associated semantics model the PTQ fragment along the
lines of Chapter 3. In particular, the simplicity of the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii en-
sures the (comparatively) low semantic complexity of the interpretations of PTQ
expressions in single-type models. However, as has been suggested by our discus-
sion of the types he, hs, tii and hhs, ti, ti (cf. Ch. 4.2.2), the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii
are not the only viable single-type choices. Alternatives include the type for func-
tions from situations to generalized quantifiers over situations hs, hhs, ti, tii, from
propositions to propositions hhs, ti, hs, tii, and infinitely many others1.
Section 5.1.1 describes the representations of individuals and propositions in
some of these more complex types. Section 5.1.2 discusses the invariance of single-
1These types take the form hhs,~ti, hhs, ti,~tii, where ~t abbreviates constructions of the form h. . . ,
h. . . , h. . . , ti, ti, . . .i for any number of types t.
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type models under their basic-type choice (granted that the basic types use a sa-
me-strength representational strategy and that they satisfy the conditions from
Properties (i) to (iii)).
5.1.1. Other Single-Type Choices. Like the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii, the
types hs, hhs, ti, tii and hhs, ti, hs, tii enable the principled representation of obje-
cts of all Montague types along the lines suggested by Property (iii). In particu-
lar, the type hs, hhs, ti, tii enables the weak representation of individuals and pro-
positions by objects of the form from (5.1.1), resp. (5.1.2), and enables the strong
representation of individuals and propositions by objects of the form from (5.1.3),
resp. (5.1.4). The objects from (5.1.1) and (5.1.2) code the weak representations
from (4.2.10) and (4.2.9). The objects from (5.1.3) and (5.1.4) code the strong re-
presentations from (4.2.12) and (4.2.17).
 hw
s
, phs,tii | p = {w0
s
| a exists in w0} (5.1.1)
 hw
s
, phs,tii | p = {w0
s
|w0 2 '} (5.1.2)
 hw
s





, phs,tii | (w 2 p or p = ') and,(5.1.4)  hw
s
, phs,tii | for some xe, ' is about x and p is about x
 
The adoption of the basic type hhs, ti, hs, tii enables an analogous representation
of individuals and propositions. In particular, the weak representation of individu-
als and propositions is described in (5.1.5) and (5.1.6). The strong representation
of individuals and propositions is provided in (5.1.7) and (5.1.8). In the last two
representations, approximation is the inverse of the definedness relation on partial
objects from (4.2.18) and (4.2.19). As a result, a proposition ' approximates a pro-
position  i↵  contains at least as much information as '.
 hphs,ti, wsi | a exists in w
 
(5.1.5)
 hphs,ti, wsi | w 2 '
 
(5.1.6)
 hphs,ti, wi | for all p0hs,ti,(5.1.7)  hphs,ti, wi | if p approximates p0 and p0 is about a, then w 2 p0
 
 hphs,ti, wi | w 2 ' and, for all p0hs,ti, if p approximates p0 and,(5.1.8)  hphs,ti, wi | for some x, ' is about x and p0 is about x, then w 2 p0
 
That the types hs, hhs, ti, tii and hhs, ti, hs, tii satisfy the representability require-
ment from Property (iii) is a direct consequence of the possibility of representing
individuals and propositions in the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii (cf. Ch. 4.2.3), and of
the possibility of coding every object of some Montague type ↵ in the type h↵, ti
(and, hence, in the types hh↵, ti, ti, hhh↵, ti, ti, ti, etc.). The latter is a general rep-
5.2. CLASSIFICATION OF SINGLE-TYPE SEMANTICS 101
resentational property of type- (or set-)theoretic objects, which is exploited in fle-
xible Montague grammar (cf. Ch. 1.2.1, 1.4.2).
5.1.2. Invariance Properties of Single-Type Models. In virtue of their
particular representation strategy, the representations of individuals and proposi-
tions in the types hs, hhs, ti, tii and hhs, ti, hs, tii will carry the same information as
their representations in the type hs, ti (resp. hs, hs, tii), such that they are equiva-
lent up to coding. As a result, the provision of a single-type semantics for the PTQ
fragment is independent of our particular basic-type choice. (Note, however, that
the representation of Montagovian objects in a higher-rank type is typically2 less
intuitive and representationally more ‘expensive’ than their representation in a lo-
wer-rank type. Our adoption of the simplicity requirement from Chapter 4 reflec-
ts this consideration).
The independence of single-type semantics of our basic-type choice is reminis-
cent of the robustness of minimal models3 of phenomena in mathematics and the
exact sciences. This robustness is witnessed by the stability of most mathematical
models of physics under calculational shortcuts, and by the formulation-invariance
of the minimal logical theories which prove theorems of ordinary mathematics, cf.
(Friedman, 1975; Simpson, 2009).4
The irrelevance of our single-type choice for the successful modeling of the
PTQ fragment is a particularly strong robustness property. This is suggested by
the fact that the existence (up to coding) of a unique minimal model of a pheno-
menon – which is witnessed in single-type semantics – cannot always be assumed
in mathematics or in physics. As a result of the strong robustness of our single-ty-
pe semantics, we need not define a single-type semantics for each of the types hs, ti,
hs, hs, tii, hs, hhs, ti, tii, hhs, ti, hs, tii, etc. Rather, it su ces to model the PTQ fra-
gment through the use of one of these types.
For the purposes of this dissertation, we will identify the paradigmatic basic
type with the type hs, ti (for the provision of an informationally ‘weak’ single-type
semantics), respectively hs, hs, tii (for the provision of a ‘strong’ single-type seman-
tics). From the semantics of these two types, the single-type semantics of all other
types which satisfy Properties (i) to (iii) are then easily obtained.
5.2. Classification of Single-Type Semantics
The previous section has identified the type-invariance of single-type models as an
example of a desirable property of minimal models of natural phenomena. Notab-
2Exceptions include the ‘strong’ representation of individuals and propositions in the type hs,
hhs, ti, tii. This representation will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.4.
3Minimal models are models which account exactly for the observed phenomena (and for no oth-
er phenomena).
4I owe this observation to Sam Sanders.
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ly, the former is not the only desirable property of the presented models. Other
properties include the invariance of single-type models under the replacement of
Montague types by their equivalent types from other type systems (e.g. the repla-
cement of hs, ti by the type for semantically primitive propositions p (Thomason,
1980), cf. (Chierchia and Turner, 1988; Fox et al., 2002; Pollard, 2005)),
and the natural classification of representations of Montagovian objects according
to their informational strength. In particular, this classification is witnessed by the
bifurcation of single-type semantics into weak theories of linguistic meaning (which
interpret proper names as the result of attributing their type-e referent an exis-
tence property) and strong theories of meaning (which interpret names as the re-
sult of attributing their referent a (set of) contextually salient property(-ies)).
Below, we will first discuss the distinction between the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ re-
presentations of Montagovian objects from Chapter 4 (in Sect. 5.2.1).We will then
show that the resulting classification of single-type theories is a particular instance
of a general classification of minimal theories in other sciences (Sect. 5.2.2).
5.2.1. Weak and Strong Single-Type Semantics. Our discussion of the
representation of individuals and propositions in the type hs, ti has already sug-
gested the possibility of distinguishing between two di↵erently ‘rich’ representati-
on strategies. Thus, we can either represent an individual a by its minimal global-
ly associated information, or by its maximal locally (i.e. contextually) associated
information. The former strategy corresponds to the identification of (some cod-
ing of) the proposition ‘a exists’. The latter strategy corresponds to the identifica-
tion of the intersection of all true propositions at some situation which carry in-
formation about a. To ensure its situation-generality, the rich representation of
individuals proceeds in the type hs, hs, tii.
The di↵erent representations of individuals are given in the left column from
Figure 5.1. They pair with the representations of propositions in the right column
to yield informationally weak, resp. strong interpretations of names and sentences.









 hw1, wi | for all phs,ti,
 hw1, wi |w 2 ' & 8p, ?if w1 2 p
(type- ?if w1 2 p & p ‘is ab- & for some x,' ‘is about’ a
hs, hs, tii) out’ a, ?then w 2 p & p ‘is about’ x, ?then w 2 p 
Figure 5.1. ‘Weak’ and ‘strong’ representations of individuals/propositions.
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The representations of basic Montagovian objects from Figure 5.1 are the only na-
tural candidates: Our characterization of property attribution as controlled infor-
mation growth (cf. (4.2.21)) excludes ‘hybrid’ representation pairs whose mem-
bers exhibit di↵erent levels of informational complexity. In particular, the exclu-
sion of the weak–strong pair (4.2.10)–(4.2.19) (or of the pair consisting of
 hw1, wi |
a exists in w
 
and (4.2.19)) is justified by the fact that the attribution of some
property F to the individual a will only extend the type-hs, ti representation of a
by the information encoded in the proposition Fa (and by the information of no
other non-trivial proposition). As a result, the proposition Fa is represented by
the characteristic function of the set of situations {w
s
| w 2 Fa}.
Our argument for the exclusion of the strong–weak pair (4.2.18)–(4.2.9) (or
of the pair (4.2.18)–(4.2.13)) follows the inverse strategy: Since the attribution of
the property F to a extends the type-hs, hs, tii representation of a at the situati-
on @ by the information of Fa,5 it cannot hold that (Fa@)† ) a†@.
As a result, all single-type representations of individuals and propositions will
either follow the weak representation strategy from the top row in Figure 5.1, or
the strong representation strategy from the bottom row in Figure 5.1. Their assoc-
iated objects will encode weak (i.e. ‘poor’, or simple), respectively strong (i.e. ‘rich’,
or complex) information about the represented Montagovian objects. The single-
type semantics from Part III (cf. Ch. 7, 8) inherit their names from the informa-
tional strength of their associated objects.
5.2.2. Classification Properties of Single-Type Models.The classifica-
tion of single-type theories according to their objects’ informational strength fol-
lows the classification of logical theories according to their proof-theoretic strength.
In the area of Reverse Mathematics, cf. (Friedman, 1975), researchers have ob-
served that the minimal axiom systems which prove theorems of ordinary mathe-
matics (called the ‘Big Five’ in (Simpson, 2009)) are totally ordered with res-
pect to their proof-theoretic strength.
Theories of single-type semantics exhibit a similar ordering as the ‘Big Five’.
Only, rather than being ordered with respect to their ability to prove their equi-
valence with a particular mathematical theorem, these theories are ordered with
respect to their ability to identify a name’s equivalent sentences. Thus, while the
proper name Barbara Partee will only be equivalent to the sentence Barbara Partee
exists in a weak single-type semantics (cf. Ch. 7.3), it may, depending on the rele-
vant situation, be equivalent to the sentence Barbara Partee is entering the room (or
Barbara Partee is arriving) in a strong single-type semantics.
This ends our identification of di↵erent subclasses of single-type semantics.
5This is conditional on the compatibility of F with a’s other properties at w (s.t. there is no pro-
perty P in the set of a’s properties at w of which it holds that
 
{xe |x 2 P}\{ye | y 2 F}
 
= ;).
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We next turn to a distinction between the semantics’ di↵erent theoretical levels.
5.3. Levels of Single-Type Semantics
Our previous considerations have identified the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii as the pa-
radigmatic single basic types for the modeling of the PTQ fragment along the lines
of (Partee, 2006). To show the representability of the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii,
Chapter 4 has given algorithms for the representation of individuals and proposi-
tions in objects of each of these two types (cf. Sect. 4.2.3). Thus, in the type hs, ti,
individuals and propositions are represented by the set of situations in which the
individual exists, resp. at which the proposition’s designator is true. In the type
hs, hs, tii, individuals are represented by functions from situations w to the set of
situations at which the designators of all true propositions at w which carry in-
formation about the individual are true. Propositions ' are represented by func-
tions from w to the intersection of the set of situations at which ' is true and
the type-hs, hs, tii representations of '’s aboutness subjects at w.
Clearly, the resulting representations constitute objects of the type hs, ti, or
hs, hs, tii. We will see in Part III that the semantics of these two types interpret all
logical PTQ forms into constructions out of the types hs, ti, respectively hs, hs, tii.
Notably, however, the descriptions of single-type objects still contain expressions
of lower-rank types, which are formed from Gallin’s basic types e, s, and t. For ex-
ample, the description of the weak representation of the individual a from (4.2.10)
relies on the availability of individuals (there, the individual a) and situations (w).
The description of the strong representation of a from (4.2.18) further relies on the
availability of propositions (p).
Below, we will first identify the rationale behind the use of lower-rank types
in the metatheory of our single-type semantics (in Sect. 5.3.1). We will then show
that this rationale warrants a distinction between the object theory and the meta-
theory of any su ciently expressive single-type semantics (in Sect. 5.3.2).
5.3.1. Constraining Single-Type Representations.The multi-typed de-
scription of single-type objects is required by the underdefinedness of the values
of the translations of PTQ words from Definition 3.2.2. As a result of this under-
definedness, translations of logical PTQ forms may receive an interpretation into
TY0 objects which disqualify as “reasonable candidate[s] for interpretations of
English”, cf. (Montague, 1973, p. 263). For example, if we failed to constrain the
interpretation of the TY0 term john by the requirement Jjohn K = {ws | John ex-
ists in w}, nothing would prevent the association of John with the intuitive rep-
resentation, {w
s
| Mary exists in w}, of Mary. But this is arguably undesirable.
By specifying, for every single-type term, which element in the relevant Gal-
lin-style model it designates, descriptions of the form from (4.2.10) and (4.2.18)
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take the role of semantic constraints. These constraints di↵er from Montagovian
meaning postulates (Montague, 1973), cf. (Carnap, 1988, Supp. B), with res-
pect to their formulation in the metalanguage, and to their comparatively greater
expressive power: In contrast to meaning postulates, constraints are not concer-
ned with the specification of linguistically significant aspects of lexical meaning.
Rather, they provide an algorithm for the ‘right’ model-theoretic interpretation
of a given TY0 term. For the translations of PTQ words in the types hs, ti and
hs, hs, tii, such constraints will be given in Definitions 7.2.2 and 8.2.2 (Part III).
The need to describe the representations of Montagovian objects through ex-
pressions of a lower type imposes an important restriction on Partee’s conjecture:
Proposition 5.1 (Levelling constraint). The ‘correct’ interpretation of logi-
cal PTQ forms in single-type semantics requires a multi-typed metatheory.
The use of a multi-typed metatheory does not compromise the integrity of our sin-
gle-type semantics: The semantics from Chapters 7 and 8 enable the interpretati-
on of all logical PTQ forms into ‘pure’ single-type objects. Further, since the sin-
gle-type interpretations of existential sentences (e.g. Bill exists) adopt the repre-
sentation strategy for individuals in a weak single-type semantics (here, the stra-
tegy for the representation of Bill; cf. Prop. 4.1, 4.3), the distinction between the
lower-type description of the single-type interpretations of proper names and sen-
tences does not coincide with the Montagovian distinction between individuals
and propositions.
We will see in Part III that the restriction of single-type interpretations thro-
ugh multi-typed semantic constraints enables the identification of their designa-
tors’ semantic equivalents.
5.3.2. Stratification Properties of Single-Type Models. To capture
the di↵erence between the types of our single-type objects (cf. Part I) and the ty-
pes of the terms in their defining semantic constraints (cf. Ch. 4.2.3), we will here-
after distinguish the object theory of our single-type semantics (at which we find
the types of single-type PTQ translations; cf. Def. 3.2.2, Def. 7.2.1) from themeta-
theory of our single-type semantics (at which we give the translations’ definitions;
cf. Def. 7.2.2, 8.2.2). While the type system of the object theory will only contain
constructions out of the type hs, ti, respectively hs, hs, tii, the type system of the
metatheory will contain (equivalents of) all Montague types.
The distinction between an object- and a metatheory of our single-type se-
mantics is orthogonal to the distinction between a weak and a strong representa-
tion of Montagovian objects. As a result, our single-type semantics from Part III
will provide a separate discussion of the object theories of our weak and strong
single-type semantics. The same applies to our discussion of the two systems’ ap-
plication to Montague’s PTQ fragment: Since the semantics of the types hs, ti and
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hs, hs, tii will define their objects through the use of expressions from Gallin’s lo-
gic TY2, the metatheory of our weak single-type semantics (cf. Ch. 6) will be iden-
tified with the metatheory of our strong semantics.
We close this section by identifying the e↵ect of our use of layered structures
on the strategy of indirect interpretation.
5.3.3. Iterated Indirect Interpretation. The introduction to this disser-
tation (Ch. 1.1.1; cf. Part I) has announced an indirect interpretation of the PTQ
fragment, which proceeds via an intermediate one-typed language. Thus, to pro-
vide the ‘pure’ single-type semantics from Part I, we have first translated all lo-
gical PTQ forms into TY0 terms (cf. step 3). The semantic values of these forms
have then been obtained via the model-theoretic interpretations (cf. step 2.i) of
the forms’ TY0 translations. For easy reference, a variant of the diagram of indi-
rect representation from Figure 1.1 is reprinted in Figure 5.2:
LF (1) L (2.i) F (2.i)
X
  I( )transl. (3) I (2.i)
Figure 5.2. Indirect interpretation in the ‘pure’ single-type model.
The need to constrain the single-type interpretations of PTQ forms (cf. Sect. 5.3.1)
requires the introduction of a further step in this interpretation process: Instead
of interpreting the single-type translations of logical PTQ forms directly into their
associated objects (cf. step 2.i), we first need to define the translations into terms
of the metalogic TY2 (step 4). The semantic values of PTQ forms will then be ob-
tained indirectly via the interpretations of their translations’ definitions (step 2.ii).
The adopted interpretation procedure is thus doubly indirect (or (once) iterated).
The doubly indirect interpretation of PTQ forms is captured in Figure 5.3
(next page). In the figure, the new steps (2.ii) and (4) are framed. The term    is
the metalogical definition of the single-type term  . The designated language, fra-
me, and interpretation function of the logic TY2 are denoted by L2, F2, and I2.
Admittedly, the iterated translation of logical PTQ forms (first into single-ty-
pe terms, and then into their TY2 definition) is rather cumbersome. To simplify
this process, one could instead translate PTQ forms directly into suitably typed
TY2 terms.
6 The resulting interpretation process enables the provision of a single-
type semantics without a single-type logic. This process is captured in Figure 5.4.
6I owe this observation to Jeroen Groenendijk.
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transl. (3) def’n (4) I2 (2.ii)
Figure 5.3. Defined doubly indirect interpretation.




defined translation (3 + 4) I2 (2.ii)
Figure 5.4. Defined singly indirect interpretation.
The formulation of single-type semantics in the familiar logic TY2 complies with
the principle of parsimony from the introduction to this dissertation (here inter-
preted as methodological parsimony). However, the remainder of this dissertation
will adopt the method of doubly indirect interpretation from Figure 5.3. This cho-
ice is supported by the possibility of justifying the definitions of the defined single-
type connectives from Notation 2.1.1 (1), by the greater ease of recognizing the
single-type correspondents of logical PTQ forms (2), and by the use of iterated
translation in other areas of formal syntax and semantics (3). We discuss these
reasons in their order of mention:
(1) In Chapter 2.1 (cf. Nota. 2.1.1), we have defined single-type stand-ins of
the familiar truth-functional connectives and quantifiers from the TY0 proxies, ,?
resp. ).= , for falsum and logical implication. We have motivated these definitions
with reference to their analogy with Henkin’s (1950) definitions of the truth-fun-
ctional connectives and quantifiers from ? and ). However, since we have been
unable to formulate easy truth- or falsity-conditions for basic single-type terms,
it has been impossible to check these definitions.
The ‘translation’ of single-type constants into their TY2 definitions (along the
lines of Fig. 5.3; steps 4 and 2.ii) enables such a test. In particular, we can use the
‘translations’ (or definitions) of the single-type constants ,? and ).= and the con-
ventions from Notation 2.1.1 to obtain the TY2 definitions of the remaining single-
type connectives: If the thus-obtained definitions match the postulated translati-
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ons, the definitions of the single-type connectives from Notation 2.1.1 are correct.
If the definitions di↵er from the translations, the definitions of the single-type con-
nectives from Notation 2.1.1 are flawed, and must be rejected.
For example, since our ‘weak’ single-type logic from Chapter 7 defines the ter-
ms ,? , ,> , and ).= as the designators of (the characteristic functions of) the sets ;,S
w2W w, and
 hx hs,ti,y hs,ti, wsi | ifz w 2 x, thenz w 2 y
 
(where ‘ifz . . . , thenz
. . .’ denotes the relation of logical implication), and since we have defined ,> as
(,? ).= ,? ) (s.t. the replacement of ,? and ).= in (,? ).= ,? ) by their definitions yiel-
ds the designator of the set
S
w2W w, which is the intuitive translation of ,> ), the
definition of ,> is correct.Other examples of this test will be given in Chapter 7.2.2
(cf. (7.2.1)) and in Appendix C.3.
(2) Beyond verificational advantages, the inclusion of a level of a designated
single-type language in our interpretation procedure facilitates the identification
of the single-type correspondents of logical PTQ forms. In Chapter 4, we have se-
en that the single-type interpretations of proper names (e.g. Bill) will be associa-
ted with more complex objects than their traditional Montagovian counterparts
(e.g. with the characteristic function of the set {w
s
|Bill exists in w}).We expect
that expressions from other syntactic categories will receive an interpretation into
even more complex objects. For example, in the hs, ti-based semantics from Chap-
ter 7, the verb walks will be associated with the characteristic function of the set
from (5.3.1). This function sends the type-hs, ti representation of every individu-
al a to the proposition ‘a walks’:
(5.3.1)





The assumption of a primitive correspondent for the above objects aids our con-
ception of these objects as a single unit of interpretation. Their designators in a
single-type language (e.g. in the language L from Part I) can then serve as ‘abbre-
viations’ for the descriptions of these objects in the language of the metatheory
TY2. Thus, the designation of the object from (5.3.1) via the single-type term
walk is significantly shorter than the object’s describing TY2 term (cf. Def. 7.2.2,
MP5). The use of a designated single-type language further supports the concep-
tion of our single-type semantics as an intended theory of meaning for the PTQ
fragment, rather than as a peculiar coding of its Montagovian semantics.
(3) The use of an iterated translation (or interpretation) procedure is not un-
common in formal syntax and semantics. For example, to enable a machine trans-
lation between di↵erent natural languages, Rosetta7 (1994) invoke a number of
intermediate languages, including controlled versions of Dutch and Spanish, cf.
7The name ‘Rosetta’ stands for a collective of twelve authors: Jan Landsbergen, Lisette Appelo,
Franciska de Jong, Theo Janssen, Jan Odijk, André Schenk, Joep Rous, René Leermakers, Harm
Smit, Petra de Wit, Elly van Munster, and Elena Pinillos Bartolomé.
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(Partee, 1997, p. 24). To interpret a fragment of natural language in models of
Property Theory with Curry Typing (PTCT), Fox and Lappin (2004) similarly
invoke first the object language and then the (extended) metalanguage of their lo-
gic PTCT.
This completes our motivation for using the method of doubly indirect inter-
pretation in a singe-type semantics. We close the present chapter with a summary
of its main results.
5.4. Summary
This chapter has discussed three salient methodological features of single-type se-
mantics with the candidate types from Chapter 4: their robustness with respect to
the particular basic-type choice, their classification according to their objects’ in-
formational strength, and their stratification into di↵erent theoretical levels. In
virtue of the first two features, representations of Montagovian objects in the ty-
pes hs, ti or hs, hs, tii are informationally equivalent (up to coding) to their repre-
sentations in higher types, and are associated with two di↵erently informative the-
ories of single-type semantics. In virtue of the last feature, we distinguish the me-
tatheory from the object theory of our single-type semantics.
The above features identify our semantics’ merits and limitations. In particu-
lar, the robustness and (self-)classification of our single-type theories – which are
both desirable methodological properties – suggest the ‘naturalness’ of the mo-
deled phenomenon. The impossibility of constraining the interpretations of logi-
cal PTQ forms in a ‘pure’ single-type semantics identifies an important limitation
on any single-type semantics: Unless the semantics employs multi-typed seman-
tic constraints (and is, thus, ‘impure’), it will not be able to accommodate the ob-
servations from Proposition 1.3.
The theories of meaning from Part III are ‘impure’ (or ‘mixed ’) single-type
semantics of the above sort. Chapter 7 presents a weak hs, ti-based single-type se-
mantics. A strong single-type semantics based on the type hs, hs, tii will be deve-






This part of the dissertation presents a weak and a strong single-type semantics
for Montague’s PTQ fragment in the sense of Chapter 5.2. These semantics are
mixed (or ‘impure’) theories of linguistic meaning, which analyze the TY0 trans-
lations of logical PTQ forms as constructions out of propositions, respectively of
propositional concepts. Proper names, sentences, and complement phrases will all
receive an interpretation in these types. In addition to the merits of the ‘pure’ sin-
gle-type semantics from Part I, the proposed semantics provide easy truth-conditi-
ons for proper names (cf. Prop. 1.3.i) and identify the semantic content of names
with the content of certain sentences.
To provide the fragment of English from (Montague, 1973) with a ‘mixed’
single-type semantics, we use the method of doubly indirect interpretation from
Chapter 5.3.3 (cf. Fig. 5.3). Thus, to obtain an hs, ti- or hs, hs, tii-based semantics
for the fragment, we first adapt all relevant concepts of the logic TY0 to construc-
tions out of the types hs, ti and hs, hs, tii (cf. step 2.i). We then specify a set of se-
mantic constraints whose members ensure the interpretation of proper names and
sentences into objects of the form from Chapter 4.2.3 (cf. step 4). We will describe
a logic with the single basic type hs, ti in Chapter 7.1. A logic with the basic type
hs, hs, tii will be the subject of Chapter 8.1. The later sections of Chapters 7 and 8
translate logical PTQ forms into terms of each of these two logics (cf. step 3).
We have noted in Chapter 5.3 that the possibility of specifying the particular
single-type values of linguistic expressions relies on the availability of a multi-ty-
ped metatheory (cf. Prop. 5.1). In reflection of this consideration, we precede our
development of the particular single-type logics with a presentation of the logic





The present chapter defines the metatheory of our single-type semantics in the
form of the logic TY32. This logic is a three-valued three-sorted type logic, whose
models contain partial objects of the form described in Chapter 4.2.4.
The name of the logic, ‘TY32’, follows Gallin’s (1975) convention of subscrip-
ting a logic’s name by the number of its basic types, not counting the truth-value
type t.1 For every natural number n, we thus let ‘TY
n
’ denote a logic with n+1
basic types (granted the existence of the basic type t). Correspondingly, the logic
TY0 (with the basic type t) is Henkin’s Theory of Propositional Types, cf. (Hen-
kin, 1963)2, the logic TY1 (with the basic types e and t) is Church’s Simple The-
ory of Types, cf. (Church, 1940), and the logic TY2 (with the basic types e, s,
and t) is Gallin’s (1975) streamlined variant of Montague’s Intensional Logic, cf.
(Montague, 1973). For the present purposes, we adopt a partial n-ary variant of
the logic TY2 that is inspired by (Muskens, 1995, Ch. 6). The partiality of TY
3
2
models is indicated by the superscript of the logic’s name.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1 defines the types and terms of
the logic TY32. Terms of this logic include an existence predicate, the iota opera-
tor, and other special-purpose operators which enable the definition of the desig-
nated single-type constants from Part I. Section 6.2 introduces general TY32 mo-
dels, and identifies the subclass of De Morgan models. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 pro-




6.1. Types and Terms
The basic types of the logic TY32 are Gallin’s types for individuals e, indices s, and
truth-values t. Since we will provide a partial interpretation of the types s and t
(cf. Ch. 4.2.4), we will hereafter refer to objects of these two types as ‘situations ’
and ‘truth-combinations’, respectively. From e, s, and t, the types of the logic TY32
are obtained via a generalized variant of the rule CT as follows:
1The exclusion of the type t from the ‘counted’ types is justified by the fact that quantification
and binding typically do not apply to type-t objects.
2In Part I, we have used ‘TY0’ instead as the name of the simplest single-type logic.
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Definition 6.1.1 (TY32 types). The set 2Type of TY
3
2 types is the smallest
set of strings such that, for 0  n 2 N, if ↵1, . . . ,↵n 2 2Type and ↵n+1 2 {e, s, t},
then (↵1 . . .↵n;↵n+1) 2 2Type.
In analogy to Definition 2.1.1, Definition 6.1.1 describes complex types as the ty-
pes for functions from n-tuples of objects of the types ↵1, . . . ,↵n to objects of a
basic type. The definition of TY32 types as constructions to one of the basic TY
3
2
types e, s, or t guarantees a correspondence between unary and multi-argument
functions, cf. (Schönfinkel, 1924).
To ensure an algebraic structure on TY32 domains, we will hereafter focus on a
proper subclass of TY32 types whose members are called conjoinable types. The set
of conjoinable TY32 types is defined as follows, cf. (Partee and Rooth, 1983, p. 4):
Definition 6.1.2 (Conjoinable TY32 types). The set CoType of conjoinable
types of the logic TY32 is the smallest set of strings such that, for 0  n 2 N,
if ↵1, . . . ,↵n 2 2Type, then (↵1 . . .↵n; t) 2 CoType.
According to the above, a TY32 term has a conjoinable type if its type is either the
type for truth-combinations t or a construction to the type t (via the rule from
Def. 6.1.1). In these two cases, we say that the term is conjoinable.
The restriction to conjoinable TY32 types implements the algebraicity require-
ment from Chapter 4.1.1 and enables the partialization of suitable single-type can-
didates from Chapter 4.2.4. We will see below that the conjoinability of single-ty-
pe types further obviates the need for single-type stand-ins of ^,_, and ¬.
We next define a class of languages for the logic TY32.
A language L2 for TY32 is a countable set [↵22TypeL↵ of uniquely typed non-
logical constants, which is supplemented by a countable set V2 := [
↵22TypeV↵ of
uniquely typed variables. We assume that L2 includes constants for the false for-
mula ? (falsum) and the neither-true-nor-false (or ‘undefined’) formula ⇤ (called
‘star ’). From these expressions, complex TY32 terms are formed inductively with
the help of application and abstraction, the constant for logical implication ),
and the non-logical constants E, ◆, and abt.
Definition 6.1.3 (TY32 terms). Let ↵1, . . . ,↵n,  2 2Type, and let ↵n+1 2
{e, s, t}. Let ✏ 2 CoType. The set T 2
↵







, ⇤,? 2 T 2
t
;
(ii) If B 2 T 2( ↵1...↵n;↵n+1) and A 2 T 2  , then (B(A)) 2 T 2(↵1...↵n;↵n+1);
(iii) If A 2 T 2(↵1...↵n;↵n+1) and x 2 V2  , then ( x.A) 2 T 2( ↵1...↵n;↵n+1);
(iv) If B,C 2 T 2
✏
, then (B ) C) 2 T 2
t
;
(v) If A 2 T 2
e
and w 2 T 2
s
, then E(A,w) 2 T 2
t
;
(vi) If   2 T 2
t
and x 2 V2
↵
, then (◆x. ) 2 T 2
↵
;
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(vii) If A 2 T 2
e
and ' 2 A 2 T 2(s;t), then abt (A,') 2 T 2(s;t).
Clause (i) identifies all suitably typed non-logical constants and variables as terms
of the logic TY32. Clauses (ii) and (iii) assert the T
2
↵
-membership of the results of
functional application and lambda abstraction (cf. Ch. 2.1). Clauses (iv) to (vii)
specify the formation of complex TY32 terms.
The existence predicate E from clause (v) enables our definition of weak sing-
le-type objects (in Ch. 7; cf. Ch. 4.2.3) and our definition of the single-type trans-
lation of the verb exists (cf. Ch. 7, 8). This predicate is a non-logical constant of
the type (e s; t) which asserts the existence of a given individual at the specified
situation.3 Thus, the term E(A,w) (read ‘A exists in w’) asserts that the situati-
on w is inhabited by the individual denoted by A. The introduction of a desig-
nated predicate E is required by the fact that the TY32 quantifiers 9 and 8 range
over a single situation-independent domain of possible4 individuals, which exist in
some situation. As a result, the TY32 formula 9x.x = A (read ‘there is an A [at so-
me situation]’) does not imply the existence of the individual denoted by A in the
current situation. Only the predicate E enables us to refer to the set of inhabi-
tants of a given situation (i.e. to the actual individuals in that situation).
The behavior of E is governed by the axiomsAx10 toAx12. Below, the vari-
ables x and y range over individuals. The variables i and j range over situations.
The connectives >, 8, 9,=,¬, 6=,^, and _ have their usual definitions:
Ax10 (Bivalence). 8x8i.E(x, i) _ ¬E(x, i)
Ax11 (Trans-situation identity). 9x9i9j.i 6= j ^ (E(x, i) ^ E(x, j))
Ax12 (Ontological independence). 8x8y.x 6= y ) ( i.E(x, i)) 6= ( j.E(y, j))
i.e. 8x8y.x 6= y )  9i.(E(x, i) ^ ¬E(y, i)) _ (E(y, i) ^ ¬E(x, i)) 
Axiom Ax10, cf. (Muskens, 1995, p. 71), defines the existence predicate E as a
bivalent predicate, which is either true or false of every individual/situation pair.5
Axiom Ax11 asserts that some individuals exist in more than one situation, such
that these individuals are identical across situations. In particular, the trans-situ-
ation identity of individuals obviates the introduction of their Lewisian counter-
parts, cf. (Lewis, 1986). Axiom Ax12 asserts that individuals are discernible by
3In quantified modal logic, cf. (Linsky and Zalta, 1994; Zalta, 1983), this predicate (written
‘C!’) asserts the concreteness of the relevant individual at the situation.
4This motivates the description of 9 and 8 as possibilist quantifiers, cf. (Scott, 1979).
5One can omit Ax10 by defining the term  x i.E(x, i) as  x i9b.x = b(i), where b is a variable
over individual concepts (type (s; e)) which does not contain any free occurrences of x. The pre-
sented definition of E generalizes the familiar definition of the existence predicate in free and in-
tuitionistic logic, cf. (Lambert, 1960; Scott, 1979). However, since we assume that the beha-
vior of E is further constrained by Ax11 and Ax12, we introduce E instead as a primitive.
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the situations in which they exist: For every pair of individuals, there is a situati-
on at which one, but not the other individual exists.
In Chapter 4.2.3, we have motivated our adoption of axiom Ax12 with refe-
rence to the need to ensure an injective relation between individuals and their ty-
pe-(s; t) representations. However, this axiom is more than a technical trick to sa-
tisfy the representability requirement from Chapter 4.1.2: It formulates (a streng-
thened version of) the assumption of contingent existence for individuals from mo-
dal logic. This assumption is made in (Kripke, 1963, p. 65):
[. . .] of course, '(H) [the domain of the possible world H] need
not be the same set for di↵erent argumentsH, just as, intuitive-
ly, in worlds other than the real one, some actually existing in-
dividuals may be absent, while new individuals, like Pegasus,
may appear.
The discernibility of individuals by the di↵erent situations in which they exist is
analogous to the discernibility of propositions by the di↵erent situations at which
their designating formulas are true (resp. false): Just like two non-equivalent for-
mulas will never be true (or false) at exactly the same situations, two non-identical
individuals will never exist in exactly the same situations.
The ontological independence of individuals is compatible with Kripke’s ‘ne-
cessity of origin’ thesis, cf. (Kripke, 1980, p. 113).6 According to this thesis, all
living organisms have their biological origin by necessity. In particular, since all
zygotes originate from the joining of two gametes, the existence of every animal
presupposes the existence of its parents (s.t.¬9x.(9i.E(x, i))^ (9y.parent (x, y)^
(¬9j.E(y, j)))). The ‘necessity of origin’ thesis thus blocks one of the disjuncts of
the second formulation of Ax12. However, since the existence of potential par-
ents is not conditional on their production of o↵spring (s.t. the ontological depen-
dence is only one-directional), the necessity of origin does not violate axiomAx12.
AxiomAx12 is further supported by the discernibility of non-identical indivi-
duals7 (in (6.1.1), below) and by the possibility of forming the individual domain
of ‘new’ situations by identifying the individuals which witness a given property
at another situation.
(6.1.1) 8x8y.x 6= y )  9P(e s;t)9i.P (x, i) ^ (¬P (y, i) _ P (y, i) = ⇤)
 
The combination of these two principles provides a mechanism for the construc-
tion of individual-discerning situations: In particular, by constructing a situation
which is inhabited by exactly all individuals which witness the property that dis-
cerns a particular individual from another individual at the relevant situation i,
6I owe this observation to Ed Zalta.
7This principle – which is weaker than Ax12 – extends to classical abstract individuals in the
sense of (Zalta, 1999a), cf. (Zalta, 1999b, §4.50).
6.1. TYPES AND TERMS 119
we obtain a situation which E-discerns these two individuals. For example, since,
in the situation w1 from Figure 4.2, the property ‘running’ is only true of John
(and is false of Mary), we can construct a new situation in which only the runners
at w1 (and, thus, John, but not Mary) exist. This situation can take the form of
a situation at which only the designator of the proposition ‘John exists’ is true,
or at which the designators of the propositions ‘John exists’ and ‘John runs’ (or
of the propositions ‘John exists’ and ‘John does not run’) are true, etc. Since Ma-
ry does not exist in this situation, this situation E-discerns John from Mary.
Granted the above principles, the inability to construct an E-discerning situ-
ation for two non-identical individuals generates a contradiction.
Admittedly, axiom Ax12 prevents the accommodation of individuals (like
Carroll’s (2000) twins Tweedledum and Tweedledee, or entangled photons) whose
existence in each situation is conditional on the existence of the other element in
the pair (s.t. the ontological dependence between these individuals is bi -directio-
nal).8 Individuals of this kind preempt the strategy for the construction of ‘dis-
cerning’ situations from the second-to-last paragraph. But the unavailability of E-
indiscernible individuals is not a serious impediment to the metatheory of our sin-
gle-type semantics. This is due to the fact that entanglement is a very unstable
state, and that the possibilist existence of E-indiscernible individuals (e.g. Tweed-
ledum and Tweedledee) is not a natural assumption in the ontology of linguistic
semantics. In particular, every formula which introduces two distinct E-indiscer-
nible individuals has a higher or equal complexity to ⇧11.
9 But the assumption of
such a formula far exceeds the strength of ordinary linguistic statements.
Beyond the above, the adoption of axiom Ax12 is justified by our characteri-
zation of situations as partial possible worlds (cf. Ch. 4.2.4). Following (Kratzer,
2011, Sect. 7, 9), we can thus assume the existence ofminimal situations w at wh-
ich only (the entailments of) a single atomic sentence (e.g.Tweedledum dances) are
true. Since the truth of such a sentence at w only presupposes the existence of the
sentence’s NP subject (e.g. the existence of Tweedledum) and its satisfaction of
the property denoted by the VP, the situation w discerns the individual denoted
by the NP subject from all other individuals.
This completes our motivation for the behavior of the existence predicate E.
The iota operator from Definition 6.1.3, clause (vi) further enables the definition
of weak single-type objects (in Ch. 7). In particular, TY32 terms of the form ◆x↵. 
where   is an open formula in which only x is free (read ‘the unique x s.t.  ’)
identify the designator of the only type-↵ object which witnesses the property de-
noted by  x
↵
.  (if such an object exists). To avoid the empty restriction problem
8Thus, Tweedledum (Tweedledee) does not exist unless Tweedledee (Tweedledum) exists.
9The ‘lowest’ formula of this kind is 8i9x9y.(x = dum ^ y = dee) ) E(x, i) = E(y, i), where
dum and dee are individual constants. I owe this observation to Sam Sanders.
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from (Winter, 1997), cf. (Winter, 2004), we assume that the iota operator is
partial (s.t. ◆x
↵
.  is only defined if 9x
↵
.  ^ (8y.y = (◆x. ) ) y = x)).







This axiom asserts that the result of substituting the variable y in a formula   by
a same-type term whose referent uniquely witnesses the property denoted by  y. 
will be true.
The predicate abt from Definition 6.1.3, clause (vii) enables the definition of
strong single-type objects (in Ch. 8). This predicate is a non-logical constant of
the type (e (s; t); t) which asserts that the proposition denoted by some type-(s; t)
formula (e.g. the proposition denoted by ‘Fa’) carries semantic information about
a given individual a. As a result, we will sometimes refer to the predicate abt as
the ‘aboutness predicate’.
AxiomsAx14 toAx17 (below) ensure that the aboutness predicate abt iden-
tifies the expected aboutness subjects of a proposition (s.t. this predicate will en-
able a strong single-type interpretation of proper names and sentences along the
lines described in Chapter 4.2.3). In the axioms, A1, . . . , An, and R are constants
of the types e and (↵1 . . .↵ns; t), respectively, where ↵1, . . . ,↵n = e. We assume
that p and q are propositional variables of the type (s; t). The variables x, y, and i
are typed as above.
Ax14. abt(A1, i.R(A1, . . . , An, i)) ^ . . . ^ abt(An, i.R(A1, . . . , An, i))
Ax15. 8p8q8x8y.(abt(x, p) ^ abt(y, q))
Ax15. 8p8q8x8i. )  (9i.(p ^ q)(i) = >) )  abt(x, (p ^ q)) ^ abt(y, (p ^ q))  
Ax16. 8p8q8x.(abt(x, p) ^ abt(x, q)) ) abt(x, (p _ q))
Ax17. 8p8x.abt(x, p) ) (8q.q = p ) abt(x, q))
The above axioms formalize10 the intuitive properties of the aboutness relation
from (Perry, 1986, p. 129).11 AxiomAx14 asserts that every proposition carries
information about each individual whose designating constant is a constituent of
the proposition’s denoting formula. Since the negation of a type-(s; t) formula does
not change the formula’s constituent individual constants, it follows from axiom
Ax14 that the set of propositions which carry information about an individual
(hereafter, the set of aboutness-relevant propositions w.r.t. an individual) is closed
under negation. This fact is captured below:
Thm14. 8p8x.abt(x, p) ) abt(x,¬p)
10Our only deviations lie in the omission of Perry’s axiom (b) (our Thm14, which is a conse-
quence of Ax14) and the addition of the condition ‘9i.(p ^ q)(i) = >’ to Ax15.
11I thank John Perry for our interesting discussion of aboutness.
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Axiom Ax15 asserts that the set of aboutness-relevant propositions is closed
under non-contradictory conjunction. Thus, the conjunction of two propositions
will carry information about all individuals about which one of the propositional
conjuncts carries information. Our restriction to non-contradictory conjunctions
(i.e. conjunctions (p^q) whose designators are true at some possible situation, s.t.
(p^q) 6= ( i.?)) is required by the robustness of the aboutness relation under se-
mantic equivalence (cf. Ax17): If we would not restrict axiom Ax15, absurd pro-
positions (e.g. ‘Everything is self-di↵erent’) – which are equivalent to the conjunc-
tion of a proposition with its complement – would carry information about every
possible individual. But this contradicts our intuitions re aboutness.
Axiom Ax16 asserts that the set of aboutness-relevant propositions is closed
under disjunction if both disjuncts share the same aboutness subjects. As a result,
the disjunction of two propositions will carry information about individuals about
which both propositional disjuncts carry information.
Axiom Ax17 asserts the robustness of the aboutness relation under the rela-
tion of semantic equivalence. As a result, every semantic equivalent of a propositi-
on will carry information about each individual about which the proposition also
carries information.
As a consequence of axiomAx14, a single proposition will be able to carry in-
formation about more than one individual. This property of the aboutness rela-
tion is exploited in our representation of ‘relational’ propositions (e.g. in our re-
presentation of the proposition ‘John loves Mary’ from Figure 4.3). In particular,
since the TY32 correlate, love(e e s;t) (marye, johne) (or Lmj), of the sentence John
loves Mary contains the TY32 correlates of the names John and Mary as constitu-
ents, the proposition ‘John loves Mary’ will carry information about both John
and Mary. The existence of a proposition’s di↵erent aboutness subjects is also as-
sumed by Putnam’s (1958) notion of strict aboutness, cf. (Goodman, 1972).
This completes our axiomatic characterization of the behavior of the predica-
tes from Definition 6.1.3, clauses (v) to (vii). On this basis, we now return to the
presentation of the TY32 language L
2.
From the familiar connectives of the logic TY32, the remaining TY
3
2 connec-
tives are defined as follows. Below, i is again a TY32 variable of the type s. The
members of the sequence of TY32 variables ~x have the type ↵1, . . . ,↵n. The TY
3
2
constants ' and B, C have the types (s; t), respectively (↵1 . . .↵n; t):
Notation 6.1.1. We write
2' for (8i.'(i))
3' for ¬2¬'
(B ⇣ C) for ((B ^ C) _ ((B _ C) ^ ( ~x.⇤))) = B
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The first two items from Notation 6.1.1 provide the familiar definitions of the mo-
dal box and diamond operators. The last item introduces the approximation pre-
dicate ⇣. This predicate (due to (Muskens, 1995, pp. 50, 47)) is the formal cor-
respondent of the conditional ‘?if . . . , ?then . . .’ from Chapter 4.2.4 (cf. (4.2.18),
(4.2.19)), which denotes the definedness relation on partial TY32 objects. As a re-
sult, for the type-(s; t) constants B and C, the formula (B ⇣ C) asserts that the
proposition denoted by C contains the information of the proposition denoted by
B, such that C is true if B is true and is false if B is false. The approximation
predicate will figure in our definition of strong single-type objects from Chapter 8.
For simplicity, we will hereafter call the logical constants ⇤, ?, and ) truth-
functional connectives, and refer to expressions of the type (s; t) as intensional for-
mulas. Truth-functional connectives distinguish themselves from the designated
single-type constants from Definition 2.1.2. We adopt the notational conventions
from Chapter 2.1. Substitution is defined as in the logic TY0 (cf. Def. 2.1.3).
This completes our specification of TY32 types and terms. We next provide a
semantics for the logic TY32.
6.2. Models
In line with our definition of the class of models for the logic TY0, we first define
a class of general models for the interpretation of atomic TY32 terms (in Sect. 6.2.1).
We then specify a class of algebraic models, which enable the interpretation of mo-
lecular TY32 terms (in Sect. 6.2.2). In contrast to algebraic models of the logic TY0,
general TY32 models are logical models, whose domains naturally exhibit an alge-
braic structure.
6.2.1. General Models. General models for the logic TY32 are defined in
analogy with general models for the logic TY0. In particular, general TY
3
2 frames
have the expected definition, where o is replaced by the types e, s, and t:
Definition 6.2.1 (General TY32 frames). A general frame for the logic TY
3
2
is a set F 2 = {D
↵





= W , D
t
= 3 = {T,F,N}, and
D(↵1...↵n;↵n+1) ✓ {f | f : (D↵1 ⇥ · · ·⇥D↵n) ! D↵n+1}
for all TY32 types (↵1 . . .↵n;↵n+1), where ↵n+1 2 {e, s, t}.
To ensure the axiomatizability of the TY32 entailment relation (cf. Corr. 2.3),
we associate complex TY32 domains with subsets of function spaces. We identifyA
and W with the sets of semantically primitive individuals, respectively situations,
and define 3 as the ordered set of the truth-combinations true and not false (T),
false and not true (F), and neither true nor false (N), cf. (Belnap, 1977). The
combinations T and F correspond to the classical truth-values true and false.12
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The combination N constitutes the truth-valuationally undefined element.
The partiality of the domain 3 implements the partiality requirement on sin-
gle-type objects from Chapter 4.2.4. In particular, it induces a definedness order
on all conjoinable-type domains. The relation of definedness is given below:
Definition 6.2.2 (Definedness). Let f and g be partial functions inD(↵1...↵n;t).
Then, g is at least as well-defined as (or is less or equally partial than) f , i.e.
f v g, i↵, for all objects d1, . . . , dn of the types ↵1, . . . ,↵n, if f(d1, . . . , dn) 6= N,
then f(d1, . . . , dn) = g(d1, . . . , dn).
Thus, a function g is as at least as well-defined as the function f if g assigns to
the elements in D
↵1 ⇥ · · ·⇥D↵n at least the same ‘defined’ values as f . As a re-
sult, the relation v orders TY32 objects with respect to their information content.
We will hereafter refer to v as the approximation relation. We call the func-
tion g an extension of f , and f an approximation of g. An extension is proper if it
holds for some element hd1, . . . , dni of D↵1⇥· · ·⇥D↵n that g(d1, . . . , dn) 2 {T,F}
and f(d1, . . . , dn) = N. We define a total function as a function f which does not
have a proper extension g.
In the semantics of the logic TY32, the relation between L
2 terms and their as-
sociated TY32 objects is established analogously to the relation between L terms





2 are defined as follows:
Definition 6.2.3 (TY32 Interpretation). An interpretation function IF 2 :
L









Variable assignments are also analogously defined. We define g
F
2 [d/x] by letting
g
F
2 [d/x](x) = d and g
F
2 [d/x](y) = g
F
2(y) if x 6= y, and denote the set of all as-
signments g
F




Since the logic TY32 has a type for truth-values (or truth-combinations), ex-
pressions of the form x 6= y qualify as terms of the logic TY32. We will see below
that TY32 enables an object-theoretic characterization of its semantics.
We call the semantic value I(c) (or g(x)) of a TY32 term c (or x) the object de-
noted by c (resp. x). Depending on their type, we distinguish five di↵erent kinds of
TY32 objects: individuals and situations (type e, resp. s), truth-combinations (ty-
pe t), propositions (type (s; t)), and properties (type (↵1 . . .↵n; t), with n   2 if
↵
n
= s, and n   1 otherwise). By Definition 6.2.2, only objects of the last three
kinds can be partial.
12As a result of Belnap’s abbreviation, the names ‘T’ and ‘F’ become ambiguous between the
truth-values true and false and the truth-combinations true and not false (i.e. {T}) and false
and not true ({F}). However, this ambiguity is not likely to create confusion.
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On the basis of the above, we define general TY32 models as follows:
Definition 6.2.4 (General TY32 models). A general model for the logic TY
3
2
is a triple M
F














) ! F 2
assigns to every TY32 assignment gF 2 and TY
3






, c) := I
F






, x) := g
F



























































Above, clause (ii) uses the first slice function of the interpretation ofB. Clause (iv)
specifies the interpretation of iota terms according to their description from Sec-
tion 6.1. Since the predicates E and abt are non-logical TY32 constants, clause (ii)






























This completes our presentation of general models for the logic TY32. We next
introduce a class of algebraic TY32 models. These models enable the interpretation
of the remaining complex TY32 terms from Definition 6.1.3 (clauses (i), (iv)).More-
over, they satisfy the requirement of algebraicity from Chapter 4.1.1.
6.2.2. Algebraic Models. In contrast to domains of the logic TY0 (on wh-
ich we have enforced an algebraic behavior through the use of metalevel axioms),
conjoinable TY32 domains possess a natural algebraic structure. This is due to the
fact that the set 3 is a De Morgan lattice, whose elements are partially ordered
w.r.t. their degree of truth and non-falsity. As a result, the ordering relation, ✓,
on 3 is described as a logical or truth-ordering. The structure h3,✓i (abbreviated








Figure 6.1. The logical lattice L3.
By the truth-ordering on the set 3, a truth-combinationX is contained in the com-
bination Y, i.e. X ✓ Y, if Y includes truth if X includes truth and X inclu-
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des falsity if Y includes falsity. As a result, the top and bottom elements of L3
are identified with the values T and F, respectively.
Since we have identified T, F, and N with the truth-combinations {T}, {F},
and ;, we can analyze the meet, join, and complement operations on L3 as set-
theoretic intersection, union, and complementation, respectively. The operations
\,[ : {T,F,N}2 ! {T,F,N} and   : {T,F,N} ! {T,F,N} then constitute
functions on the set of truth-combinations. Thus, the meet, \, of two truth-com-
binations, X and Y, is true i↵ X and Y are both true, and false i↵ at least one of
X and Y is false. Dually, the join, [, of X and Y is true i↵ at least one of X and
Y is true, and false i↵ X and Y are both false. The complement,  , of the truth-
combination X is true i↵ X is false, and false i↵ X is true.
The above considerations define the operations \, [, and   via the truth-con-
ditions of the Strong Kleene tables (Kleene, 1938), cf. (Dunn, 1976):
\ T F N [ T F N  
T T F N T T T T T F
F F F F F T F N F T
N N F N N T N N N N
Table 6.1. The Strong Kleene tables for \, [, and  .
The identification of the domain D
t
with the truth-ordered set 3 warrants the re-
placement of the laws of Consistency and Excluded Middle by the complete De
Morgan laws and the law of Double Negation (cf. Ax7, Ax8). In particular, since
the truth-value N is uncomplemented (s.t.  N = N and, thus, (N\ N) = (N[
 N) = N), the laws of Consistency and of Excluded Middle both do not obtain.
The invalidity of these two laws in the structure h3,[,\, ,F,Ti motivates the
characterization of algebraic TY32 models as De Morgan models.
Operations on 3 are lifted on conjoinable domains by pointwise definition:
Definition 6.2.5 (Lifting). Let X = {A1, . . . , Am} be the set of the type-
(↵1 . . .↵n; t) functions A1, . . . , Am. De Morgan operations on the members of X





are generalized meet- and join-operations. The vector ~d abbre-
viates the sequence of objects d1, . . . , dn of the types ↵1, . . . ,↵n.

















(iv)  A1 :=  ~d. A1(~d );
(v) 0 :=  ~d.0, 1 :=  ~d.1
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The weak definition of the generalized top and bottom elements from clause (v)
(s.t. 0 and 1 are not defined via the familiar Boolean clauses 0 :=  d.d\ d and
1 :=  d.d[ d) is warranted by the invalidity of LEM and the law of Consistency
in the logic TY32.
The lifting of ✓, \, [,  , 0, and 1 ensures an algebraic structure on all con-
joinable-type domains. This observation is captured in Theorem 6.1:
Theorem 6.1. Every TY32 domain D(↵1...↵n;t) forms a De Morgan algebra.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.1.
In virtue of the above, algebraic TY32 models are defined through the restriction
of TY32 frames to conjoinable-type domains as follows:
Definition 6.2.6 (Algebraic TY32 models). An algebraic (or De Morgan)mo-






where each domain D
✏
is the carrier of a complete De Morgan algebra.
The algebraic structure on conjoinable-type domains enables the interpretation
of molecular TY32 terms as follows:
Definition 6.2.7. Let M
F





2i be a general model for TY32 and
let g
F


















































































































, ⇤ ) := N
This completes our discussion of the interpretation of TY32 terms. We next turn
to the definition of truth for intensional TY32 formulas.
6.3. Truth
The definition of truth for the logic TY32 falls directly out of the logics’ semantics.
This is due to the restriction of TY32 truth to intensional formulas, and the availa-
bility of designated TY32 types for situations and truth-combinations. Thus, we
can identify a formula’s truth-value at a given situation with the result of applying
its interpretation to the situation.
6.3. TRUTH 127
We call an intensional TY32 formula ' true (or false) at a situation w, given
a general TY32 model MF 2 and assignment gF 2 if VF 2(gF 2 ,')(w) = T (resp. F).
We use the following abbreviation scheme, where ‘M2’ abbreviates ‘M
F
2 ’:


























,')(w) = N or F;
w 6=|
M





,')(w) = N or T.






,')(w) = T if w |=
M
2








,')(w) = F if w =|
M










,')(w) = N if w 6|=
M
2
' and w 6=|
M
2 ' .
Since it is possible to assign the undefined truth-value (N), we are no longer able
to identify the transmission of truth, |=
M
2 , and falsity, =|
M
2 , with the transmis-
sion of non-falsity, 6=|
M
2 , resp. of non-truth, 6|=
M
2 . This is due to the greater str-




2 , such that the following holds:
w 6=|
M







' if w, ( i.⇤) =|
M
2 '
While the relation w |=
M
2
' (or w =|
M
2 ') allows us to conclude that ' (resp.
not-'), its counterpart, w 6=|
M
2 ' (or w 6|=
M
2
'), only prevents us from conclud-
ing that not-' (resp. ').
In the logic TY32, the notions of satisfiability and validity have their usual de-
finitions:
Definition 6.3.1 (TY32 satisfiability). An intensional formula ' is satisfiable
if ' is true at some situation w in some TY32 model MF 2 under some assignment
g
F




Definition 6.3.2 (TY32 validity). An intensional formula ' is valid if ' is sa-
tisfiable at every situation w in every TY32 model MF 2 under every assignment
g
F




If the formula ' is not satisfiable, we call it contradictory.
We close the present section with a demonstration of the (truth-)functional
completeness of the set of primitive TY32 connectives. Below, we assume that the
formula ' contains exactly the type-(s; t) constants p1, . . . , pn. Truth-functions for
intensional TY32 formulas are defined as follows:
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Definition 6.3.3 (Truth-functions). The function f : {T,F,N}n ! {T,F,N}






























The following theorem establishes the expressive adequacy of the set {⇤,?,)}:
Theorem 6.2 (Functional completeness). Every truth-function is expressible
by some intensional TY32 formula.
Proof. The truth-functional completeness of the set {⇤,?,)} follows from
the completeness of the set {>,?,¬,^,_,⌦} (Blamey, 1986, Sect.4.1) and the
definability of >, ¬, ^, _, and ⌦ from ⇤, ?, and ), cf. (Henkin, 1950), where
(' ⌦  ) is defined as (' ^  ) _ ((' _  ) ^ ( i.⇤)). ⇤
This completes our truth-definition for the logic TY32. We next turn to the
definition of TY32 entailment.
6.4. Entailment and Proof Theory
In the logic TY32, entailment between type-identical terms is defined through the
logical ordering on conjoinable-type domains (cf. Def. 2.4.1):
Definition 6.4.1 (Generalized TY32 entailment). A set of TY
3
2 terms   = {  |
  2 T 2(↵1...↵n;t)} entails a set of type-identical TY32 terms  = {  |   2 T 2(↵1...↵n;t)},
i.e.   |=
g

















Definition 6.4.1 enables the following definition of semantic equivalence:
Definition 6.4.2 (Global TY32 equivalence). A TY
3
2 term A is (globally) equi-
valent to a TY32 term B, i.e. |=g A = B, if, for all general TY32 models MF 2 and
assignments g
F
2 , A |=
g
B and B |=
g
A.
The relation of global equivalence between terms of the logic TY32 corresponds to
the relation of TY0 equivalence from Chapter 2 (Def. 2.4.2). However, to enable
the identification of a name’s contextually salient sentential equivalents in our str-
ong single-type semantics (cf. Prop. 1.3.ii), we identify a second, weaker, notion of
equivalence, called ‘local equivalence’. In the definition of local equivalence, pro-
positional TY32 types are defined as follows:
Definition 6.4.3 (Propositional TY32 Types). The set PropType of proposi-
tional TY32 types is the smallest set of strings such that, for 0  n 2 N, if ↵1, . . . ,
↵
n 1 2 2Type, then (↵1 . . .↵n 1 s; t) 2 PropType.
The local equivalence relation between TY32 terms is defined below:
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Definition 6.4.4 (Local TY32 equivalence). A propositional-type term A is
locally equivalent to a TY32 term B at a given situation w (or is w-equivalent to
B), i.e. w |=
g










In contrast to the relation of global TY32 equivalence, local equivalence only de-
mands the identity of the terms A andB at w.13 As a result, we can define the glo-
bal equivalence of two TY32 terms via their local equivalence at all situations.
To enable the proof-theoretic characterization of TY32 entailment, we use the
connective) from Definition 6.1.3. In Chapter 2 (cf. Thm.2.2), we have stipulated
that ) be the syntactic correspondent of the modeling relation in our single-type
object theory. The existence of a TY32 constant for the truth-combinationN enab-
les us to motivate this move: In virtue of its definition, only logical implication, )
(but not material implication, !) always yields a bivalent formula. The Strong
Kleene tables for ) and ! are compared in Table 6.2:
! > ? ⇤ ) > ? ⇤
> > ? ⇤ > > ? ?
? > > > ? > > >
⇤ > ⇤ ⇤ ⇤ > ? >
Table 6.2. The Strong Kleene tables for ! and ).
On the basis of the above, we establish the following deduction theorem for the









same-type conjoinable TY32 terms.
Theorem 6.3 (Deduction theorem for TY32). The set   entails the set   if






Proof. The proof is standard.
We also characterize the proof-theoretic correlate of TY32 entailment via a
Gentzen sequent calculus. The definitions of TY32 sequents and of TY
3
2 provability
and refutation correspond to the definitions from Chapter 2.4. Since the structu-
ral rules for TY32 are the structural rules of TY0 (modulo the replacement of type-
o by type-(↵1 . . .↵n; t) terms), and since the logical rules for TY0 are analogous to
the logical rules of TY32 (modulo the replacement of the designated TY0 constants
by TY32 connectives and quantifiers), we forego their detailed presentation.
13For the lack of a better alternative, we use the letter ‘w’ both as a situation constant and as
the semantic value of this constant. However, this ambiguity is innocent.
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The introduction rules for ‘star’ and the principle of discernibility of non-id-
entical individuals (cf. (6.1.1)) are given in Table 6.3. In the table, i, P , and ~x are
(sequences of) TY32 variables of the types s, (e s; t), and ↵1, . . . ,↵n, respectively.
The TY32 constants A and c1, c2 have the type (~↵; t), respectively e.
⇤1
( ~x.⇤) ) ¬( ~x.⇤) ⇤2¬( ~x.⇤) ) ( ~x.⇤)
⇤ L
( ~x.⇤) ) A,¬A ⇤RA,¬A ) ( ~x.⇤)
disc
c1 6= c2 ) (9P9i.P (c1, i) ^ (¬P (c2, i) _ P (c2, i) = ⇤))
Table 6.3. Additional logical rules for TY32.
The rules for the behavior of ‘star’ are due to Blamey (1986). In particular, the
rules ⇤1 and ⇤2 are motivated by the fact that the truth-combination N is uncom-
plemented (s.t. N = ¬N). The observations that (N_¬N) = N and (N^¬N) =
N motivate the rules ⇤ L, resp. ⇤R. In particular, the rule ⇤ L is motivated by the
observation that, for every sequence ~c of TY32 constants of the types ↵1, . . . ,↵n,
it holds that, if A(~c) = > or A(~c) = ?, then A(~c)_¬A(~c) = >, such that ( ~x.⇤)
(~c) ) (A(~c)_¬A(~c)). If A(~c) = ⇤, then (A(~c)_¬A(~c)) = ⇤, such that ( ~x.⇤)(~c) =
(A(~c)_¬A(~c)). The rule ⇤R is motivated by the observation that, if A(~c) = > or
A(~c) = ?, then A(~c)^¬A(~c) = ?, such that (A(~c)^¬A(~c)) ) ( ~x.⇤)(~c). If A(~c)
= ⇤, then (A(~c) ^ ¬A(~c)) = ⇤, such that (A(~c) ^ ¬A(~c)) = ( ~x.⇤)(~c).
The metamathematical properties of TY32 correspond to the properties of the
logic TY0 from Chapter 2.4.
6.5. Summary
The present chapter has introduced the three-sorted three-valued logic TY32. This
logic is a partial variant of Gallin’s logic TY2, whose types are formed from the ba-
sic types e, s, and t through a generalization of the type-forming rule CT. Terms
of TY32 include the symbol for logical implication, which corresponds to the logical
ordering on conjoinable TY32 frames. To enable the specification of semantic con-
straints on the PTQ translations from Definition 3.2.2, the TY32 language L
2 ex-
tends the language of TY2 with the iota operator, and with an existence and ab-
outness predicate. The use of these predicates will be exemplified in the following
chapters.
Our focus on conjoinable types, and our assumption of the undefined truth-
value N, ensure the partiality of certain TY32 objects. In particular, the attributi-
on of the value undefined to some objects induces an approximation order on con-
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joinable-type objects. The existence of this ordering enables the representation of
strong single-type objects along the lines described in Chapter 4.2.3.
In virtue of the above, the logic TY32 constitutes the metatheory of the single-
type semantics from Chapters 7 and 8. Its (s; t)-based subsystem WTY31 is defi-
ned in the following chapter. This subsystem is obtained by restricting the sets of




The previous chapter has presented the metatheory of our single-type semantics in
the form of the logic TY32. The present chapter introduces its (s; t)-based subsys-
tem WTY31 and develops a weak, WTY
3
1-based, single-type semantics for Monta-
gue’s PTQ fragment. This semantics is a designated model for the logic WTY31
which interprets proper names, sentences, and complement phrases in the type for
propositions, (s; t). Objects of this type represent individuals via the set of situa-
tions in which these individuals exist, and represent propositions via the set of si-
tuations at which the propositions’ denoting sentences are true. The resulting se-
mantics enables the interpretation of all logical PTQ forms (Prop. 1.2), accommo-
dates NP/CP complement-neutral verbs, name/CP coordinations, and CP equa-
tives (Ch. 1.2.1) and explains the truth-evaluability of proper names (Prop. 1.3.i).
Our presentation of the TY0-based single-type semantics from Part I has al-
ready provided a theory of syntax for the PTQ fragment (in Ch. 3.1; cf. step 1),
and has formulated a set of rules for the translation of logical PTQ forms into sin-
gle-type terms (in Ch. 3.2.1; cf. step 3). Consequently, to obtain a weak single-ty-
pe semantics for the PTQ fragment, we only need to define the interpreting logic
WTY31 (step 2.i) and impose a number of semantic constraints on the interpreta-
tion of the WTY31-based PTQ translations from Definition 3.2.2 (step 4). In Fig-
ure 7.1 (next page), these two steps are framed.
This chapter performs the relevant steps from the previous paragraph. In par-
ticular, Sections 7.1 to 7.2.1 and Section 7.2.2 will carry out steps (2.i) and (4), re-
spectively. Section 7.3 specifies the truth-conditions for PTQ forms of the basic
WTY31 type and identifies these forms’ semantic equivalents. The chapter closes
with an alternative to the explanation of syntactic well-formedness from Chapter
3.4 (in Sect. 7.4). Section 7.5 contains a summary of the semantics’ achievements.
7.1. The ‘Weak’ Object Theory WTY31
We begin by defining the object theory, WTY31, of the weak single-type semantics
from Chapter 4.2.3. This semantics is a designated model of a subsystem of the lo-
gic TY32 which constructs all of its types from the TY
3
2 type for propositions, (s; t).




134 7. WEAK SINGLE-TYPE SEMANTICS





trnsl. (3) def’n (4) I2 (2.ii)
Figure 7.1. Doubly indirect interpretation via WTY31.
will be algebraic (cf. Ch. 4.1.1), will contain partial objects (cf. Ch. 4.2.4), and will
allow the truth-evaluation of basic-type terms (cf. Prop. 1.3.i).
The name of the logic, ‘WTY31’, again follows Gallin’s naming convention for
type logics. In particular, the subscript ‘1’ in its name is warranted by the con-
struction of the least complex WTY31 type, (s; t), from 1+t basic TY
3
2 types. The
letter ‘W’ (for ‘weak ’) distinguishes the presented theory from Church’s Simple
Theory of Types TY1, and from the ‘strong’ single-type logic from Chapter 8. As
for TY32, the three-superscript indicates the partiality of the logic’s models.
Our presentation of the logic WTY31 follows the presentation of the logics TY0
and TY32. In particular, the characterization of WTY
3
1 as a subsystem of the logic
TY32 will allow us to skip many definitions.
7.1.1. Types and Terms. Our survey of Montagovian objects from Chap-
ter 4.2.3 has identified functions from situations to truth-combinations (or propo-
sitions ; cf. Partee’s properties of situations) as the simplest ‘weak’ single-type can-
didate. As a result, we adopt the TY32 type (s; t) as the lowest-rank type of the lo-
gic WTY31. The description of the type (s; t) as the basic
1 WTY31 type is justified
by the fact that the TY32 types s and t disqualify as WTY
3
1 types. Consequently,
we cannot obtain the type (s; t) from lower-rank WTY31 types through the type-
forming rule from Definition 7.1.1 (below).
The set of WTY31 types is defined as a subset of the set 2Types as follows:
Definition 7.1.1 (WTY31 types). The set w1Type of WTY
3
1 types is the smal-
lest set of strings s.t., for 0  n 2 N, if ↵1, . . . ,↵n 2 w1Type, then (↵1 . . .↵n s; t) 2
w1Type.
By our basic-type choice, all types of the logic WTY31 are propositional (cf. Def.
6.4.3) and conjoinable (cf. Def. 6.1.2) (s.t.w1Type ✓ PropType ✓ CoType). As a re-
sult of the ‘propositionality’ of WTY31 types, the linguistic correlates of basic-type
1The description of (s; t) as the ‘basic’ type of the logic WTY31 is, at best, unfortunate. However,
since this description supports the intuitions from Part I – and since the two uses of the adjective
basic will be distinguished by their respective contexts –, this ambiguity is harmless.
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WTY31 terms will admit of a definition of truth and equivalence (cf. Sect. 7.1.4).
As a result of the conjoinability of WTY31 types, the logic WTY
3
1 provides natural
semantic counterparts for many linguistic connectives (cf. Sect. 7.2.2).
A language Lw1 for WTY31 is a proper subset, L
2
 w1Type, of the set of non-logi-
cal constants of the logic TY32. The set Vw1 of WTY31 variables is a proper subset,
V2 w1Type, of the set of TY32 variables. From these expressions, complex terms are
formed inductively via restricted variants of clauses (ii) to (iii) from Definition
6.1.3 and via type-adapted2 variants of clauses (i) and (iv) from Definition 2.1.2:
Definition 7.1.2 (WTY31 terms). Let ↵1, . . . ,↵n,  2 w1Type. The set Tw1↵







, ,? 2 Tw1(s;t);
(ii) If B 2 Tw1( ↵1...↵ns;t) and A 2 Tw1  , then (B (A)) 2 Tw1(↵1...↵ns;t);
(iii) If A 2 Tw1(↵1...↵ns;t) and x 2 V  , then ( x.A) 2 Tw1( ↵1...↵ns;t);
(iv) If B,C 2 Tw1
↵
, then (B ).= C) 2 Tw1(s;t).
In clauses (i) and (iv), our use of the TY0 symbol for the absurd entity and the
TY0 stand-in for logical implication is motivated by the ill-typing of the TY
3
2 con-
stants ? and ) in the logic WTY31, and by the availability of suitable constants
in the logic TY0. Of course, since TY0 is an o -based logic, the constants ,?
o
and
).= (↵↵;o) are, strictly speaking, also ill-typed in WTY31. However, the possibility
of interpreting o as the type (s; t) (Ch. 4.2.3) supports the adoption of ,? and ).= .3
From ,? and ).= , suitably typed variants of the TY0 stand-ins for the remain-
ing TY32 connectives are obtained by an analogue of Notation 2.1.1. In particular,
the constants ,> ; 2· and 3· ; V andW; and .=, !· , and $· are now non-logical con-
stants of the types (s, t), ((s; t) s; t), (↵ (s; t) s; t), resp. (↵↵ s; t), where ↵ 2 w1Ty-
pe. Our use of the same symbol for TY32 and WTY
3
1 conjunction (^), disjunction
(_), and negation (¬) is motivated by the availability of these connectives in the
logic WTY31, such that they have their familiar type (i.e. (↵↵;↵), resp. (↵;↵)).
4
We will see in Section 7.2.2 that the definition of the designated WTY31 con-
stants in terms of their associated TY32 connectives constrains the semantic beha-
vior of these constants without the use of meta-level axioms.
This completes our specification of WTY31 types and terms. We next turn to
the definition of general WTY31 frames and models.
2In this adaptation, we replace all TY0 types (↵1 . . .↵n; o) by WTY31 types (↵1 . . .↵n s; t).
3Our bold-scripting of WTY31 terms (in clauses (ii)–(iv)) and the circling of nullary TY
3
2 con-
stants to yield their WTY31 correspondents (in clause (i)) serve the same purpose.
4Thus, in the logic WTY31, we write ¬B for ( x.B
.
= ( y.,? )) and (B^C ) for ( x.( X.X (B .=
C ))
.
= ( X.X (,> ))). The connective _ then has its usual definition.
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7.1.2. Models. General WTY31 frames are w1Type-restricted variants of ge-
neral frames for the logic TY32. These variants have the expected definition:




proper subset, F 2 w1Type = {DF
2
↵
|↵ 2 w1Type}, of the relevant TY32 frame.
Since we have identified the TY32 domainD(s;t) with a subset of the function space
(W ! 3), the ground domain of the logic WTY31 contains partial objects, which
are ordered with respect to their degrees of truth and definedness. As a result,
WTY31 frames contain the desired partial objects from Chapter 4.2.4.
Definitions 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 warrant the definition of WTY31 interpretation fun-
ctions I
F
w1 and variable assignments g
F
w1 as subsets of TY32 interpretation func-
tions and variable assignments (in (7.1.1), resp. (7.1.2)). General modelsM
F
w1 for





2 w1Type : L2 w1Type ! F 2 w1Type(7.1.1)
g
F
2 w1Type : V2 w1Type ! F 2 w1Type(7.1.2)
(7.1.3) M
F
2 w1Type = hF 2 w1Type, IF 2 w1Type, VF 2 w1Typei
Since WTY31 types are conjoinable, all general models for the logic WTY
3
1 are al-
gebraic De Morgan models (cf. Def. 6.2.6).
On the basis of the above, we next turn to the notions of truth, equivalence,
and entailment for basic-type WTY31 terms.
7.1.3. Truth and Entailment. In contrast to the ‘pure’ single-type logic
from Part I, the logic WTY31 commands a truth-definition for its basic-type terms.
This is due to the fact that the basic WTY31 type is the TY
3
2 type for propositions
(s; t), and that the notions of TY32 truth and falsity are defined for terms of this
type (cf. Nota. 6.3.1). However, since the logic WTY31 does not command designat-
ed types for situations (s) or truth-combinations (t), we need to evaluate the truth





The truth (or falsity) of basic-type WTY31 terms is defined below. In the defi-
nition, an ‘embedded’ WTY31 model MFw1 and assignment function gFw1 of a
general TY32 model MF 2 (abbr. ‘M2’) and assignment gF 2 (abbr. ‘g2’) are under-
stood as the results of restricting (the relevant constituents of) M2 and g2 to




The truth or falsity of basic-type WTY31 terms is then defined as follows:
Definition 7.1.4 (WTY31 truth). A WTY
3
1 term A(s;t) is true (or false) at a
situation w in an embedding TY32 model, M
2, of a general WTY31 model MFw1
under an embedded assignment, g2, of the assignment g
F
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Since we have defined the logic WTY31 as an (s; t)-based subsystem of the logic
TY32, the relation of WTY
3
1 entailment is a restricted variant of the generalized en-
tailment relation for terms of the logic TY32 (cf. Def. 6.4.1). The relation of WTY
3
1
entailment is defined as follows:
Definition 7.1.5 (WTY31 entailment). A set of basic-type WTY
3
1 terms   =
{  |   2 Tw1(s;t)} entails a set of WTY31 terms  = {  |   2 Tw1(s;t)}, i.e.   |=g  , if, for
















On the basis of the above, the relation of WTY31 equivalence is a type-(s; t) re-
stricted variant of the global equivalence relation between terms of the logic TY32
(cf. Def. 6.4.2).
Like the proof theory of the single-type logic TY0, the proof theory of the lo-
gic WTY31 characterizes entailment via the TY
3
2 symbol for logical implication,).
As a result, it holds for all sets of basic WTY31 terms   and   that   |=g   i↵
|=
g
  )   (Thm.2.2, cf. Thm.6.3). The behavior of ) is governed by WTY31-ty-
ped variants of the rules of the logic TY0 (cf. Tables 2.1–2.3).
In virtue of its proximity to the logic TY32, the logic WTY
3
1 has the desired
metamathematical properties from Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 and Corollaries 2.1 to
2.3. In the interest of space, we here omit their detailed statements.
This completes our discussion of the (s; t)-based logic WTY31. We next show
that a designated model of this logic interprets the PTQ fragment (cf. Prop. 1.2),
accommodates the mentioned phenomena from lexical syntax, syntactic coordi-
nation, and specification (cf. Ch. 1.2.1) and explains the truth-evaluability of pro-
per names (Prop. 1.3.i).
7.2. A WTY31 Semantics for the PTQ Fragment
To identify the WTY31 translations of logical PTQ forms (cf. steps 2.i, 3), we first
specify the particular WTY31 language Lw1 and frame Fw1. Their elements are
(interpretations of) the designated single-type constants ,? , ).= , etc. from Secti-
on 7.1.1 and the weak single-type translations, respectively interpretations of the
lexical items from Table 3.1.
7.2.1. Fixing Lw1, Fw1, L2, and F2. Table 7.1 (next page) contains the
non-logical constants of the language Lw1. Table 7.2 introduces our notational
conventions for WTY31 variables. To ease the readability of WTY
3
1 terms – and to
indicate their representational relations to terms of the logic TY32 –, we again in-
troduce di↵erent variables for type-identical objects (e.g. x and p in Table 7.2).
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Constant WTY31 Type
B,C (↵1 . . .↵n s; t)
¬ ((↵1 . . .↵n s; t)↵1 . . .↵n s; t)
^,_ ((↵1 . . .↵n s; t) (↵1 . . .↵n s; t)↵1 . . .↵n s; t)V
,
W
(↵ (s; t) s; t)
).= , .=, 6 .=, !· , $· (↵↵ s; t)
,> ,,? , john,mary, bill,ninety, sherlock,pat, (s; t)
moriarty,partee,w
2· ,3· ,man,woman,park,fish,pen,unicorn, ((s; t) s; t)
room,problem
run,walk, talk,wait,arrive,E ((s; t) s; t)
find, lose, eat, love,date, remember, fear,hate, ((s; t) (s; t) s; t)
destroy, enter, believe, assert
temp,price, rise, change (((s; t) s; t) s; t)
rapidly, slowly, voluntary,allegedly, try,wish (((s; t) s; t) (s; t) s; t)
in, for ((s; t) ((s; t) s; t) (s; t) s; t)
seek, conceive ((((s; t) s; t) s; t) (s; t) s; t)
about ((((s; t) s; t) s; t) ((s; t) s; t) (s; t) s; t)
Table 7.1. Lw1 constants.
Variable WTY31 Type
x,x1, . . . ,xn,y, z,p,p1, . . . ,pn, q, r (s; t)
P,P1, . . . ,Pn ((s; t) s; t)
Q,Q1, . . . ,Qn (((s; t) s; t) s; t)
L,L1, . . . ,Ln ((((s; t) s; t) s; t) (s; t) s; t)
Table 7.2. WTY31 variables.
We assume that, like the designated frame of the logic TY0, the WTY
3
1 frame Fw1
is very large. The designated interpretation function IFw1 sends all Lw1 constants
from Table 7.1 to their semantic values in Fw1. The function IFw1 respects the
conventional lexical relations between content words.
To constrain the interpretations of the WTY31 translations of PTQ forms (as
motivated in Ch. 5.3.1), we further need to specify a designated language L2, fra-
me F2, and interpretation function IF2 of the logic TY32 (cf. Ch. 6). The particu-
lar members of L2 and the relevant TY32 variables are listed in Tables 7.3 and 7.4.
Since we want to define WTY31 terms through expressions of the logic TY
3
2,
we let the non-logical TY32 constants and variables from Tables 7.3 and 7.4 include
the WTY31 constants and variables from Tables 7.1 and 7.2 (cf. the last entry in
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Constant TY32 Type
john,mary, bill,ninety, sherlock,moriarty, pat, partee, c e
@ s
', (s; t)
man,woman, park,fish, pen, unicorn, problem, room (e s; t)
run,walk, talk,wait, arrive, E (e s; t)
find, lose, eat, love, date, remember, fear, destroy, hate, (e e s; t)
enter
believe, assert ((s; t) e s; t)
temp, price, rise, change (((s; t); e) s; t)
rapidly, slowly, voluntary, allegedly, try,wish ((e s; t) e s; t)
in, for (e (e s; t) e s; t)
seek, conceive (((e s; t) s; t) e s; t)
about (((e s; t) s; t) (e s; t) e s; t)
All WTY31 constants from Table 7.1 are designated TY
3
2 constants.
Table 7.3. L2 constants.
Variable TY32 Type Object
i, j, k, k1, . . . , kn s situation
x, x1, . . . , xn, y, z e individual
p, p1, . . . , pn, q, r (s; t) proposition
P, P1, . . . , Pn (e s; t) 1st-order intensional indiv. p’ty
T, T1, . . . , Tn ((s; t); e) proposition-to-individual-function
Q,Q1, . . . , Qn ((e s; t) s; t) 2nd-order intensional indiv. p’ty
L,L1, . . . , Ln ((((e s; t) s; t) s; t) s; t) 4th-order intensional indiv. p’ty
The WTY31 variables from Table 7.2 are in the set of TY
3
2 variables.
Table 7.4. TY32 variables.
Tables 7.3, resp. 7.4). To enable the truth-evaluation of basic-type WTY31 terms
in a model of the logic TY32, we further require that the designated TY
3
2 frame F2
and interpretation function IF2 embed the designated frame and interpretation
function of the logic WTY31, such that Fw1 = F2 w1Type and IFw1 = IF2 w1Type.
7.2.2. Translations of Logical PTQ Forms.On the basis of the above,we
are able to provide WTY31 translations for lexical elements of the PTQ fragment
and for the example sentences from Chapter 1.2.1. These translations are WTY31-
typed variants of the TY0 translations from Definition 3.2.2. For convenience, we
already include the translations of the linguistic connectives from Definition 3.2.4.
140 7. WEAK SINGLE-TYPE SEMANTICS
Definition 7.2.1 (Basic WTY31 translations).The rule (T0) translates the le-
xical elements from Table 3.1 into the following WTY31 terms, where X1, . . . ,Xn,
R, and R1 are WTY
3
1 variables of the types ↵1, . . . ,↵n, resp. (↵1 . . .↵n s; t):
John  john ; Mary  mary ;
Bill  bill ; ninety  ninety ;
Pat  pat ; B. Partee  partee ;
Moriarty  moriarty ; Sherlock  sherlock ;
man  man ; who(m)/which   P.P ;
fish  fish ; woman  woman ;
park  park ; unicorn  unicorn ;
pen  pen ; temperature  temp ;
price  price ; fears   Q x.Q( y.fear (y,x));
problem  problem ; hates   Q x.Q( y.hate (y,x));
room  room ; finds   Q x.Q( y.find (y,x));
waits  wait ; loses   Q x.Q( y.lose (y,x));
arrives  arrive ; eats   Q x.Q( y.eat (y,x));
runs  run ; loves   Q x.Q( y.love (y,x));
walks  walk ; dates   Q x.Q( y.date (y,x));
talks  talk ; destroys   Q x.Q( y.destroy (y,x));
exists  E ; remembers   Q x.Q( y.remember (y,x));
rises  rise ; enters   Q x.Q( y.enter (y,x));
changes  change ; is   Q x.Q( y.x .= y);
seeks  seek ; believes   p Q. Q( x. believe (p,x));
conceives  conceive ; asserts   p Q. Q( x.assert (p,x)) ^ p ;
about  about ; in   Q P x.Q( y.in (y,P,x);
allegedly  allegedly ; for   Q P x.Q( y.for (y,P,x);
that   p.p ; slowly   P x.slowly (P,x) ^P (x);
tries to  try ; rapidly   P x.rapidly (P,x) ^P (x);
wishes to  wish ; voluntarily   P x.voluntary (P,x) ^P (x);





















y.(P1(y)$· x .= y) ^P (x);
and   R1 R ~X.R (~X ) ^R1(~X );
or   R1 R ~X.R (~X ) _R1(~X );
not   R ~X.¬R (~X )
To identify the particular TY32 referent of every WTY
3
1 term (cf. Ch. 5.3), we con-
strain the interpretation of the primitive WTY31 constants from Table 7.1. From
these constraints, the constraints for the remaining WTY31 terms from Definition
7.2.1 can then be obtained via a compositional definition.
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Definition 7.2.2 (Definition of Lw1-constants). The interpretations of the
WTY31 constants from Table 7.1 obey the following semantic constraints: In (C9)–
(C13), we let X abbreviate ◆P.(8z 8k1.P (z, k1) = P ([◆z.z = ( k2.E(z, k2))], k1)).
(C1) ,? =  i.?
(C2) (B ).= C) =  i.B(i) ) C(i)
(C0) w =  i8p.p(@)⇣ p(i)
(C3) john =  i.E(john, i); sherlock =  i.E(sherlock, i);
mary =  i.E(mary, i); moriarty =  i.E(moriarty, i);
bill =  i.E(bill, i); pat =  i.E(pat, i);
ninety =  i.E(ninety, i); partee =  i.E(partee, i)
(C4) man =  x i.man
 



































[◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i
 
(C5) run =  x i.run
 

























[◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i
 
(C6) believe =  p x i.believe
 





p, [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i
 
(C7) find =  y x i.find
 













































[◆y.y = ( j.E(y, j))], [◆x.x = ( k.E(x, k))], i
 
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(C8) temp =  P i.temp
 ⇥
◆T.












 8z.P (z) = [ j.E(T (z), j)] ⇤, i 
(C9) rapidly =  P x i.rapidly
 















X, [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i
 
(C10) try =  P x i.try
 





X, [◆x.x = ( k.E(x, k))], i
 
(C11) in =  y P x i.in
 
[◆y.y = ( j.E(y, j))], X,
 y P x i.in
 





[◆y.y = ( j.E(y, j))], X,
 y P x i.for
 
[◆x.x = ( k.E(x, k))], i
 
(C12) seek =  Q x i.seek
 
[◆Q.(8P.( k.Q(P, k)) = ( k3.Q(X, k3)))],
 Q P x i.about
 





[◆Q.(8P.( k.Q(P, k)) = ( k3.Q(X, k3)))],
 Q P x i.about
 
[◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i
 
(C13) about =  Q P x i.about
 
[◆Q.(8P.( k.Q(P, k)) = ( k3.Q(X, k3)))],
 Q P x i.about
 
X, [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i
 
The constraints (C1) and (C2) define the designated WTY31 constants ,? and ).=
as the results of lifting the TY32 connectives ? and ) to constructions out of the
basic WTY31 type (s; t).
5 For example, (C1) defines the constant ,? as the designa-
tor of the constant function from situations to ‘bottom’.
The constraint (C0) defines the basic-type WTY31 constant w as the designa-
tor of the set of all situations which extend the semantic information of the cur-
rent situation, @. Thus, w denotes the propositional representation of @. This re-
presentation is needed for the definition of the WTY31 translations of the sentences
The temperature is ninety and Ninety rises (cf. (7.2.25), (D.1.1)).
From (C1), (C2), and Notation 2.1.1, the remaining designated WTY31 con-
stants are easily defined:




x.A) for ( i8x.A(i)) (Wx.A) for ( i9x.A(i))
5This is similar to the translation of dynamic to typed terms from (Muskens, 1991, p. 9).
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B
.
= C for ( x i.B(x, i) = C(x, i)) ¬B for ( x i.¬B (x, i))
(B ^C ) for ( x i.B(x, i) ^C(x, i)) 2· A for ( i.2A)
(B _C) for ( x i.B(x, i) _C(x, i)) 3· A for ( i.3A)
For example, the definition of the WTY31 stand-in, ,> , for verum (previous page)
is obtained by using the TY32 definitions of the WTY
3
1 constants ,? and ).= in the
definition of ,> , and by replacing the resulting TY32 term by its  -equivalent:
,> = (,? ).= ,? )(7.2.1)
= ( i.( j.?)(i) ) ( j.?)(i))
= ( i.? ) ?) = ( i.>)
The definition of the WTY31 stand-in, 2· , for the modal box operator relies on
the type-(s; t) representation of situations w along the lines of (C0) (cf. Ch. 4.2.4;
in (7.2.2), line 6), and on our restriction of situations to possible situations (s.t.
¬9i8p.p(i) = ?; line 5). The definition of 2· is then obtained as follows:




= ,? _ (p ).= A) (7.2.2)
=
 ^




 i8p.[ j.p (j) = ? _ (p (j) ) A(j))](i) 
=
 






 i8p.p (i) = [9w
s
8q.q(w)⇣ q(i)] ) A(i) 
= ( i8j.A(j)) = ( i.2A)
The definition of 3· is analogously obtained. The derivations of the TY32 definiti-
ons of the remaining designated constants from Notation 7.2.1 are included in Ap-
pendix C.3. The constants 6 .=, !· , and $· have their expected definitions.
The ⌘-equivalence of conjunctive, disjunctive, and negative WTY31 terms to
their definitions in the logic TY32 obviates the need for designated WTY
3
1 connec-
tives for conjunction, disjunction, or negation (cf. Sect. 7.1.1).
We next turn to the semantic constraints (i.e. (C3)–(C13)) for the definition
of WTY31 constants which do not serve as proxies for logical or situation-denoting
TY32 constants. We start with a discussion of the constraint (C3).
In line with the type-(s; t) representation of individuals from Chapter 4.2.3
(cf. (4.2.10)), the third instance of the constraint (C3) defines the WTY31 constant
bill as the designator of a function which sends situations to the truth-value of the
proposition ‘Bill exists’ at those situations (i.e. as the designator of the characte-
ristic function of the set of situations in which Bill exists).
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The remaining constraints ensure that the WTY31 translations of sentential
PTQ forms are interpreted as objects of the form of (4.2.9). In particular, since
the type-((s; t) s; t) term walk is defined as the designator of a function from pro-
positions x to the characteristic function of the set of situations at which the
weak type-e correlate, ◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j)), of x walks (cf. (C5)), we can define the
WTY31 translation of the sentence Bill walks as follows:
1. [npBill] bill =  i.E(bill, i)(7.2.3)
2. [vp[ivwalks]] walk =  x i.walk
 
[◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i
 
3. [s[npBill][vp[ivwalks]]] walk (bill)
=  x i.walk
 ⇥













[◆x.bill = x], i
 
=  i.walk (bill, i)
The step from the third to the fifth line of (7.2.3.3) is justified by the additional as-
sumption that every type-e constant has a unique referent, and by the assumption
from axiom Ax12 (cf. Ch. 6.1). As a result, the interpretation of the term ◆x.[ k.
E(bill, k)] = ( j.E(x, j)) will be defined in every model of the logic TY32 which
provides an interpretation for the constant bill (cf. Def. 6.2.4.iv).
The resulting term,  i.walk (bill, i), adopts the strategy for the type-(s; t) re-
presentation of propositions from Chapter 4.2.3 (cf. (4.2.9)). Since it is further eq-
uivalent to Montague’s translation of the sentence Bill walks from (Montague,
1973, p. 266), cf. (Gallin, 1975), the interpretations of logical PTQ forms in the
designated model of the logic WTY31 are not significantly more complex than th-
eir interpretation in models of Montague’s Intensional Logic, IL. The small in-
crease in semantic complexity (reflected in the larger number of required lambda
conversions) is compensated for by the greater modeling power of our semantics
(w.r.t. the modeling power of IL, and of the logic TY0 from Part I). This advan-
tage will be demonstrated in (7.2.16), (7.2.26), (7.2.34), and in Section 7.4.
From Definition 7.2.2, the definitions of the WTY31 translations of all other
lexical elements from Table 3.1 are easily obtained. In particular, the definition























[◆z.y = ( j.E(z, j))], [◆x.x = ( k.E(x, k))], i
  
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The definitions of the WTY31 translations of the determiners a, every, and the are
given in items (7.2.5) to (7.2.7). These definitions involve the definitions of some
of the designated WTY31 constants from Notation 7.2.1. In particular, in (7.2.5)
and (7.2.6) (cf. (7.2.7)), the second (resp. second-to-fourth) line uses the TY32 defi-
nition of the WTY31 stand-ins for the connectives ^ and ! (resp. ^, =, and $).
The remaining lines use the TY32 definitions of the WTY
3
1 stand-ins for the quan-






x.[ j.P1(x, j) ^P (x, j)]
=  P1 P i9x.[ j.P1(x, j) ^P (x, j)](i)






x.[ j.P1(x, j) ! P (x, j)]
=  P1 P i8x.[ j.P1(x, j) ! P (x, j)](i)











y.[ k.( k2.P1(y, k2) $ x (k2) = y (k2))(k) ^P (x, k)]
=  P1 P i9x [ j8y.(P1(y, j) $ x (j) = y (j)) ^P (x, j)](i)
=  P1 P i9x 8y.(P1(y, i) $ x (i) = y (i)) ^P (x, i)
To show that our constraints from Definition 7.2.2 yield the ‘right’ definitions of
the WTY31 translations of complex logical forms, we next define the TY0 transla-
tions of the logical forms of the example sentences from Chapter 3.2. We begin
with the definition of the WTY31 translation of the logical form of the sentence A





=  P1 P i9x.P1(x, i) ^P (x, i)
2. [nman] man =  x i.man
 




x.man (x) ^P (x)




[◆x.y = ( j.E(x, j))], k
 ⇤
=  P i9x.⇥ y k.man  [◆x.y = ( j.E(x, j))], k ⇤(x, i) ^P (x, i)
=  P i9x.man  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^P (x, i)
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4. [vp[ivwalks]] walks =  x i.walk
 




x.man (x) ^walk (x)
=  P i9x.man  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^P (x, i)
=  i9x.⇥ y k.walk  [◆y.y = ( k1.E(y, k1))], k
 ⇤
=  i9x.man  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i ^
=  i9x.⇥ y k.walk  [◆y.y = ( k1.E(y, k1))], k
 ⇤
(x, i)
=  i9x.man  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^ walk  [◆y.x = ( k1.E(y, k1))], i
 
=  i9x.man (x, i) ^ walk (x, i)
The definitions of the WTY31 translations of the logical forms of the sentences Ev-
ery man walks, The man walks, A price rises, The temperature rises, and John finds a
unicorn (cf. (3.2.3)–(3.2.7)) are given below. Since the obtaining of these definiti-
ons closely follows the obtaining of the definitions from (7.2.3) and (7.2.8), we con-
tent ourselves with their statement. Some of the more interesting definitional de-
rivations can be found in Appendix D.2.
[s[np[every][man]][[walks]]] 
^
x.man (x)!· walk (x)(7.2.9)





y.(man (y)$· x .= y) ^walk (x)(7.2.10)
=  i9x8y.(man (y, i) $ x = y) ^ walk (x, i)
[s[[deta][nprice]][vp[rises]]] 
_
P.price (P) ^ rise (P)(7.2.11)






P1.(temp (P1)$· P .= P1) ^ rise (P)
=  i9T 8T1.(temp (T1, i) $ T = T1) ^ rise (T, i)
[s[John][[finds][np[a][nunicorn]]]] 
_
x.unicorn (x) ^ find (x, john)(7.2.13)
=  i9x.unicorn (x, i) ^ find (x, john, i)
Notably, our semantic constraints from Definition 7.2.2 still allow the use of
the type-shifting functions from Definitions 3.2.3, D.1.1, and D.1.2. For the func-
tion lift, this is illustrated in the definition of the WTY31 translation of the logical
form of the sentence John finds Mary (cf. (3.2.8)):
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1. [npMary] mary =  i.E(mary, i)
(7.2.14)





[◆z.y = ( j.E(z, j))], [◆x.x = ( k.E(x, k))], i
  

































[◆z.y = ( j.E(z, j))],















mary, [◆x.x = ( k.E(x, k))], i
 
4. [s[npJohn][vp[tvfinds][npMary]]] find (mary, john)
=  x i.find
 







The definitions of the WTY31 translations of the sentences Pat remembers Bill and
Pat remembers that Bill waits for her (cf. (3.2.9), (3.2.11)) also use the function lift :
[s[npPat][vp[tvremembers][npBill]]]  remember (bill,pat)(7.2.15)
=  i.remember (bill, pat, i)
























[◆x1.x1 = ( k2.E(x1, k2))],wait, bill, k
 ⇤












,[◆x.x = ( k.E(x, k))], i
 





























, [◆x.x1 = ( k.E(x, k))], i
 
5. [s[npPat]


































[◆y.[ k.for (pat,wait, bill, k)] = ( j.E(y, j))], pat, i
 
The possibility of translating the above sentences in our WTY31-based semantics
establishes a variant of Proposition 3.1 for this semantics:
Proposition 7.1 (NP/CP neutrality). A weak single-type semantics enables
the interpretation of (both guises of ) NP/CP complement-neutral expressions.
Note that the possibility of defining the WTY31 translations of [[tv][cp]]-stru-
ctures in a weak single-type semantics is conditional on the existence of non-Mon-
tagovian individuals which serve as type-e correlates of propositions: The TY32 co-
rrelate, i.e. remember, of the WTY31 term remember restricts its first argument
to TY32 terms of the type e. To satisfy the typing constraints of the relevant TY
3
2
terms, we need to identify the individual which encodes the semantic information
of the propositional argument. In (7.2.16), this is achieved by identifying the uni-
que individual which exists exactly in the situations at which the formula  k.for
(pat,wait, bill, k) is true (cf. the underlined TY32 term in (7.2.16)). However, this
individual is a ‘special’6 type-e object which is not included in the set of individu-
als from (Montague, 1973). The propositional status of such individuals explai-
6In (Zalta, 1983), such individuals are described as abstract objects.
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ns the impossibility of modeling the logical form (7.2.16) (and, similarly, (3.2.12))
in traditional Montague semantics.
We will see in (7.2.26) (next page) that the existence of propositional individu-
als is also required for the definition of the WTY31 translation of CP equatives (e.g.
(3.2.22)). The definitions of the WTY31 translations of the logical forms of the re-
maining PTQ sentences from Chapter 3.2 are included below.
As expected, our definitions of the WTY31 translations of the di↵erent-scope
readings of the sentences John seeks a unicorn (cf. (3.2.13), (3.2.14)), John talks
about a unicorn (cf. (3.2.15), (3.2.16)), and A woman loves every man (cf. (3.2.17),
(3.2.18)) are equivalents of the forms’ familiar Montagovian translations. These






x.unicorn (x) ^P (x)], john 
=  i.seek
 





x.unicorn (x) ^ seek  [ P.P (x)], john 






x.unicorn (x) ^P (x)], talk, john 
=  i.about
 





x.unicorn (x) ^ about  [ P.P (x)], talk, john 




x.woman (x) ^  
^
y.man (y)!· love (y,x) 







x.woman (x) ^ love (y,x) 
=  i8y.man (y, i) !  9x.woman (x, i) ^ love (y, x, i) 
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The definition of the WTY31 equality sign (cf. Nota. 7.2.1) constrains the inter-
pretation of the translation of the English copula be. The WTY31 translations of
the LFs of its involving sentences from (3.2.19) to (3.2.21) are defined as follows:
[s[npBill][vp[tvis][npMary]]] bill .= mary(7.2.23)
=  i.bill = mary
[s[npBill][vp[tvis][np[deta][nman]]]] man (bill)(7.2.24)








P2. temp (P2) ^ y .= P2(w)
 $· x .= y  ^ x .= ninety
=  i9x8y.  9T.temp (T, i) ^ y = T (w)  $ x = y  ^ x = ninety
Notably, our assumption of type-e correlates of propositions (cf. (7.2.16)) also en-
ables the definition of the WTY31 translation of the equative The problem is that
Mary hates Bill (cf. (3.2.22)). This definition is obtained below:
1. [cp[cthat][s[npMary][vp[tvhates][npBill]]]] hate (bill,mary)
(7.2.26)
=  i.hate(bill,mary, i)
2. [tvis]  Q x.Q( y.x .= y) =  Q x.Q( y i.x (i) = y (i))
3. [vp[tvis][cp[cthat][s[npMary][vp[tvhates][npBill]]]]]
  x.x .= hate (bill,mary)
=  Q x.Q( y i.x (i) = y (i)) [lift ( j.hate(bill,mary, j))]
=  Q x.Q( y i.x (i) = y (i)) [ P.P ( j.hate(bill,mary, j))]
=  x.[ P.P ( j.hate(bill,mary, j))] ( y i.x (i) = y (i))
=  x.[( y i.x (i) = y (i)) ( j.hate(bill,mary, j))]
=  x.[( i.x (i) = ( j.hate(bill,mary, j))(i))]





y.(problem (y)$· x .= y) ^P (x)






y.(problem (y)$· x .= y) ^ x .= hate (bill,mary)
=  P i9x 8y. problem  [◆x.y = ( j.E(x, j))], i  $ x = y  ^P (x, i)
=  P i9x 8y.[ z j.z (j) = hate(bill,mary, j)]
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=  i9x 8y. problem  [◆x.y = ( j.E(x, j))], i  $ x = y ^
=  i9x 8y.[ z j.z (j) = hate(bill,mary, j)] (x, i)
=  i9x 8y. problem  [◆x.y = ( j.E(x, j))], i  $ x = y  ^ x (i) = hate(bill,mary, i)
=  i9x8y.(problem (y, i) $ x = y) ^ x = [◆z.( k.hate(bill,mary, k)) = ( j.E(z, j))]
The equivalence of the second-to-last and the last term from (7.2.26.5) is warran-
ted by the identity of x, y and ( k.hate(bill,mary, k)), and by the resulting possi-
bility of replacing x (i) = hate(bill,mary, i) by the term [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))] =
[◆x.( k.hate(bill,mary, k)) = ( j.E(z, j))]. The equivalence of [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))]
with x yields the second conjunct from the last line of (7.2.26.5).
On the basis of the above, we next turn to the definitions of the WTY31 trans-
lations of coordinated logical forms. These definitions involve ⌘-expansions of the
WTY31 translations of and, or, and not from Definition 7.2.1:
 R1 R 
~
X.R (~X) ^R1(~X ) =  R1 R ~X i.R (~X, i) ^R1(~X, i)(7.2.27)
 R1 R 
~
X.R (~X ) _R1(~X ) =  R1 R ~X i.R (~X, i) _R1(~X, i)(7.2.28)
 R 
~
X.¬R (~X ) =  R ~X i.¬R (~X, i)(7.2.29)
By using these definitions, we can define the WTY31 translations of the sentences
Bill walks and every man finds a unicorn (cf. (3.2.23)), John finds and eats a unicorn
(cf. (3.2.24)), and John does not find a unicorn (cf. (3.2.27)):
[s[s[npBill][vp[ivwalks]]](7.2.30)
[s[[conjand][s[np[detevery][nman]][vp[tvfinds][np[deta][nunicorn]]]]]]]




x.unicorn (x) ^ find (y,x)  




x.unicorn (x) ^ (find ^ eat)(x, john)




x.unicorn (x) ^ find (x, john) 
=  i.¬ 9x.unicorn (x, i) ^ find (x, john, i) 
Remark that our definition of the WTY31 translation of the verb exists enables a
consistent interpretation of negative existential sentences:7
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1. [npJohn] john =  i.E(john, i)(7.2.33)
2. [vp[ivexist]] E =  x i.E
 
[◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i
 
3. [does not] ( P x.¬P (x)) = ( P x i.¬P (x, i))
4. [vp[does not][vp[ivexist]]]  x.¬E (x)
=  x i.¬E [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i 
5. [s[npJohn][vp[does not][vp[ivexist]]]] ¬E (john)
=  i.¬E [◆x.[ k.E(john, k)] = ( j.E(x, j))], i 
=  i.¬E(john, i)
In virtue of their particular form, our constraints on the interpretation of
WTY31 constants also enable the definition of the WTY
3
1 translations of coordina-
tions with a proper name- and a CP-conjunct. However, since the TY32 correlates
(i.e. find, remember) of some WTY31 constants (e.g. find, remember) restrict th-
eir first argument to TY32 terms of the type e – and since the TY
3
2 counterpart of
linguistic conjunction is only defined for conjoinable types (and is, thus, not avai-
lable for type-e terms) –, we are unable to define the WTY31 translation of the re-
sult of coordinating a name and a CP in the complement of transitive verbs (cf.
(3.2.25)). To compensate for this inability, we instead define the WTY31 transla-
tion of the coordination of the results of combining the transitive verb with the
NP, respectively CP (in (7.2.34)), or of the coordination of the results of combin-
ing the thus-obtained VPs with the proper name Pat (in (7.2.35)):
[s[npPat]





 x.remember (bill,x) ^ remember  for (x,wait, bill),x  (pat)
=
 











1 [s t1 [vp[tvremembers][cp[cthat][s[npBill][vp[ivwaits][pp[pfor][npshe1]]]]]]]]
 remember
 
bill,pat) ^ remember  for (pat,wait, bill),pat 
=  i.remember (bill, pat, i)^
 i.remember
 
[◆y.[ k.for (pat,wait, bill, k)] = ( j.E(y, j))], pat, i
 
7I owe this observation to Dietmar Zae↵erer.
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Since the logical forms from (7.2.34) and (7.2.35) are intuitively equivalent to the
logical form from (3.2.25), their substitution for the form from (3.2.25) does not
give reason for concern. However, the impossibility of defining the WTY31 transla-
tion of (3.2.25) once more illustrates the merits of a single-type semantics (here,
the merits of the semantics of the logic WTY31) over traditional Montague seman-
tics (or over the semantics of the logic TY32).
The possibility of defining the WTY31 translation of (an intuitive equivalent
of) sentence (7.2.34) is in agreement with a weak single-type version of Proposi-
tion 3.2. This version is stated below:
Proposition 7.2 (NP/CP coordinability). A weak single-type semantics can
model logical forms which contain coordinations with a proper name- and a CP-
conjunct.
This completes our definition of the WTY31 translations from Definition 7.2.2.
To assess our semantics’ ability to accommodate the claims from Proposition 1.3,
the next section specifies the truth-conditions for PTQ expressions of the basic
WTY31 type, and identifies their semantic equivalents.
7.3. PTQ Truth and Equivalence
Our presentation of the logic WTY31 has already established the possibility of eva-
luating the truth or falsity of basic-type WTY31 terms in models of the metatheory
TY32 (cf. Def. 7.1.4). Since we know (from Sect. 7.2.2) that the WTY
3
1 translation
of every logical PTQ form is defined through a term of the logic TY32, we can eva-
luate the truth or falsity of logical PTQ forms via the truth, respectively falsity
of their translations’ TY32 definitions.
Below, we let A(s;t) be the WTY
3
1 translation of some logical form X, such
that X  A. We let M2 and MFw1 be the designated models of the logics TY32,
respectively WTY31, and let g
2 and gw1 = g2 w1Type be their associated assignments.
We assume that w is a situation in the metatheory.
The truth or falsity of logical PTQ forms is then defined as follows:
Definition 7.3.1 (WTY31-based linguistic truth). A logical form X is true








(X)), if w |=
M
2
A (resp. w =|
M
2 A).
The above definition provides the expected truth-conditions for the logical forms
of PTQ sentences. In particular, the truth-conditions for the sentence Barbara Par-

























2 arrive (partee) i↵ @ =|
M
2  i.arrive (partee, i)
i↵ @ |=
M




For example, if @ is the context from (9) – which is inhabited by Barbara Partee
and in which she has the property of arriving –, the sentence Barbara Partee ar-
rives is true at @. If @ is a variant of the context from (9) which is inhabited by
Barbara Partee, but in which she does not have the property of arriving (instead,
the new arrival is Angelika Kratzer), the sentence Barbara Partee arrives is false
at @. If @ is the context from (10) (which is only inhabited by Mia, Rob, and their
mothers, such that Barbara Partee neither has nor does not have the property of
arriving), the truth-value of the sentence Barbara Partee arrives is undefined at @.
Since we interpret proper names in the basic WTY31 type, Definition 7.3.1 ex-
tends the definition of linguistic truth and falsity to proper names. Thus, the name
Barbara Partee is true at the current situation @ i↵ the definition,  i.E(partee, i),
of the name’s WTY31 translation, partee, is true at @ in M
2 under g2, i.e. if Bar-















The bivalent behavior of the TY32 existence predicate E (cf. Ch. 6.1, Ax10) ensu-
res the ‘classical’ truth-evaluation of names in aWTY31-based semantics. Thus, the
name Barbara Partee is false at @ if it is not the case that the name Barbara Partee















The truth-evaluability of proper names (cf. Prop. 1.3.i) and the classicality of
their WTY31 truth-conditions are captured below:
Proposition 7.3 (WTY31 truth-aptness of names). In a weak single-type se-
mantics, proper names receive a classical truth-value at every situation.
Admittedly, the possibility of evaluating the truth of proper names in a single-
type semantics again depends on the availability of a multi-typed metatheory (he-
re, on the availability of a designated model of TY32). However, since this require-
ment does not impact the possibility of interpreting all logical PTQ forms into
constructions out of the single basic type, it is compatible with Partee’s conjec-
ture. Analogous observations hold for the requirement on the identification of eq-
uivalence relations between names and sentences (cf. Def. 7.3.2, next page).
The truth-aptness of proper names and sentences suggests the greater suita-
bility of our weak single-type semantics in comparison to the ‘pure’, TY0-based,
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semantics from Part I. This greater suitability is further supported by the fact
that, in a weak single-type semantics, proper names share the truth- and falsity-
conditions of their containing simple existential sentences. For example, the truth
(or falsity) of the name Barbara Partee thus coincides with the truth (resp. falsity)



















partee i↵ @ |=
M
2





















partee i↵ @ 6|=
M
2




In virtue of the above, our WTY31-based semantics enables the identification
of some of a name’s equivalent sentences. This observation is captured below:
Proposition 7.4 (Existential WTY31 equivalents of names). In a weak sin-
gle-type semantics, proper names stand in equivalence relations to the logical for-
ms of some existential sentences. Instances of this relation are identifiable via the
global equivalence of the TY32 definitions of the forms’ WTY
3
1 translations.
The semantic equivalence of logical PTQ forms is defined below. In this defini-
tion, we letA(s;t) andB(s;t) be the WTY
3
1 translations of the logical formsX, res-
pectively Y , such that X  A and Y  B.
Definition 7.3.2 (WTY31-based linguistic equivalence). The formX is seman-




A = B in
M
2 under g2.
The above definition improves upon the equivalence-definition of our ‘pure’
single-type semantics (cf. Def. 3.3.1) by enabling the identification of equivalence
relations between proper names and sentences. In particular, the equivalence-con-
dition from Definition 7.3.2 supports the equivalence of names and their contain-










partee = E (partee)
i↵ |=
g
( i.E (partee, i)) = ( i.E (partee, i)) i↵ |=
g
>
However, our WTY31-based semantics still fails to identify a name’s contextual-
ly salient sentential equivalents. In particular, the definition of basic-type WTY31
constants as intensional TY32 formulas of the form  i.E(c, i) (cf. (C3)) prevents
the equivalence of proper names with contingent non-existential sentences. For ex-
ample, since we can imagine a situation at which only the intensional formula  i.
E (partee, i) (but not the formula  i.arrive(partee, i)) is true, the name Barbara
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  6=   i.arrive (partee, i) 
because |=
g
 9i.E (partee, i) = > ^ arrive (partee, i) = ? _
|=
g
 9i.E (partee, i) = > ^ arrive (partee, i) = ⇤ 
The informational poverty of the TY32 definitions of basic-type WTY
3
1 terms sug-
gests that a weak single-type semantics is unable to satisfy Proposition 1.3.ii. This
observation is summarized in Proposition 7.5:
Proposition 7.5 (Absence of non-existential name equivalents). In a weak
single-type semantics, proper names fail to be equivalent to contextually contingent
non-existential sentences.
Given the findings in nonsentential speech from Chapter 1.2.1, the inability to
identify a name’s non-existential sentential equivalents is a severe problem for our
WTY31-based single-type semantics. We will solve this problem in the next chap-
ter.
To show that our WTY31-based semantics shares the familiar relation of logi-
cal consequence between the logical forms of PTQ sentences, we also specify this
relation. The latter is defined in analogy to the relation of TY0-based linguistic
entailment from Chapter 3.3 (cf. Def. 3.3.2).
In the definition of WTY31-based linguistic entailment, we let ⌅ = {X |X  
 } and ⌥ = {Y |Y   } be sets of logical forms of sentences which are translated
into the sets of WTY31 terms   = {  |   2 Tw1(s;t)} and   = {  |   2 Tw1(s;t)}:
Definition 7.3.3 (WTY31-based linguistic entailment). A set of logical forms





  )   in M2 under g2.
The above definition validates the inference from (3.3.1) and blocks the inference
from (3.3.2). Since we assume the truth of the formula 8x8i.arrive(x, i)) E (x, i)
in the designated model of our metatheory TY32, the sentence Barbara Partee ar-
rives further entails the sentential interpretation of the proper name Barbara Par-
tee from (9) in our weak single-type semantics.
This completes our illustration of the greater modeling power of the weak,
WTY31-based, single-type semantics with respect to traditional Montague seman-
tics, or with respect to the ‘pure’ single-type semantics from Part I. We next assess
the relative explanatory power of this new semantics.
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7.4. Sorting Single-Type Objects
Admittedly, by its single-type character, our WTY31-based semantics inherits the
explanatory challenges of the ‘pure’ single-type semantics from Part I (cf. Ch. 3.4).
However, the TY32 definition of WTY
3
1 PTQ-translations admits of a semantic ex-
planation of the ill-formedness of the expressions from (16b) to (21b). This expla-
nation exploits the fact that the WTY31 translations of most English sentences
8
are not defined by a TY32 formula of the form  i.E(c, i), where c is some individual
constant. Rather, their definition will contain some type-(e s; t) predicate P which
is not equivalent to E. As a result, we can distinguish di↵erent sorts (called sepa-
ration subtypes, or subtypes) within the single basic type. These sorts then serve
as the formal basis for syntactic categories.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the correspondence between syntactic categories and
WTY31 subtypes. As is easy to see, WTY
3
1 subtypes almost completely regain the
granularity of the semantic distinctions in the Montagovian type system.
(GB) Syntax S NP N C SAV · · ·
WTY31 Semantics · · ·
(Object theory)

















((s; t)⇢ s; t⇢)
Figure 7.2. Syntactic categories and WTY31 subtypes.
Below, we first give a formal introduction to subtypes. We then describe the use of
subtypes in the formulation of syntactic well-formedness constraints.
Separation subtyping (Lambek and Scott, 1986), cf. (Pollard, 2008), is
a type-forming operation which restricts a given type, ↵, to the set of objects (i.e.
the (separation) subtype of ↵) satisfying some predicate P(↵;t). The resulting type
is denoted by ‘{a 2 ↵ |P (a)}’, or ‘↵
P
’. In particular, the separation of the basic
WTY31 type by the TY
3
2 predicates for the representation of individuals (in (7.4.1),
next page; cf. (4.2.10)) and propositions (in (7.4.2); cf. (4.2.9)) enables an emula-
tion of the distinction between individuals and propositions within the single ba-
sic type (s; t).9 Below, the type-(e; t) constant mont asserts that its argument de-
notes a Montagovian (i.e. non-abstract) individual. The introduction of this con-
stant is required by the inclusion of ‘propositional’ individuals in the domain of
the TY32 type e (cf. (7.2.16)), and by the use of (7.4.1) to identify the WTY
3
1 cor-
8The only exceptions include simple existential sentences, as we will see below.
9This possibility has been pointed out by Jeroen Groenendijk.
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relates of Montagovian individuals:
 p.[9x.mont (x) ^ p = ( i.E(x, i))](7.4.1)
 p.p ^ [¬9x.mont (x) ^ p = ( i.E(x, i))](7.4.2)
The second conjunct of the predicate from (7.4.2) is required by a version of Mon-
tague’s homomorphism requirement on the syntax-semantics map, cf. (Montague,
1970b). This requirement demands that no two occurrences of a logical form may
receive an interpretation in di↵erent (sub-)types (cf. Obs. 1.1.ii). For convenience,
we will hereafter abbreviate the predicates from (7.4.1) and (7.4.2) by ‘ ◆’ and ‘⇢’,
respectively.
From (s; t) ◆and (s; t)
⇢
, the subtypes of all other WTY31 types are obtained via
a sorted variant of the type-forming rule from Definition 7.1.1:
Definition 7.4.1 (WTY31 sorts). The set w1Sorts of WTY
3
1 subtypes (or sor-
ts) is the smallest set of strings s.t., for 0  n 2 N, if ↵1, . . . ,↵n 2 w1Sort, then
(↵1 . . .↵n s; t ◆) 2 w1Sort and (↵1 . . .↵n s; t⇢) 2 w1Sort.
The above identifies the subtype ((s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
) as the sort for functions from objects
of the sort (s; t) ◆to objects of the sort (s; t)
⇢
. By the definition of the basic WTY31
sorts (s; t) ◆and (s; t)
⇢
, these functions are associated with the WTY31 representa-
tions of properties of individuals. The semantic constraints from Definition 7.2.2
restrict the sort ((s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
) to sets of objects satisfying some predicate of the fo-
rm  x i.P
 
[◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i
 
. As a result, the replacement of WTY31 types
by sorts reduces single-type domains to sets of ‘representationally relevant’ ob-
jects (in the sense described in Ch. 4.1.2).
The replacement of WTY31 types by sorts in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 (cf. Tables 7.5,
resp. 7.6, next page) restricts the translations of logical PTQ forms to WTY31 te-
rms of the specified sort. In particular, the restriction of the WTY31 constant E to
arguments of the sort (s; t) ◆prevents the application of E to the sort-(s; t)
⇢
term
walk (bill). This fact accounts for the syntactic ill-formedness of the expression
Bill walks exists from (18c).
The possibility of providing a semantic basis for all syntactic well-formedness
constraints is curbed by the assignment of the sort (s; t) ◆to simple existential sen-
tences.10 As a result, the presented variant of our WTY31-based single-type sem-
antics will be unable to explain the well-formedness of the logical form from (23),
and the ill-formedness of the expressions from (24a) and (24b) (next page; cf. (18c),
(18b)). In the single-type semantics from Section 7.2, the last two expressions are
associated with the designators of the proposition ‘Bill walks’.
10See the definition of the WTY31 translation of the sentence John does not exist from (7.2.33).
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⇢
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run,walk, talk,wait,arrive,E ((s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
)






(s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
)
temp,price, rise, change ((s; t)
⇢
(s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
)
rapidly, slowly, voluntarily,allegedly (((s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
) (s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
)
try,wish (((s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
) (s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
)
in, for ((s; t) ◆((s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
) (s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
)




) (s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
)




) ((s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
) (s; t) ◆s; t
⇢
)
Table 7.5. Sorted Lw1 constants.
Variable WTY31 Sort
x,x1, . . . ,xn,y, z (s; t) ◆
p,p1, . . . ,pn, q, r (s; t)⇢
P,P1, . . . ,Pn ((s; t) ◆s; t⇢)
Q,Q1, . . . ,Qn (((s; t) ◆s; t⇢) s; t⇢)
L,L1, . . . ,Ln ((((s; t) ◆s; t⇢) s; t⇢) (s; t) ◆s; t⇢)
Table 7.6. Sorted WTY31 variables.
(23) Possibly [sBill exists].
(24) a. ⇤ [sBill exists] walks.
b. ⇤ [cpThat Bill exists] walks.
Notably, expressions of the above form only constitute a very small percent-
age of PTQ expressions. Since simple existential sentences are further only rarely
used in ordinary (i.e. non-philosophical) discourse, the inability of our sorted single-
type semantics to explain the well- (or ill-)formedness of the expressions from (23)
160 7. WEAK SINGLE-TYPE SEMANTICS
(resp. (24a), (24b)) is rather unproblematic. In Figure 7.2, the residual mismat-
ch11 between categories and sorts is represented by stacked diagonals, .   
To regain the full explanatory power of the Montagovian type system in our
single-type semantics (cf. Fig. 7.3, below), one could introduce a second existence
predicate into the logic TY32 (next to the constant E from Ch. 6.1).
12 A possible
candidate for this predicate would be Linsky and Zalta’s concreteness predicate
C!, cf. (Linsky and Zalta, 1994). The replacement of the existence predicate E
by the predicate C! in the definition of theWTY31 constantE from (C5) (in (7.4.3))
would then prevent the identification of simple existential sentences (or CPs) as
sort-(s; t) ◆terms. The resulting semantics would recognize all Montagovian cate-
gorial distinctions, and would, thus, explain the well- (resp. ill-) formedness of the
logical forms from (23) (resp. (24a), (24b)).
E =  x i.C!
 
[◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i
 
(7.4.3)
An answer to the question of whether the introduction of a second non-logical ex-
istence predicate is well-justified is left to the reader. We will see in Chapter 8.3
that the di↵erent subtypes of the ‘strong’ single-type type (s s; t) restore Monta-
gue’s semantic distinctions without the metatheoretical introduction of a second
existence predicate.
(GB) Syntax S NP N C SAV · · ·


















((s; t)⇢ s; t⇢)
Figure 7.3. Syntactic categories and WTY31 subtypes (alt).
This completes our discussion of the explanatory power of our weak single-type se-
mantics. We close the chapter with a summary of our interim achievements.
7.5. Summary
This chapter has developed a weak single-type semantics for the set of English lo-
gical forms from (Montague, 1973). This semantics is a designated model for a
subsystem, WTY31, of the logic TY
3
2, which interprets the forms’ TY0 translations
from Part I into constructions out of propositions. In virtue of the possibility of
representing individuals in the propositional type (s; t), proper names, sentences,
11The reader is reminded that the same-type interpretation of complementizers and sentence
adverbs is a Montagovian heritage (cf. Ch. 3.4).
12I owe this observation to Lucas Champollion.
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and complement phrases receive an interpretation in this type (cf. Prop. 1.2). The
resulting semantics preserves the merits of the ‘pure’ single-type semantics from
Part I. It improves upon this semantics by explaining the truth-aptness of proper
names (cf. Prop. 1.3.i) and by identifying their equivalent simple existential sen-
tences.
In particular, the assignment of truth-conditions to names (Prop. 1.3.i) is war-
ranted by the interpretation of names as functions from situations to truth-com-
binations. The identification of a name’s sentential equivalents is enabled by the
interpretation of names into the set of situations in which their traditional type-e
referents exist. Since we have defined the existence predicate E as a bivalent pre-
dicate, proper names will receive a classical truth-value at every situation. Since
only the WTY31 translations of simple existential sentences are defined by TY
3
2
formulas of the described form, the set of a name’s WTY31-equivalent sentences is
restricted to existential sentences. This observation motivates our description of
the semantics of the type (s; t) as a weak single-type semantics (cf. Ch. 5.2).
The next chapter is dedicated to the development of a strong single-type se-




The present chapter provides a strong single-type semantics for Montague’s PTQ
fragment in the sense of Chapter 5.2.1. This semantics is a designated model for
a subsystem of the logic TY32 which interprets names, sentences, and complement
phrases in the type for propositional concepts, (s; (s; t)) (or, equivalently, in the ty-
pe for characteristic functions of binary relations between situations, (s s; t)). Ob-
jects of this type represent individuals via functions from situations w to the set
of situations at which the designators of all w-true propositions about the indivi-
duals are true, and represent propositions via functions from situations w to the
set of situations at which the propositions’ designators and all w-true propositio-
ns about their type-e arguments are true. The semantics improves upon the sem-
antics from the previous chapter by identifying a name’s value at a situation with
the values of contextually contingent sentences at that situation (cf. Prop. 1.3.ii).
Our strategy for the presentation of a strong single-type semantics follows the
strategy for the presentation of its weak counterpart from Chapter 7. Thus, to ob-
tain a strong (s s; t)-based semantics for the PTQ fragment, we will first define the
(s s; t)-based subsystem, STY31, of the logic TY
3
2 (in Sect. 8.1) and introduce its de-
signated language, frame, and interpretation function (in Sect. 8.2.1).We will then
adapt the WTY31 translations of basic PTQ words to terms of the logic STY
3
1, and
formulate a number of constraints on the interpretation of the adapted transla-
tions (in Sect. 8.2.2).Our constraints on these translations will di↵er in interesting
respects from the constraints for terms of the logic WTY31. Section 8.3 gives the
truth- and equivalence-conditions for logical PTQ forms of the basic STY31 type.
These conditions contain a solution to the problem of explaining syntactic well-
formedness in single-type semantics. The chapter closes with a discussion of the
representational complexity of strong single-type semantics, and with a compari-
son of this semantics to classical propositional logics with only the She↵er stroke.
8.1. The ‘Strong’ Object Theory STY31
We again begin by defining the object theory, STY31, of the presented single-type
semantics. This theory is a subsystem of the logic TY32 which constructs all its ty-
pes from the TY32 type for propositional concepts, (s s; t). Like the basic type of
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the logic WTY31, the type (s s; t) is a propositional conjoinable TY
3
2 type, whose
domain has an algebraic structure. Since strong single-type models are partial mo-
dels (cf. the superscript ‘3’), objects in these models further satisfy the require-
ment on suitable single basic types from Chapter 4.2.4.
The name of the logic STY31 shares the rationale behind the name of the (s; t)-
based logic WTY31. To emphasize the possibility of providing semantically ‘rich’
representations of individuals and propositions in models of this logic (cf. Ch. 5.2.1),
we replace the letter ‘W’ (for ‘weak ’) by ‘S’ (for ‘strong ’).
8.1.1. Types and Terms. Our survey of Montagovian objects from Chap-
ter 4.2.3 has identified characteristic functions of binary relations between situ-
ations (or propositional concepts) as the simplest strong single-type candidate. As
a result, we adopt the TY32 type (s s; t) as the lowest-rank type of the logic STY
3
1.




Definition 8.1.1 (STY31 types). The set s1Type of STY
3
1 types is the smallest
set of strings s.t., if ↵1, . . . ,↵n 2 s1Type, then (↵1 . . .↵n s s; t) 2 s1Type.
The class of languages for the logic STY31 is a type-(s s; t) variant of the class
of languages for the logic WTY31. In particular, a language L
s1 and a set of varia-
bles Vs1 for the logic STY31 are proper subsets, L2 s1Type, resp. V2 s1Type, of the re-
levant sets of non-logical constants and variables of the logic TY32. From their
members, complex STY31 terms are formed inductively through suitably typed
1
variants of the clauses from Definition 7.1.2 and through the non-logical constant
⇠ (called focused negation):
Definition 8.1.2 (STY31 terms). Let ↵1, . . . ,↵n,  2 s1Type. The set T s1↵ of







, ,? 2 T s1(s s;t);
(ii) If B 2 T s1( ↵1...↵ns s;t) and A 2 T s1  , then (B (A)) 2 T s1(↵1...↵ns s;t);
(iii) If A 2 T s1(↵1...↵ns s;t) and x 2 V  , then ( x.A) 2 T s1( ↵1...↵ns s;t);
(iv) If B,C 2 T s1
↵
, then (B ).= C) 2 T s1(s s;t);
(v) If B 2 T s1
↵
, then ⇠B 2 T s1
↵
.
Our introduction of focused negation (clause (v)) is motivated by the unsuitability
of the TY32 symbol ¬ for the STY31 translation of English negation, as we will see
in Section 8.2.2.
From the non-logical STY31 constants ,? and ).= , suitably typed variants of the
designated constants from Notation 2.1.1 are, again, easily obtained. In particu-
1As a result, ,? and ).= are non-logical STY31 constants of the type (s s; t), resp. (↵↵ s s; t).
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lar, the constants ,> ; 2· and 3· ; V and W; and .=, !· , and $· are now characteri-
zed as non-logical STY31 constants of the types (s s, t), ((s s; t) s s; t), (↵ (s s; t) s s; t),
and (↵↵ s s; t), respectively, where ↵ 2 s1Type. The TY32 definition of these con-
stants (in Sect. 8.2.2) will ensure their desired semantic behavior.
8.1.2. Models. Like general frames for the logic WTY31, general STY
3
1 fra-
mes are restricted variants of general frames for the logic TY32:




proper subset, F 2 s1Type = {DF
2
↵
|↵ 2 s1Type}, of the relevant TY32 frame.
Since we have identified the TY32 domainD(s s;t) with a subset of the function spa-
ce ((W⇥ W ) ! 3), the ground domain of the logic STY31 will contain the desired
partial objects from Chapter 4.2.4.
STY31 interpretation functions IF s1 and assignments gF s1 are defined as sub-
sets of the relevant functions in the logic TY32 (in (8.1.1), resp. (8.1.2)). General




2 s1Type : L2 s1Type ! F 2 s1Type(8.1.1)
g
F
2 s1Type : V2 s1Type ! F 2 s1Type(8.1.2)
(8.1.3) M
F
2 s1Type = hF 2 s1Type, IF 2 s1Type, VF 2 w1Typei
This completes our discussion of the interpretation of STY31 terms. We next
turn to the notions of STY31 truth, equivalence, and entailment.
8.1.3. Truth and entailment. Since the propositional type (s; t) is not avai-
lable in the logic STY31, basic-type terms of this logic do not admit of a TY
3
2 truth-
definition. However, we will see in Section 8.3 that truth- and falsity-conditions
for the STY31 translations of names and sentences can be obtained in a straightfor-
ward manner.
Like entailment in the logic WTY31, the STY
3
1 entailment relation is a restric-
ted variant of generalized entailment for the logic TY32:
Definition 8.1.4 (STY31 entailment). A set of basic-type STY
3
1 terms   =
{  |   2 T s1(s s;t)} entails a set of STY31 terms   = {  |   2 T s1(s s;t)}, i.e.   |=g  , if,
















The relation of STY31 equivalence is then a type-(s s; t) variant of the equivalence
relation between terms of the logic WTY31. The proof theory of the logic STY
3
1
has the expected form.
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This completes our discussion of the (s s; t)-based single-type logic STY31. We
next show that this logic enables the ‘strong’ single-type interpretation of proper
names, CPs, and sentences along the lines described in Chapter 4.2.3.
8.2. An STY31 Semantics for the PTQ Fragment
Following the structure of the presentation from Chapter 7.2, we first specify the
designated STY31 language Ls1 and frame Fs1. The latter are the particular STY31
language, respectively frame whose elements are associated with the designated
STY31 constants from Section 8.1.1 and with the lexical elements from Table 3.1.
8.2.1. Fixing Ls1 and Fs1. The members of the STY31 language Ls1 and
the set of STY31 variables Vs1 (in Tables 8.1, resp. 8.2) are STY31-typed variants of
the non-logical constants, resp. variables of the WTY31 language Lw1 and the set
of WTY31 variables Vw1 from Tables 7.1 and 7.2. To enable the adequate trans-
lation of linguistic negation in our strong single-type semantics, the language Ls1
contains the symbol for focused negation, ⇠ .
Constant STY31 Type
B,C (↵1 . . .↵n s s; t)
⇠,¬ ((↵1 . . .↵n s s; t)↵1 . . .↵n s s; t)
^,_ ((↵1 . . .↵n s s; t) (↵1 . . .↵n s s; t)↵1 . . .↵n s s; t)V
,
W
(↵ (s s; t) s s; t)
).= , .=, 6 .=, !· , $· (↵↵ s s; t)
,> ,,? , john,mary, bill,ninety, sherlock, (s s; t)
moriarty,pat,partee,w
2· ,3· ,man,woman,park,fish,pen, room, ((s s; t) s s; t)
unicorn,problem
run,walk, talk,wait,arrive,E ((s s; t) s s; t)
find, lose, eat, love,date, remember, fear, ((s s; t) (s s; t) s s; t)
destroy,hate, enter, believe,assert
temp,price, rise, change (((s s; t) s s; t) s s; t)
rapidly, slowly, voluntary,allegedly (((s s; t) s s; t) (s s; t) s s; t)
try,wish (((s s; t) s s; t) (s s; t) s s; t)
in, for ((s s; t) ((s s; t) s s; t) (s s; t) s s; t)
seek, conceive ((((s s; t) s s; t) s s; t) (s s; t) s s; t)
about ((((s s; t) s s; t) s s; t) ((s s; t) s s; t) (s s; t) s s; t)
Table 8.1. Ls1 constants.
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Variable STY31 Type
x,x1, . . . ,xn,y, z,p,p1, . . . ,pn, q, r (s s; t)
P,P1, . . . ,Pn,T,T1, . . . ,Tn ((s s; t) s s; t)
Q,Q1, . . . ,Qn (((s s; t) s s; t) s s; t)
L,L1, . . . ,Ln ((((s s; t) s s; t) s s; t) (s s; t) s s; t)
Table 8.2. STY31 variables.
Again, we let the STY31 frame Fs1 be very large, and assume that the designa-
ted STY31 interpretation function IFs1 : Ls1 ! Fs1 respects the conventional lexi-
cal relations between content words. To allow the definition of STY31 terms through
terms of the logic TY32, we expect that the designated TY
3
2 language L2 and set of
variables V2 (cf. Tables 7.3, 7.4) also include the STY31 language Ls1 and set Vs1.
Further, we require that the frame F2 and interpretation function IF2 of the de-
signated model for the logic TY32 embed the designated STY
3
1 frame and inter-
pretation function, such that Fs1 = F2 s1Type and IFs1 = IF2 s1Type .
8.2.2. Translations of Logical PTQ Forms. The STY31 translations of
the lexical elements from Table 3.1 are STY31-typed variants of the elements’ tra-
nslations from Definition 7.2.1. Thus, the STY31 translation, bill, of the name Bill
is the type-(s s; t) term bill from Table 8.1. The STY31 translation, walk, of the
intransitive verb walk has the type ((s s; t) s s; t). The STY31 translations of non-
lexical forms are (s s; t)-based variants of the translations from (3.2.1) to (3.2.27).
Since basic-type terms of the logic STY31 have a di↵erent type from their cor-
responding terms in the logic WTY31 – and since they encode ‘richer’ semantic in-
formation than their WTY31 correspondents (cf. Ch. 4.2.3, 5.2.1) –, the interpre-
tations of basic-type STY31 terms are governed by a di↵erent set of semantic con-
straints than the ones from Definition 7.2.2. For the interpretation of the desig-
nated STY31 constants, these constraints are given in Definition 8.2.2 (next page).
In the constraints, the function   is the inverse image of the meaning-shifting func-
tion • from Definition 8.2.1. We will hereafter write the symbol ‘•’ in postfix nota-
tion, such that ‘x •’ denotes •(x). For variables of the logic TY32, we use the typing
conventions from Table 7.4.
Definition 8.2.1. The function • sends TY32 terms to constructions out of
the type (s s; t), such that
(i) x • = ( i j8p.(p(i) ^ abt (x, p))⇣ p(j)),
q
• = ( i j.q(j) ^ (8p.(p(i) ^ (9x.abt (x, q) ^ abt (x, p)))⇣ p(j)));
(ii) (B(A))• = (B•(A •));
(iii) ( x
↵
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Our use of the function • suggests that all ‘relevant’ STY31 objects (in the sense of
Ch. 4.1.2) are constructions out of type-(s s; t) representations of individuals and
propositions (cf. (4.2.18), resp. (4.2.19)). In particular, clause (i) describes the shif-
ting of individual-denoting terms x to the designator of a function from ordered
pairs of situations hw1, wi to the truth-value of the proposition ‘the designators of
all true propositions at w1 which carry information about x are true at w’. Fur-
ther, it describes the lifting of intensional formulas q to the designator of a func-
tion from pairs of situations hw1, wi to the truth-value of the proposition ‘q is true
at w and the designators of all true propositions at w1 which carry information
about one of q’s aboutness subjects are also true at w’.
Clauses (ii) and (iii) generalize the definition of the function • to TY32 terms of
arbitrarily complex types. For example, the function • lifts the type-(e s; t) term




= ( x i.P (x, i))• (by ⌘-expansion)
=  x • i.[ j.P (x, j)]•(i) (by (iii))
=  x • i.
⇥






 8p.(p(k) ^ (9y.abt (y, [ k1.P (x, k1)]) ^ abt (y, p)))⇣ p(j)
 ⇤
(i)
=  x • i j.P (x, j) ^  8p.(p(i) ^ (9y.abt (y, [ k.P (x, k)]) ^ abt (y, p)))⇣ p(j) 
The constraints on the interpretation of the members of Ls1 are specified below.
To avoid specifying the defining TY32 term for every member of Ls1, we only de-
fine a few representative constants for each STY31 type. We assume that c, ⇡, x, y,
P, T, and Q are defined by the TY32 terms c
•, '•, x•, y•, P •, T •, and Q •, re-
spectively. The function   is defined as (•) 1.
Definition 8.2.2 (Definition of Ls1 constants). The interpretations of the
STY31 constants from Table 8.1 obey the following constraints:
(C1) ,? =  i j.?;
(C2) (B ).= C) =  i j.B(i, j) ) C(i, j);




(C3) bill =  i j8p.(p(i) ^ abt (bill, p))⇣ p(j);
(C4) man =  x i j.man (x  , j) ^  8p.(p(i)^
 x i j(9y.abt (y, [ k.man (x  , k)]) ^ abt (y, p)))⇣ p(j) ;
(C5) walk =  x i j.walk (x  , j) ^  8p.(p(i)^
 x i j(9y.abt (y, [ k.walk (x  , k)]) ^ abt (y, p)))⇣ p(j) ;
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(C6) believe =  p x i j.believe (p  ,x  , j) ^  8p.(p(i) ^ (9y.abt (y, p)^
 p x i j.abt (y, [ k.believe (p  ,x  , k)])))⇣ p(j)
 
;
(C7) find =  y x i j.find (y  ,x  , j) ^  8p. p(i) ^  9z.abt (z, p)^
 y x i j.abt
 





(C8) temp =  T i j.temp (T  , j) ^  8p. p(i) ^  9z.abt (z, p)^
 T i j.abt
 





(C9) rapidly =  P x i j.rapidly (P  ,x  , j) ^  8p. p(i) ^  9y.abt (y, p)^
 P x  i j.abt
 





(C10) try =  P x i j.try (P  ,x  , j) ^  8p. p(i) ^  9y.abt (y, p)^
 P x  i j.abt
 





(C11) in =  y P x i j.in (y  ,P  ,x  , j) ^  8p. p(i) ^  9z.abt (z, p)^
 y P x i j.abt
 





(C12) seek =  Q x i j.seek (Q  ,x  , j) ^  8p. p(i) ^  9z.abt (z, p)^
 Q x i j.abt
 





(C13) about =  Q P x i j.about (Q  ,P  ,x  , j) ^  8p. p(i) ^  9z.
xxlQabt (z, p) ^ abt  z, [ k.about (Q  ,P  ,x  , k)]   ⇣ p(j) 
The constraints (C1) and (C2) define the designated STY31 constants ,? and ).=
as the results of lifting the TY32 connectives ? and ) to constructions out of the
basic STY31 type (s s; t).
The constraint (C14) defines the focused negation of basic-type STY31 terms
as the result of negating the ‘updating’ proposition2 in the definition of these ter-
ms through the use of the familiar negation operator ¬ . The definition of STY31
terms of the form ⇠('•) employs this strategy. Since the type-(s s; t) representa-
tion of individuals does not express an update on the available information at the
relevant situation3 – and since linguistic negation is typically not available for pro-
per names –, we leave the negation of STY31 representations of individuals unde-
fined. From STY31 terms of the basic type, the definition of ⇠ can be lifted to sui-
tably defined terms of any complex STY31 type.
From (C1), (C2), and Notation 2.1.1, the STY31 proxies for all other TY
3
2 con-
nectives are again easily defined:
Notation 8.2.1. We write ¬B for ( x i j.¬B(x, i, j))
2In the second item from Definition 8.2.1.i, the ‘updating’ proposition is denoted by q (cf. the dis-
cussion of (4.2.20) in Ch. 4.2.4).
3Note the absence of a correlate (i.e. q(j) for some intensional formula q) of the first conjunct
from the definition of q • in the definition of x• in Definition 8.2.1.i.
170 8. STRONG SINGLE-TYPE SEMANTICS
(
V
x.A) for ( i j8x.A(i, j))
(
W
x.A) for ( i j9x.A(i, j))
B
.
= C for ( x i j.B(x, i, j) = C(x, i, j)) ,> for ( i j.>)
(B ^C) for ( x i j.B(x, i, j) ^C(x, i, j)) 2· A for ( i j.2A(i))
(B _C) for ( x i j.B(x, i, j) _C(x, i, j)) 3· A for ( i j.3A(i))
The derivations of the above definitions are included in Appendix C.3.
The constraint (C0) defines the STY31 stand-in for the current situation,w, via
the strong single-type representation of the proposition denoted by  i8q.q(@)⇣
q(i). This representation is justified by the possibility of representing every situ-
ation via the set of all situations extending its propositional information (cf. the
constraint (C0) from Ch. 7.2), by our ‘strong’ representation strategy for proposi-
tions (cf. Def. 8.2.1.i), and by the resulting equivalence of the defining TY32 term
from (C0) with the TY32 term from (8.2.2) (below). The latter term designates a
function from pairs of situations hw1, wi to the truth-value of the proposition ‘all
propositions which are true at @ and w1 and which carry information about one
of the inhabitants of @ are also true at w’.
(8.2.2)  i j8p. (p(@) ^ p(i)) ^ (9x.E(x,@) ^ abt (x, p)) ⇣ p(j)
Like for the semantics of the logic WTY31, the availability of a suitably typed re-
presentation of @ will allow a solution to Partee’s temperature puzzle.
In correspondence with our representation of individuals in the type (s s; t)
(cf. Def. 8.2.1.i), the constraint (C3) defines the STY31 constant bill as the desig-
nator of a function from pairs of situations hw1, wi to the truth-value of the pro-
position ‘all true propositions at w1 which carry information about Bill are true
at w’ (i.e. as the designator of the characteristic function of the set of situation
pairs, hw1, wi, with the above properties).
The remaining constraints enable the definition of the STY31 translations of
sentential PTQ forms as the designators of strong single-type representations of
these forms’ Montagovian (i.e. type-(s; t)) interpretations. Thus, the constraints
(C4) to (C13) contribute to the STY31 representation of propositions along the li-
nes of (4.2.19). In particular, the constraint (C5) ensures the interpretation of the
STY31 constant walk as a function from propositional concepts x to the charac-
teristic function of the set of pairs hw1, wi at whose second element, w, the type-e
correspondent, x  , of x walks and at which all x  -relevant true propositions wh-
ose designators are true at w1 are true.
The semantic constraints on the interpretation of the Ls1 constants bill and
walk enable the definition of the STY31 translation of the sentence Bill walks (in
(8.2.3)). For better readability, we underline the definition of bill in step (3):
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1. [npBill] bill =  i j8p.
 
p(i) ^ abt (bill, p) ⇣ p(j)
(8.2.3)
2. [vp[ivwalks]] walk =  x i j.walk (x  , j)^
= xxxi x i j.
 8p.(p(i) ^ (9y.abt (y, [ k.walk (x  , k)]) ^ abt (y, p)))⇣ p(j) 
3. [s[npBill][vp[ivwalks]]] walk (bill)
=  x i j.walk (x  , j) ^  8p.(p(i) ^ (9y.abt (y, [ k.walk (x  , k)])^



















 8p. p(i) ^  9y.abt  y, ⇥ k.walk  ⇥ k1 k28q.
 
q(k1)^













  ^  8p.(p(i) ^ abt (bill, p))⇣ p(j) 
As expected, the term from the penultimate line of (8.2.3.3) results from applying
the function • to the intensional TY32 formula  k.walk (bill, k). Since this formula
only has a single type-e constituent, bill (s.t. 8y.abt (y, [ k.walk (bill, k)]) ) y =
bill, byAx14–Ax17), the term from the penultimate line of (8.2.3.3) is equivalent
to the simpler term from the last line of (8.2.3.3).
Admittedly, the definition of the STY31 translation of the sentence Bill walks is
much more complex than (a TY32 equivalent of) the sentence’s Montagovian trans-
lation (cf. (7.2.3.3)). However, since logical PTQ forms receive a translation into
simple terms of the logic STY31 (here, into the term walk (bill)) – such that the
terms’ TY32 definitions only describe the underlying semantic mechanisms –, the
complexity of STY31 definitions does not impact the adequacy or unificatory pow-
er of our STY31-based single-type semantics. We will show in Section 8.4 that oth-
er attempts at providing a rich interpretation of names, cf. (Landman, 1984;
Scott, 1982; Merchant, 2008), exhibit a similar representational complexity.
Like its counterpart in the logic WTY31, Definition 8.2.2 enables us to define
the STY31 translations of all other lexical elements from Table 3.1. To show this,










1 , j) ^
 8p.(p(i)^
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=  Q x.Q
 
 y i j.find (y  ,x  , j) ^  8p.(p(i)^
 Q x.Q (9z.abt (z, [ k.find (y  ,x  , k)]) ^ abt (z, p)))⇣ p(j)  
The definitions of the STY31 translation of the determiners a, every, and the
are given in items (8.2.5) to (8.2.7). Like their counterparts in the logic WTY31,
these definitions involve the definitions of some of the designated single-type con-













y.(P1(y)$· x .= y) ^P (x)(8.2.7)
=  P1 P i j9x 8y.(P1(y, i, j) $ x = y) ^P (x, i, j)
To show that our constraints on the STY31 translations of lexical elements yi-
eld the ‘right’ definitions of the STY31 translations of complex logical forms, we
next define the STY31 translations of the sentential forms from Part I, Chapter 3.2.





=  P1 P i j9x.P1(x, i, j) ^P (x, i, j)
2. [nman] man
=  x i j.man (x  , j) ^  8p.(p(i)^
=  x i j.(9y.abt (y, [ k.man (x  , k)]) ^ abt (y, p)))⇣ p(j) 
3. [np[deta][nman]]  P
_
x.man (x) ^P (x)






 8p.(p(k) ^ (9y.abt (y, [ k2.man (x  , k2)]) ^ abt (y, p)))⇣ p(k1)
 ⇤
=  P i j9x. man (x  , j) ^  8p.(p(i) ^ (9y.abt (y, p)^
=  P i j9x.⇥abt (y, [ k2.man (x  , k2)])))⇣ p(j)
   ^P (x, i, j)
4. [vp[ivwalks]] walks
=  x i j.walk (x  , j) ^  8p.(p(i)^
=  x i j.(9y.abt (y, [ k.walk (x  , k)]) ^ abt (y, p)))⇣ p(j) 
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5. [s[np[deta][nman]][vp[ivwalks]]] 
_
x.man (x) ^walk (x)
=  P i j9x. man (x  , j) ^  8p.(p(i) ^ (9y.abt (y, p) ^ abt (y, [ k2.man
=  i j9x.(x  , k2)])))⇣ p(j)
   ^P (x, i, j)⇥ y k k1.walk (y  , k1)^
=  i j9x. 8q.(q(k) ^ (9z.abt (z, q) ^ abt (z, [ k3.walk (y  , k3)])))⇣ q(k1)
 ⇤
=  i j9x. man (x  , j) ^  8p.(p(i) ^ (9y.abt (y, p) ^ abt (y,
=  i j9x.[ k2.man (x  , k2)])))⇣ p(j)
   ^  walk (x  , j) ^  8q.(q(i)^
=  i j9x.(9z.abt (z, q) ^ abt (z, [ k3.walk (x  , k3)])))⇣ q(j)
  
=  i j9x. man (x  , j) ^ walk (x  , j)  ^  8p.(p(i) ^ (9y.abt (y, p)^
=  i j9x.abt (y, [ k2.man (x  , k2) ^ walk (x  , k2)]))⇣ p(j))
 
=  i j9x. man (x, j) ^ walk (x, j)  ^  8p. p(i) ^  9y.abt (y, p)^
=  i j9x. abt  y, [ k.man (x, k) ^ walk (x, k)]  ⇣ p(j)  
The definitions of the STY31 translations of the forms from (3.2.3) to (3.2.27) are
•-lifted variants of the TY32 terms from (7.2.9) to (7.2.32). For illustration, some of
these definitions are included below. Their derivations, and the definitions of the
STY31 translations of the remaining example sentences from (Montague, 1973),





y.(man (y)$· x .= y) ^walk (x)(8.2.9)
=  i j9x. 8y.(man (y, j) $ x = y) ^ walk (x, j)  ^  8p. p(i)^
=  i j9x. 9z.abt (z, p) ^ abt  z, ⇥ k.(8x1.(man (x1, k) $ x = x1)^
=  i j9x. 9z.walk (x, k))⇤  ⇣ p(j)  
[s[npJohn][vp[tvfinds][npMary]]] find (mary, john)(8.2.10)
=  i j.find (mary, john, j)^
=  i j.





x.unicorn (x) ^ seek  [ P.P (x)], john 
=  i j9x. unicorn (x, j) ^ seek ([ P k. P (x, k)], john, j) ^
 i j9x. 8p.(p(i) ^ (abt (x, p) _ abt (john, p)))⇣ p(j) 






x.unicorn (x) ^P (x)], john 
=  i j.seek
 
[ P k9x.unicorn (x, k) ^ P (x, k)], john, j ^
 i j.
 8p. p(i) ^  9y.abt (y, p) ^ abt  y, ⇥ k1.seek
 i j.
 




[s[npBill][vp[tvis][npMary]]] bill .= mary(8.2.13)
=  i j.bill = mary ^ (8p.(p(i) ^ (abt (bill, p) _ abt (mary, p)))⇣ p(j))
Our definition of the STY31 translation of the sentence John does not find a unicorn
(cf. (3.2.27)) justifies the replacement of the familiar constant for negation, ¬, by




x.unicorn (x) ^ find (x, john) 
=  i j.⇠
 
[9x.unicorn (x, j) ^ find (x, john, j)]^
 i j. ⇠
 8p. p(i) ^  9y.abt  y, [ k9x.unicorn (x, k)^
 8p. p(i) ^  9y.abt  y,  [ kfind (x, john, k)]  ^ abt  y, p)    ⇣ p(j)  
=  i j.
 ¬[9x.unicorn (x, j) ^ find (x, john, j)] ^  8p. p(i) ^  9y.abt  y,
 
[ k.¬(9x.unicorn (x, k) ^ find (x, john, k))]  ^ abt (y, p)    ⇣ p(j)  
The STY31 translation of not via the constant¬ (cf. Def. 7.2.1)would assert the fal-
sity of the designators of all i-true propositions which carry information about the
aboutness subjects of the proposition denoted by  k9x.unicorn (x, k) ^ find (x,
john, k), rather than only the falsity of this proposition. But this contradicts our
intuitions about the meaning of the sentence John does not find a unicorn.
Our semantic constraints on STY31 terms give the expected definitions of the
NP/CP-neutral verbs from (3.2.9) and (3.2.11) (in (8.2.15), resp. (8.2.20)):
[s[npPat][vp[tvremembers][npBill]]] remember (bill,pat)(8.2.15)
=  i j.remember (bill, pat, j)^
 i j
 8p.(p(i) ^ (abt (bill, p) _ abt (pat, p)))⇣ p(j) 
The definition of the ‘strong’ single-type translation of the logical form of (1b) (in
(8.2.20), next but one page) illustrates the need for non-Montagovian type-e ob-
jects (and the resulting greater modeling power of single-type semantics w.r.t. tra-
ditional Montague semantics) even more forcefully than the form’s ‘weak’ single-
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type translation (cf. (7.2.16)). This is due to the fact that the first argument of the
TY32 term remember from (8.2.20) (in (8.2.16), below) has the form of a
•-shifted
version of an intensional formula (in (8.2.17)). But the identification of (8.2.17)


































To compensate for this problem, we ‘flexibilize’ the TY32 definitions of basic-type
STY31 terms between type-(s s; t) representations of individuals and propositions.
Definition 8.2.3 demonstrates this possibility. In the definition, A is a TY32 term
of the type e:
Definition 8.2.3. The operator flex (type ((s s; t) s s; t)) renders the value of
the function   flexible between type-e and -(s; t) correlates of the TY32 definitions






























(◆x.[ k.E(x, k)] = ')•
⇤  





if ⇣ 2 T 2((s;t)↵1...↵n;t)
By the above, it holds that, if a TY32 term of the form [A
•]  serves as the argument
of a type-((s; t)↵1 . . .↵n; t) term, it is identified with the conjunction of the result
of applying the TY32 term [A
•] to each situation (cf. (a)). If a TY32 term of the fo-
rm ['•]  serves as the argument of a type-(e ↵1 . . .↵n; t) term, it is identified with
the designator of the STY31 representation of the type-e correspondent of the pro-
position ' (cf. (b)). Strategy (a) is motivated by the truth-evaluation of type-(s s;
t) terms from Section 8.3 (below). Strategy (b) is inspired by the strategy for the
identification of individual proposition-correlates from Chapter 7.2.2 (cf. (7.2.16)).
In particular, the application of the flex -operator to the argument of the type-















y, [ k.for (x 1,wait, bill, k)]
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=  x i.remember
 ⇥ 














The STY31 translation of the LF from (3.2.11) can then be defined as follows:
[s[npPat]








[◆y.[ k.for (pat,wait, bill, k)] = ( k1.E(y, k1))], pat, j
 ^
 i j.
 8p. p(i) ^  9x.abt  x, ⇥ k2.remember
 
[◆y.[ k.for (pat,wait, bill, k)] =
 i j.( k1.E(y, k1))], pat, k2
 ⇤  ^ abt (x, p)  ⇣ p(j))
=  i j.remember
 
[◆y.[ k.for (pat,wait, bill, k)] = ( k1.E(y, k1))], pat, j
 ^
 i j.
 8p. p(i) ^ (abt (pat, p) _ abt (bill, p)) ⇣ p(j))
Expectedly, the flex -operator is also instrumental in our definition of the STY31
translation of CP equatives. The definition of the STY31 translation of (3.2.22.5) is







y.(problem (y)$· x .= y) ^ x .= hate (bill,mary)
=  i j9x8y.((problem (y, j) $ x = y) ^X) ^  8p. p(i)^
 i j9x 9z.abt  z, [ k.(problem (y, k) $ x = y) ^X]  ^ abt (z, p)  ⇣ p(j) 
Since the TY32 type for individuals is not conjoinable, we are unable to define
the STY31 translations of coordinations with a proper name- and a CP conjunct
(cf. Ch. 7.2.2). To circumvent this problem, we translate the form from (7.2.34)
(or (7.2.35)) instead of the form from (3.2.25). The STY31 translation of (7.2.34)
is defined as follows:
[s[Pat]














 8p. p(i) ^ (abt (x, p) _ abt (bill, p)) ⇣ p(j)) (pat)
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=  i j.remember
 ⇥





 8p. p(i) ^ (abt (pat, p) _ abt (bill, p)) ⇣ p(j) 
The possibility of defining the STY31 translation of (an intuitive equivalent of) sen-
tence (4) is in agreement with a strong single-type version of Proposition 3.2:
Proposition 8.1 (NP/CP coordinability). A strong single-type semantics
can model logical forms which contain coordinations with a proper name- and a
CP-conjunct.
This completes our definition of the STY31 translations of logical PTQ forms.
To assess our semantics’ ability to accommodate the phenomena from Proposition
1.3, we next specify the truth-conditions for logical forms of the basic STY31 type,
and identify their sentential equivalents.
8.3. PTQ Truth and Equivalence
Like in the semantics of the logic WTY31, the notions of STY
3
1-based truth and fal-
sity extend from the logical forms of sentences to proper names. However, since
the logic STY31 does not command the propositional type (s; t), the truth (or fal-
sity) of names and sentences cannot be obtained via the truth (resp. falsity) of the
definitions of these forms’ STY31 translations (w.r.t. the designated model of the
logic TY32).
To compensate for this shortcoming, we determine the truth of sentences via
the truth of the conjunction of the results of applying the definition of the sen-
tences’ STY31 translation to the designator of each situation in the set W. Since
we know (by a strong4 reading of Ax12) that there is, for each individual, at lea-
st one situation in which this individual does not exist, we can identify this con-
junction with the updating intensional TY32 formula in the definition of the sen-
tences’ STY31 translation. For the sentence Barbara Partee arrives, this conjunction














4This reading exploits the discernibility of non-identical individuals (cf. (6.1.1)) and the possi-
bility of forming (the individual domain of) ‘new’ situations by identifying the individuals which
witness a given property at another situation (cf. Ch. 6.1). It is further supported by Kratzer’s
(2011) assumption of minimal situations at which only a single atomic sentence is true.
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Since the type-(s s; t) representation of individuals does not express an up-
date on the available information at the relevant situation, the evaluation strategy
from (8.3.1) is not available for proper names. To compensate for this shortcom-
ing, we determine the truth of names via the truth of the result of applying the
definition of the name’s STY31 translation to the designator of some representing
(or local) situation (e.g. the information state @0 at which some cognitive agent
obtains the rich propositional representation of the name’s type-e referent). For
the name Barbara Partee and the representing situation @0, the resulting term is
given in (8.3.2):
(8.3.2)  j8p.(p(@0) ^ abt (partee, p))⇣ p(j)
Thus, to evaluate the truth (or falsity) of the name Barbara Partee at the current
situation @, we check whether the conjunction of the designators of all true pro-
positions at the state @0 which carry information about Barbara Partee is true
(resp. false) at @. As a result of this strategy, names in STY31 semantics no longer
share the truth-conditions of their containing simple existential sentences.
The notion of STY31-based linguistic truth is defined below. In the definition,
we let A(s s;t) be the STY
3
1 translation of some logical sentence form X, and let
B(s s;t) be the STY
3
1 translation of some proper name Y , s.t. X  A and Y  B.





and let g2 and gs1 = g2 s1Type be their assignments. We assume that w and @0 are
the evaluating and the representing situation, respectively:
Definition 8.3.1 (STY31-based linguistic truth). A logical sentence form X




















The @0-specific representation of the proper name Y is true (or false) at w in
M








(Y )), if w |=
M
2 ( j.B (@0, j))
(resp. w =|
M
2 ( j.B (@0, j))).
As anticipated, Definition 8.3.1 yields the familiar truth-conditions for the lo-
gical forms of sentences. The truth- and falsity-conditions of the sentence Barbara




































































Definition 8.3.1 also yields the intuitive truth- and falsity-conditions for pro-
per names. For the isolated utterance of the name Barbara Partee in the context
































p(@0) ^ abt (partee, p) ⇣ p(j)
The STY31 truth- and falsity-conditions from (8.3.5) and (8.3.6) formalize the in-
tuitive truth- and falsity-conditions for proper names from Chapter 1.2.1. In par-
ticular, if, in an agent’s representing situation @0, Barbara Partee has the prop-
erty of arriving, then, since it holds for the situation @ from (9) that @ |=
M
2 ( i.
arrive (partee, i)), the @0-specific representation of the name Barbara Partee is eva-
luated ‘true’ at @. If, in an agent’s representing situation @0, Barbara Partee has
the property of not arriving, then the @0-specific representation of the name Bar-
bara Partee is evaluated ‘false’ at @.
Remarkably, since we have identified evaluating indices with partial situati-
ons, it may happen that the conjunction of the designators of all true propositions
at the state @0 which carry information about Barbara Partee is undefined at @.
This observation is captured below:
Proposition 8.2 (STY31 truth-aptness of names). In a strong single-type se-
mantics, proper names receive a partial truth-value at some situations.
Our interpretation of proper names in strong single-type semantics also en-
ables the non-trivial equivalence of the interpretation of logical forms at a situa-
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tion. The resulting relation of semantic equivalence is defined in reference to the
local equivalence relation between TY32 terms (cf. Def. 6.4.4).
In the definition of linguistic equivalence, we let A(s s;t) and B(s s;t) be the
STY31 translations of the logical forms X, respectively Y , such that X  A and
Y  B. We assume that @0 is the representing situation.
Definition 8.3.2 (Local STY31-based linguistic equivalence). A logical formX






( i.A(@0, i)) = ( i.B(@0, i)) in M2 under g2.
The notion of local STY31-based equivalence supports the situation-specific equiva-
lence of proper names and contextually salient sentences. Thus, at every situation
w at which the intensional formula  i.arrive (partee, i) is true, the name Barbara















 i8p. p(w) ^ abt (partee, p) ⇣ p(i) 
=
 
 i.arrive (partee, i) ^  8p. p(w) ^ abt (partee, p) ⇣ p(i)  
Our definition of local STY31-based equivalence models the attested equivalence
relations between proper names and sentences from Chapter 1.2.1.
The above motivates our description of STY31-based semantics as a strong sin-
gle-type semantics for the PTQ fragment, which accommodates Proposition 1.3.ii.
For the designated model of the logic STY31, this proposition is restated below:
Proposition 8.3 (Contextually salient STY31 name equivalents). In a strong
single-type semantics, proper names can stand in equivalence relations to contex-
tually salient non-existential sentences. Instances of this relation are identifiable
via the local equivalence of the TY32 definitions of the forms’ STY
3
1 translations.
To obtain situation-general equivalence and entailment relations between lo-
gical forms in our strong single-type semantics, we use the notions of global TY32
equivalence and entailment. As a result, general equivalence and entailment in our
strong single-type semantics are defined in analogy to the corresponding relations
in the semantics of the logic WTY31 (cf. Def. 7.3.2, 7.3.3).
Notably, in contrast to the relation of global equivalence on logical forms in
the semantics of the logic WTY31, the global equivalence relation in our strong
STY31-based semantics does not obtain between proper names and sentences. This
is due to the fact that the definitions of the STY31 translations of proper names do
not express an update on the available information at the relevant situation, and
to our assumption that each individual fails to exist in some situation (cf. the
strong reading of Ax12). The resulting observation is captured below:
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Proposition 8.4 (Absence of global STY31 name equivalents). In a strong
single-type semantics, proper names do not have global sentential equivalents.
Proposition 8.4 reflects the intuitive absence of a name’s sentential equivale-
nt(s) independent of a specific context. Moreover, it avoids the negative consequ-
ences of a single-type semantics for the semantic motivation of the syntactic cate-
gory system (cf. Ch. 3.4). In particular, since the definitions of the STY31 transla-
tions of simple existential sentences do not satisfy the predicate for the description
of the STY31 sort for individuals (in (8.3.8)), our STY
3
1-based semantics will not
classify the STY31 translation of the sentence Bill exists as an expression of the
sort (s s; t) ◆(where ◆abbreviates the predicate from (8.3.8)). As a result, this se-
mantics will be able to explain the well-formedness of the logical form from (23),
and the ill-formedness of the expressions from (24a) and (24b) (cf. Ch. 7.4).
 ⇡.




⇥9q.⇡ =   i j.(8p.(p(i) ^ (9y.abt (y, q) ^ abt (y, p)))⇣ p(j)) ⇤
The close correspondence between syntactic categories and STY31 subtypes is cap-
tured in Figure 8.1. In the figure, the sort label ⇢ abbreviates the predicate from
(8.3.9). In (8.3.8) and (8.3.9), the variable ⇡ ranges over type-(s s; t) objects.
(GB) Syntax S NP N C SAV · · ·















((s s; t)⇢ s s; t⇢)
Figure 8.1. Syntactic categories and STY31 subtypes.
This completes our discussion of the linguistic truth- and equivalence-relations
in the semantics of the logic STY31. We close the chapter with a defense of the se-
mantic complexity of our strong single-type objects.
8.4. A Note on Semantic Complexity
In Section 8.2.2, we have observed that our semantic constraints on the STY31 tra-
nslations of lexical PTQ elements display a high syntactic complexity. Thus, the
definition of the STY31 translation of the name Bill (in (8.4.1), next page) consists
of a significantly ‘longer’ lambda term than the definition of the name’s transla-
tion into a term of the logic WTY31 (in (8.4.2)) or of the logic TY
3
2 (in (8.4.3)):
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 i j8p.(p(i) ^ abt (bill, p))⇣ p(j)(8.4.1)
 i.E (bill, i)(8.4.2)
bill(8.4.3)
Since the definitions of all other STY31 translations are similarly complex, the de-
rivation of the definitions of STY31 translations of non-lexical logical forms (e.g.
the derivation of the definition of the STY31 term walk (bill) from (8.2.3)) require
many more lambda conversions than their counterparts in the logics WTY31 (cf.
(7.2.3)) or TY32. From a practitioner’s point of view, this makes our strong single-
type semantics much less appealing than its weaker counterpart, and than the for-
mal semantics from (Montague, 1973).
The present section defends the high semantic complexity of our strong single-
type objects. In particular, it argues that this complexity is demanded by the pos-
sibility of representing worldly objects in terms of their available information (cf.
Ch. 4.2.4), and of accommodating the assertoric interpretation of names from Pro-
position 1.3.ii (cf. Ch. 1.2.1). To support this claim, we cite a number of semantic
theories which also postulate complex values for names. It is demonstrated that
the formalization of these theories and their generalization across situations yields
at least equally complex objects as our semantics. In fact, our strong single-type
semantics even proves to be the simplest theory which models these phenomena.
Below, we first show the high complexity of the semantic values of names in
Landman’s version of Data Semantics (Landman, 1984), cf. (Scott, 1982). We
will then do the same for Merchant’s semantic account of ellipsis (Merchant,
2008). We close the section with a comparison between our single-type semantics
and propositional logics with only the She↵er stroke.
8.4.1. Interpretations of Names in Data Semantics. In (Landman,
1984), cf. (Landman, 1986), Landman provides a semantic theory of partial in-
formation which captures the incomplete knowledge of linguistic agents about wo-
rldly objects. The theory is shown to solve a number of problems regarding the
failure of substitutivity of logically equivalent expressions in epistemic contexts.
To solve these problems, Landman replaces possible worlds by partial infor-
mation states. Such states are proper filters in the set of propositions, which con-
tain the propositions that are implicitly assumed in conversation. At each state,
proper names are interpreted as subsets of the state whose members carry true in-
formation about the name’s referent at that state, cf. (Scott, 1982, p. 579–584).
Below, we let 0 be the constant for the absurd proposition, and let   denote the op-
eration of information combination. Landman’s description of the referent of Hes-
perus at the state   from (Landman, 1984) can then be formalized as follows,
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where hesp is the constant for Hesperus, and where p, q, and r are variables over
primitive propositions:
(8.4.4)  p.
 ⇥¬ (0) ^ (8q8r.( (q) ^  (r)) $  (q   r))⇤ ^  (p)  ^ abt (hesp, p)
In the first conjunct of the above term, the first conjunct (in square brackets) des-
cribes the semantic value of   as an information state. The rest of the term iden-
tifies the set of all propositions in   which carry information about Hesperus.
The term from (8.4.5) generalizes the description from (8.4.4) across informa-
tion states. In the term, ! is a variable over information states:
(8.4.5)  ! p.
 ⇥¬!(0) ^ (8q8r.(!(q) ^ !(r)) $ !(q   r))⇤ ^ !(p)  ^ abt (hesp, p)
It is easy to see that the resulting term is much more complex than the defini-
tion of the translation of Hesperus (or Bill) in the logic STY31. To reduce the term’s
complexity, one could identify data-semantic propositions with functions from si-
tuations to truth-combinations, and identify information states with situations.
However, the result of this simplification (in (8.4.6)) still has about the same com-
plexity as the definition of the STY31 translation of the name Bill (copied for conve-
nience below). In fact, item (8.4.6) employs the same representational strategy as
(8.4.1). This possibility has been demonstrated in Chapter 5.1.1 (cf. (5.1.3)).
 i p.p(i) ^ abt (hesp, p)(8.4.6)
 i j8p.(p(i) ^ abt (bill, p))⇣ p(j)(8.4.1)
Our use of the type (s s; t) as the basic type of the logic STY31 is justified by the lo-
wer rank of the type (s s; t) w.r.t. the rank of the type (s (s; t); t) (cf. (8.4.6)) and
by the analysis of natural language entailment as a truth- (rather than as an ap-
proximation-)ordering (cf. Def. 6.2.2). As a result of the former, only the type (s s;
t) satisfies the requirement of simplicity from Chapter 4. As a result of the latter,
only the metatheory of our (s s; t)-based logic allows a restriction to the familiar
logical connectives.
This completes our demonstration of the high complexity of name-interpreta-
tions in Data Semantics. We next show that the interpretations of names in sem-
antic accounts of ellipsis have a similar complexity.
8.4.2. Interpretations of names in Nonsentential Speech. In (Mer-
chant, 2008, Sect.4), Merchant provides an analysis of sentential NP-interpreta-
tions which explains the semantic equivalence between proper names and senten-
ces via an e-to-((e s; t) s; t) meaning-shifting function. This function sends the tra-
ditional type-e referent, partee, of the name Barbara Partee to the result (in (8.4.7),
next page) of applying its type-((e s; t) s; t) correspondent, P i.P (partee, i), to
the type-(e s; t) variable P1. The term from (8.4.7) receives its semantic value via
the contextually determined assignment function gF2 (ibid. pp. 38–39). The inter-
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pretation of this term in the designated TY32 model MF2 under the function gF2
then yields the desired proposition.
(8.4.7)  i.P1(partee, i)
Admittedly, Merchant’s interpretation of the name Barbara Partee in a given
context @ looks much simpler than the name’s STY31 interpretation at @. How-
ever, the result of replacing the variable P1 by a contextually specified predicate
(in (8.4.8)) already significantly increases the complexity of the term from (8.4.7):
 i8P.P (partee,@)⇣ P (partee, i)(8.4.8)
The generalization of the interpretation of Barbara Partee from (8.4.8) across
contexts or situations yields the term from (8.4.9):
 i j8P.P (partee, i)⇣ P (partee, j)(8.4.9)
 i j8p. p(i)^ abt (bill, p) ⇣ p(j)(8.4.1)
This term is equivalent to the definition of the STY31 translation of Bill from (8.4.1)
(again restated above). However, since our definition of the STY31 translations of
proper names facilitates the identification of relations between di↵erent individu-
als, and since it is closer in form to the (s s; t)-shifted variants of intensional for-
mulas (cf. Def. 8.2.1), we choose this format.
We close this section with a discussion of the similarities between our strong
single-type semantics and a propositional logic with only the She↵er stroke. The
discussion provides a di↵erent defense of the complexity of the TY32 definitions of
linguistic STY31 translations.
8.4.3. Single-Type Objects and the She↵er Stroke. The interpreta-
tion of the PTQ fragment through a single complex Montague type (s.t. individu-
als and propositions can both be represented via objects of this type) is reminis-
cent of the definition of the classical propositional connectives from only the nega-
tion of the conjunction operation (read ‘not both’, and called the She↵er stroke,
| ), cf. (She↵er, 1913).5 In particular, the She↵er stroke enables the definition
of ¬' as (' |')6, and enables the definitions of ('!  ), ('^ ), and ('_ ) as
(' | ( | )), ((' | ) | (' | )), and ((' |') | ( | )), respectively, where ' and  
are propositional constants. Since the semantics of the She↵er stroke can be cap-
tured by a single logical axiom, cf. (Nicod, 1917), ‘She↵er stroke’-based systems
improve upon the economy and simplicity of classical propositional logic without
the loss of expressive power.
5The section originates from discussions with Leon Horsten, Jan Sprenger, and Dietmar Zaef-
ferer.
6This holds because ¬' = ¬(' ^ ').
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Single-type semantics witnesses the merits of ‘She↵er-stroke’ logics: In parti-
cular, it illustrates the greater simplicity (on the object level) and the higher degr-
ee of unification w.r.t. traditional Montague semantics (through the identification
of new representational relations). However, the two systems share an important
practical impediment. This impediment lies in the absence of a natural (i.e. lingu-
istic or semantic/cognitive) correlate for the chosen primitive, and the resulting
impossibility of using these systems directly for the translation or interpretation
of natural language: For example, while most human languages command lexical
translations of logical negation (e.g. not), conjunction (and, but), and disjunction
(or), they lack a lexical correspondent of the She↵er stroke. Similarly, while the
explanation of a large number of linguistic facts (e.g. predication, anaphora, and
wh-phenomena) require reference to individuals, few phenomena require reference
to individual/proposition-neutral objects (cf. Ch. 1.2.1).
The salience of the connectives ¬, ^, and _ and of the types e and (s; t) (or e,
s, and t) is further reflected in our description of the She↵er stroke in terms of ¬
and ^, and in our definition of single-type objects with reference to individuals,
situations, and truth-values (cf. Ch. 5.3.1). But the salience of these ‘natural’ pri-
mitives can also be used to defend (and reduce) the complexity of the definitions of
single-type objects: Once we have introduced the She↵er stroke through referen-
ce to conjunction and negation, we do not require its re-introduction in the defini-
tion of the remaining connectives. In particular, it is redundant to define material
implication, (' !  ), through the specification, ¬(' ^ ¬( ^  )), of its ‘She↵er
stroke’-definition.7 A similar redundancy holds of the repeated specification of a
term’s TY32 definition in our single-type semantics. In particular, it is unnecessa-
ry to describe each STY31 interpretation of Bill through the relevant term from (C3).
It su ces to know that – and how – the definition proceeds. Section 8.2.2 has de-
monstrated the latter. This insight motivates the observation from the subsequ-
ent paragraph of (8.2.3).
This completes our discussion of the semantic complexity of strong single-ty-
pe objects. We close the chapter with a summary of our semantics’ achievements.
The main results of this dissertation are surveyed in the next Chapter (esp. in
Sect. 9.1).
8.5. Summary
This chapter has developed a strong single-type semantics for Montague’s PTQ
fragment. The semantics is a designated model for the TY32 subsystem STY
3
1 wh-
ich interprets logical PTQ forms into constructions out of (equivalents of) propo-
sitional concepts (type (s s; t)). Since individuals and propositions can both be re-
7This holds because ¬(' ^ ¬( ^  )) = ¬(' ^ ¬ ) = (¬' _ ¬¬ ) = (¬' _  ) = ('!  ).
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presented in the type (s s; t), proper names, sentences, and complement phrases
all receive an interpretation in this type (cf. Prop. 1.2). The resulting semantics
preserves the merits of the ‘pure’ and the weak single-type semantics from Chap-
ters 3 and 7. It improves upon these semantics by allowing for the possibility of
assigning undefined truth-values to names (cf. Prop. 1.3.i) and by identifying a na-
me’s equivalent contextually salient sentences (cf. Prop. 1.3.ii). As a result of the




This chapter evaluates the success of the experiment performed in this dissertati-
on: the attempt to support Partee’s conjecture by constructing a single-type model
for the PTQ fragment. In particular, the chapter reviews the conditions which en-
able the formulation of a single-type semantics for the PTQ fragment, assesses the
strength of these conditions on the proposed semantics, and compares these condi-
tions with the conditions on other non-Montagovian semantics.
The chapter is organized as follows: To identify the challenges on the provisi-
on of a single-type semantics, Section 9.1 reviews the merits and limitations of our
strong single-type semantics. Section 9.2 identifies the conditions on the solution
of these challenges. Section 9.4 presents the main precursors of single-type seman-
tics, and compares their conditions with the conditions on our strong single-type
semantics. Section 9.3 answers the guiding questions from the introduction to this
dissertation. Section 9.5 identifies alternative approaches to single-type seman-
tics. The chapter closes with a view to future work.
9.1. Assessment of Single-Type Semantics
This dissertation has shown that Montague’s PTQ fragment can be modeled thr-
ough the use of a single basic type of object which is semantically neutral between
individuals and propositions (Prop. 1.2). However, it has also shown (in Part I)
that many semantic properties of basic-type objects (i.e. their truth-evaluability,
and their equivalence to other non-algebraically related objects; Prop. 1.3) cannot
be accommodated in a ‘pure’ single-type system which leaves the basic type una-
nalyzed.We have developed two alternative (‘mixed’) single-type semantics which
identify the single basic type with a particular Montague type (in Part III), and
have shown that these semantics satisfy the requirements from Proposition 1.3.
To evaluate the success of our single-type semantics, we consider the merits
and limitations of the strong single-type semantics from Chapter 8. Our focus on
this particular semantics is motivated by the fact that only strong single-type se-
mantics model all of the observations from Proposition 1.3. As a result, we expect
that these semantics will exemplify the advantages and drawbacks of single-type
theories most clearly. We will see in the next section that – because of their good
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suitability as formal semantics for the PTQ fragment – strong single-type seman-
tics also best identify the constraints on any single-type semantics.
9.1.1. Merits of Single-Type Semantics. Chapter 1 has motivated our
interest in single-type semantics with reference to its ability to identify new rep-
resentational relations between di↵erent types of Montagovian objects (cf. Sect.
1.4.2), to its unificatory power (cf. Sect. 1.4.1), and to its extension of the model-
ing scope of traditional Montague semantics (cf. Sect. 1.2.1). Our formulation of
the strong single-type semantics from Chapter 8 has confirmed these expectati-
ons. In particular, the injective functions from (9.1.1) and (9.1.2) (below) – which
send Montagovian individuals and propositions to their strong single-type corre-
lates – extend the set of the familiar type- (or meaning-)shifting functions from
(Partee, 1987) (cf. Fig. 1.2):
 x i j8p. p(i) ^ abt (x, p) ⇣ p(j)(9.1.1)
 p i j.p(j) ^  8q. q(i) ^ (9x.abt (x, q) ^ abt (x, p)) ⇣ q(j) (9.1.2)
Figure 9.1 (below) replaces the proxies, o1 and o2, for the single-type candidates
from Chapters 7 and 8 by the types (s; t) and (s s; t). In the figure, the domains of
the functions from (9.1.1) and (9.1.2) are connected by thick black arrows. Wit-
nesses of the ‘dashed’ functions (e.g. for (s; t)-to-(e s; t) shifts) are easily specified.
(e s; t)
(s; t) (s s; t)
e ((e s; t) s; t)
Figure 9.1. Relations between objects of the types from Fig-
ure 1.2 and objects of the type (s; t) and (s s; t).
The representation of Montagovian individuals and propositions by strong
single-type objects (s.t. proper names, sentences, and complement phrases are all
interpreted in the type (s s; t)) allows us to model a number of linguistic phenome-
na which cannot be accommodated in traditional Montague semantics. These phe-
nomena include the neutrality of some verbs between an NP or a CP complement
(cf. (8.2.20)), the possibility of coordinating proper names with complement phra-
ses (cf. (8.2.23)), and the existence of specificational sentences with a CP comple-
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ment (cf. (8.2.22)). Because of its ‘rich’ interpretation of logical PTQ forms (cf.
(9.1.1), (9.1.2)), our strong single-type semantics also makes it possible to inter-
pret isolated occurrences of proper names in the semantic type for sentences. The
‘sentential’ interpretation of names enables us to identify contextual truth- and
equivalence-conditions for name/sentence pairs (cf. (8.3.5), (8.3.7)).
The di↵erent strategies for the representation of individuals and propositions
from (9.1.1) and (9.1.2) further preserve the explanatory power of Montague sem-
antics in our strong single-type semantics. This is due to the possibility of identi-
fying two non-intersecting (s s; t)-subtypes whose elements have the form from
(9.1.1) resp. (9.1.2). Since no element of either of these subtypes represents both
an individual and a proposition, the hierarchy of type-(s s; t) subtypes preserves
all semantic distinctions of the ontology from (Montague, 1970a). As a result,
our strong single-type semantics provides an equally ‘good’ explanation of syn-
tactic well- (or ill-)formedness as Montague semantics.
The above observations identify our strong single-type semantics as a monist
conservative extension of Montague semantics1. This description is justified by the
semantics’ assumption of a single basic type of object (s.t. it is a monist variant of
Montague semantics), by its preservation of the explanatory power of Montague
semantics (s.t. it is conservative over traditional Montague semantics), and by its
ability to model a number of phenomena which cannot be modeled in traditional
Montague semantics (s.t. our strong single-type semantics extends the empirical
scope of this semantics).
9.1.2. Limitations of Single-Type Semantics. The success of our strong
single-type semantics is curbed by the impossibility of achieving most2 of the ab-
ove-listed merits in the absence of a multi-typed metatheory. In particular, we
have seen in Part I that a ‘pure’ single-type semantics is unable to serve as a foun-
dation for syntactic categories (s.t. it is not conservative over Montague seman-
tics), and that it is unable to identify equivalence relations between names and
sentences (s.t. it does not extend the empirical scope of traditional Montague se-
mantics to phenomena like (9)). As a result, a ‘pure’ single-type semantics is not,
in all respects, preferable over traditional Montague semantics.
The merits of traditional Montague semantics and of our ‘pure’ and strong
single-type semantics are compared in Table 9.1 (next page). In this table, the im-
provement (resp. regress) of a semantics w.r.t. the unification, and the explanatory
and modeling power of its competing theories is marked by a checkmark, ‘3’ (resp.
by a cross, ‘7’). The abbreviations ‘MS’, ‘TY0’, and ‘STY
3
1’ stand for ‘Montague
semantics’, ‘‘pure’ single-type semantics’, and ‘strong single-type semantics ’:
1This description (as well as its extension from p. 193) has been proposed by Markus Werning.
2The only exception is the unification of Montague’s semantic ontology.
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Better performed in
Role of types MS TY0 STY
3
1
(1) Unification of basic semantic domains (monism) 7 3 3
(2) Explanation of distribution/categ’s (conservativity) 3 7 3
(3) Interpretation of natural language (extension) 7 7 3
Table 9.1. Success of single-typing vs. Montague typing.
However, we have seen in this dissertation that the limitations of ‘pure’ single-
type semantics are not restricted to the inability of this semantics to achieve the
merits from Section 9.1.1. Other challenges include the facts from (a) to (d):
(a) The truth-functional connectives are not available in the object theory.
(b) The truth of basic-type terms cannot be evaluated in the object theory.
(c) Equivalence between terms cannot be established in the object theory.
(d) Object-level separation subtypes cannot be identified within the single
basic type.
These challenges will be addressed in the next section.
9.2. Constraints on Single-Type Semantics
The introduction to this chapter has already mentioned the dependence of a suit-
able single-type semantics on the satisfaction of a number of semantic conditions.
For our strong single-type semantics, these conditions are listed below:
(i) The single basic type o is a conjoinable Montague type (cf. Ch. 4.1.1).
(ii) The metatheory commands the truth-value type t (cf. Ch. 2.5).
(iii) The metatheory commands types for individuals (e) and situations (s)
(cf. Ch. 5.3.2).
(iv) Object-theoretic terms are defined by metatheoretic terms (cf. Ch. 5.3.1).
The relevance of each of these conditions for the solution to Challenges (a) to (d)
from the end of the previous subsection is summarized in Table 9.2 (next page). In
the table, conditions which are required for a solution to the respective challenge
are marked by a checkmark. Conditions which are not required for the solution to
the challenge are marked by a cross.
Note the strength of Conditions (i) to (iv) for the success of a single-type se-
mantics: None of the challenges can be solved without the satisfaction of at least
two conditions. Some important challenges (i.e. Challenge (c) and (d)) even requ-
ire the satisfaction of all conditions. Since these conditions all refer to some sali-
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Challenge \ Solution condition (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
(a) Definability of proxies for truth-funct. connectives 3 3 7 7
(b) Truth-evaluability of names/sentences (Prop. 1.3.i) 3 3 3 7
(c) Identifiability of name/S equivalences (Prop. 1.3.ii) 3 3 3 3
(d) Definability of single-type subsorts 3 3 3 3
Table 9.2. Conditions on the success of a single-type semantics.
ent aspect of Montague’s original type system, our single-type semantics remains
dependent on Montague semantics.
The characterization of strong single-type semantics as a monist dependent
conservative extension of Montague semantics challenges the status of single-type
semantics as a serious competitor to Montague semantics. In particular, since our
single-type semantics is unable to model the PTQ fragment without recourse to
Montagovian (or Gallin) objects, it does not question the salience of Montague’s
original type system. To the contrary, it can be regarded as generating support for
the semantic ontology from (Montague, 1970a; 1973), cf. (Gallin, 1975).
Remarkably, the resistance of formal semantics to a ‘pure’ single-type charac-
terization is not an isolated phenomenon. A similar observation has been made for
the attempt to model natural language in an ontology based (only) on situations
(cf. Sect. 9.4.1). Thus, in Barwise and Perry’s interview on Situations and Attitu-
des (Barwise and Perry, 1985), the interviewer notes the following (p. 110):
[. . .] in the early chapters of the book, you sketch a certain per-
spective: hard-headed realism [. . .]. The idea [is that] we shou-
ld be able to understand [human language] in realistic terms
without appeal to things like mental representations or other
possible worlds. [. . .]
But look what you end up with as parts of your reality: ty-
pes of events, constraints, roles, frames of mind, ideas, concep-
ts, and images [. . .]. You must admit that that sounds pretty
far from the hard-headed realism of the early [chapters].
In Section 9.4, we will present other ostensible one-base-type semantics which are
subject to similar constraints.
9.3. Answering the Initial Questions
The observations from the previous section enable us to formulate specific answers
to the questions from the beginning of this thesis (cf. the first paragraph of Ch.
1.2). We present these answers in the original order of mention of their questions:
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What happens if we replace Montague’s types for individuals
(e) and propositions (hs, ti) by a single basic type of object?
Answer: Initially not much: We are still able to model all logical forms from the
PTQ fragment. However, to ensure that basic-type forms have the expected sem-
antic properties (like representability, truth, and equivalence), and to provide a se-
mantic basis for some syntactic categories, we still need to refer to Montague ty-
pes. As a result, a single-type semantics does not make Montague’s type system
dispensable.
What does a suitable interpretive domain for the single basic
type look like?
Answer:To ensure the truth-evaluability of basic-type objects, the domain of the
single basic type must be a construction to the type for propositions, hs, ti. For the
weak single-type semantics from Chapter 7, this requirement is satisfied by any
type of the form (. . . s;~t ), where ~t is a construction to the truth-value type t. For
the strong single-type semantics from Chapter 8, this requirement is satisfied by
any type of the form (. . . s s;~t ). Objects of this type further enable the represen-
tation of individuals and propositions, and allow the interpretation of linguistic
connectives as algebraic operations.
What e↵ects does this change of type system have on our se-
mantics’ ability to model natural language?
Answer: The interpretation of proper names and sentences in a single basic ty-
pe accommodates a number of phenomena which cannot be modeled in traditional
Montague semantics (cf. Sect. 9.1.1). These phenomena include the neutrality of
some verbs between an NP or a CP complement, the possibility of coordinating
proper names with complement phrases, the existence of specificational sentences
with a CP complement, and the local equivalence of names with sentences.
This completes our assessment of the strong single-type semantics from Chap-
ter 8. We next present some principal precursors of this semantics, and discuss al-
ternative strategies for the provision of a single-type semantics.
9.4. Precursors of Single-Type Semantics
This dissertation has treated single-type semantics as a novel theory of formal se-
mantics. The attempt to support Partee’s conjecture with a designated single-ty-
pe theory is (to the best of our knowledge) unprecedented. However, the last three
decades of semantic research have produced several ostensible one-base-type the-
ories. These include Kratzer’s Situation Semantics (Kratzer, 1989), Zalta’s Ab-
stract Object Theory (Zalta, 1983), and Chierchia and Turner’s Property The-
ory (Chierchia and Turner, 1988). We discuss these theories in turn:
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9.4.1. Situation Semantics. In (Kratzer, 1989), cf. (Kratzer, 1990;
2002), Kratzer provides a formal semantics for counterfactual conditionals which
is based on semantically primitive situations. Situations are parts of possible wor-
lds (or partial possible worlds), cf. (Barwise and Perry, 1983), which contain
possible individuals alongside possible facts. Situations are ordered by a ‘part of’-
relation, , which captures the richness of their semantic content. The truth of a
proposition p in a situation s is defined via the membership of s in p (s.t. p is true
in s if s 2 p). The exemplification of p by a fact s is defined via the p-minimality
of s (s.t. s exemplifies p if s is the smallest situation in which p is true).
The association of possible individuals and facts with situations gives Kratzer’s
theory the appearance of a situation-based single-type semantics. However, her as-
signment of semantic types to syntactic categories destroys this appearance.3 In
particular, while Kratzer interprets individual constants and variables in the do-
main of situations (type s), cf. (Kratzer, 1989, p. 619), she identifies the seman-
tic values of sentences with (functions from utterance situations to) sets of situati-
ons (type (s; t), resp. (s; (s; t))) (ibid. pp. 615, 618). This move prevents the single-
typed modeling of the PTQ fragment (cf. Prop. 1.2) and disables an accommoda-
tion of the phenomena from Chapter 1.2 (cf. Prop. 1.3).
Despite its unsuitability as a single-type semantics, Kratzer’s semantics is clo-
sely related to the project of this dissertation. In particular, the weak single-type
semantics from Part III contains a number of Kratzerian elements. These elemen-
ts include the identification of sets of situations as a salient object type, and the
use of a ‘situations-to-sets of situations’ lifting function. In (Kratzer, 2002, pp.
19–20), this function is described as a function from situations s to their smallest
content-preserving extensions. Since possible individuals are classified as situati-
ons, this function also enables the lifting of individuals. Specifically, since Kratzer
identifies every individual a with the smallest situation s in which this individu-
al exists, the set denoted by {s0 | s  s0} is identical to the representation of in-
dividuals from (4.2.10).
We next discuss the relation of our single-type semantics to Zalta’s Abstract
Object Theory.
9.4.2. Abstract Object Theory. In (Zalta, 1983), cf. (Zalta, 1988), Zal-
ta proposes an axiomatic metaphysics which seeks to describe the behavior of ab-
stract objects. Abstract objects are non-concrete non-existing objects (e.g. Sher-
lock Holmes or Pegasus), which cannot have a location in space-time. They distin-
guish themselves from ordinary (i.e. concrete) objects (e.g. Ed or Barbara Partee),
which can occupy a specific position in space-time.Objects of these two classes are
3However, since Kratzer’s theory (like the theories from Sect. 9.4.2, 9.4.3) is not devised as a sin-
gle-type semantics, it never intends or claims to satisfy Propositions 1.2 and/or 1.3.
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associated with di↵erent ways of witnessing properties:While ordinary objects ex-
emplify properties (e.g. biking to CSLI on Monday 4th November, 2013, at 8:51
a.m., resp. being a formal semanticist), abstract objects encode properties (e.g. be-
ing a consulting detective, resp. having two wings) (Zalta, 1983, pp. 12 ↵.). Ex-
emplification and encoding constitute a ‘bottom up’ and a ‘top down’ approach to
predication, respectively (s.t. a exemplifies P at @ i↵ ha,@i 2 P , and a encodes P
i↵, for all w, hP,wi 2 Q, where a is a type-e correlate of Q).
Since abstract objects are individual correlates of certain sets of properties
(s.t. there is an injective function from property sets to abstract objects, cf. (Zalta,
1983, p. 34)), abstract objects encode each of their encoded properties by neces-
sity. For example, since Sherlock Holmes is a type-e correlate of the set including
the properties of being a consulting detective and of living at 221b Baker Street,
Sherlock Holmes encodes both of these properties. Since concrete objects do not
serve as the individual correlates of property sets, they exemplify each of their pro-
perties contingently. For example, although Ed is a member of the set of cyclists
at the actual world (or situation), it is well possible that he is a member of this
set’s complement at another world (or situation).
The possibility of encoding singleton sets of properties suggests the possibili-
ty of formulating single-type semantics in an ‘abstract object’-framework. In par-
ticular, since every proposition ' can be converted into the property of being such
that ', there exists an ‘abstract object’-correlate for each proposition, cf. (Zalta,
1983, p. 78). The union of the sets of ordinary and abstract objects then enables
the construction of (a representation of) Montague’s semantic ontology along the
lines of Part I. By its proximity to our ‘pure’ single-type semantics, Zalta’s theo-
ry accommodates NP/CP complement-neutral verbs, CP equatives, and NP/CP
coordinations. However, since the theory does not specify entailment relations bet-
ween ordinary and abstract objects, it cannot accommodate Proposition 1.3. As a
result, the theory disqualifies as a single-type semantics for the PTQ fragment.
This completes our discussion of Abstract Object Theory. We finish our pres-
entation of single-type precursors with a discussion of Chierchia and Turner’s Pro-
perty Theory.
9.4.3. Property Theory. In their e↵ort to provide a (hyper-)intensional
impredicative semantics for natural language predicative expressions, Chierchia
and Turner (1988) adopt a single-typed semantics (their Property Theory, PT)
which is not unlike the TY0-based semantics from Part I.
4 Their theory is a va-
riant of Henkin’s Theory of Propositional Types, cf. (Henkin, 1963), which re-
places the truth-value type t by a basic type, u, for basic individuals (called ur-
elements).5 Objects of this type take the form of familiar Montagovian individu-
4This similarity has been pointed out to me by Chris Potts.
9.5. OTHER APPROACHES TO SINGLE-TYPE SEMANTICS 197
als (our sort e) or of (hyper-)fine-grained propositions (called information units,
sort i). The identity-conditions for information units remain unspecified.
Chierchia and Turners’ linguistic application of Property Theory identifies
this theory as a single-type semantics for a small extension of the PTQ fragment.
Its interpretation of proper names and sentences as urelements, cf. (Chierchia
and Turner, 1988, p. 284), supports Partee’s conjecture from Proposition 1.2.
However, since it (deliberately) restricts truth to information units (ibid. p. 270),
PT excludes the truth-aptness of proper names (cf. Prop. 1.3.i). Since the connec-
tives ¬, ^, _, 8, 9, !, and $ are also restricted to sort-i objects (ibid. p. 267),
the theory is further unable to establish equivalence relations between names and
sentences (cf. Prop. 1.3.ii). As a result, Property Theory also disqualifies as a good
single-type semantics for the PTQ fragment.
The semantics from Part III answer the shortcomings of Property Theory as a
single-type semantics. Our uniform treatment of proper names and sentences (s.t.
names have truth-conditions, and can be coordinated via the designated single-ty-
pe connectives; cf. Prop. 1.3.i) exemplifies this. Our definition of (the single-type
correspondents of) individuals and information units in terms of their underlying
individuals, respectively propositions further enables the specification of their eq-
uivalence-conditions (cf. Prop. 1.3.ii). Our definition of the designated single-type
connectives in terms of the familiar propositional connectives follows this pattern.
The development of Property Theory along the described lines remains a project
for further research.
But the semantics from Part III also have a lesson to learn from Property The-
ory. This lesson concerns the organization of the base domain of our single-type







Chapter 7.4, we have achieved this sorting of domains through the use of separa-
tion subtypes, cf. (Lambek and Scott, 1986; Pollard, 2008). Subtypes pro-
vide a rough semantic basis for syntactic categories, and reduce single-type do-
mains to representationally relevant objects (along the lines of Ch. 4.1.2).
This completes our discussion of the precursors of single-type semantics. We
next compare our adopted single-type strategy to other type-theoretic approaches
to single-type semantics.6
9.5. Other Approaches to Single-Type Semantics
This dissertation has identified single-type models with models of a generalization
of the simply typed lambda calculus, cf. (Church, 1940). These models give a ty-
5In fact, Chierchia and Turner replace the type t by the type e, which includes urelements and
nominalized functions. Yet, since we are not interested in nominalization, we neglect the latter.
6The section originates from discussions with Stanley Peters, Daisuke Bekki, and Hans Leiss.
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ped interpretation of the system from (Church, 1985), which involves the explicit
and unique typing of every term (Fact 1). From the single basic type, all types are
obtained through a generalization, ( ; ), of the function type constructor ! (cf.
Montague’s constructor h , i) (Fact 2).7 Fact 1 ensures the well-typing of expres-
sions and prevents functional self-application. Fact 2 identifies complex-type terms
with the designators of function spaces.
The identification of single-type models with models of the simply typed lam-
bda calculus follows the approach from (Montague, 1973), (Gallin, 1975), and
(Partee, 2006). Our choice of this system is further supported by its generality
and canonicity, cf. (Scott, 1980), and by the proximity of its models to models of
set theory8, cf. (Henkin, 1950). However, none of these facts excludes the possi-
bility of providing a single-type semantics in models of other lambda calculi like
the untyped lambda calculus, cf. (Church, 1985), or the polymorphically typed
lambda calculus, cf. (Girard, 1972; Reynolds, 1974). These two systems flout
Fact 2 and Fact 1, respectively. To motivate our choice of the single-type seman-
tics from Part III, we briefly characterize an untyped and a polymorphically typed
single-type semantics, and identify their merits and limitations.
9.5.1. Untyped Single-‘Type’ Semantics. The characterization of single-
type semantics as a model of the untyped lambda calculus (Church, 1985), cf.
(Barendregt, 1984), constitutes the conceptually simplest alternative to the se-
mantics from Part III. The untyped lambda calculus is a type-free interpretation
of the lambda calculus, in which all expressions remain untyped. As a result, we
can identify the ‘types’ of the untyped lambda calculus with the universal type
(our single basic type) into which all other types can be isomorphically embedded,
cf. (Scott, 1980).
Like models of the untyped lambda calculus, models in an untyped single-‘ty-
pe’ semantics can be described as functional domain structures, which consist of a
complete lattice D, the space (D ! D) of functions over elements of this lattice,
a function sending every element of D to a corresponding function in the space
(D ! D), and the inverse of this function. To augment the language of the unty-
ped lambda calculus with single-type stand-ins for logical constants, cf. (Church,
1932; Henkin, 1950), we demand that D be a complete complemented lattice,
cf. (Wadsworth, 1976). We identify the top and bottom elements of this lattice
with the semantic values of single-type terms of the form  x
↵
.,> , resp.  x
↵
.,? ,
where ↵ is the universal type. This move enables the interpretation of the single-
type stand-ins for verum, falsum, etc. along the lines of Chapter 2.
7Since our type constructor ( ; ) combines the constructors for function types, !, and Cartesian
product types, ⇥, we, in fact, already use a small extension of the simply typed lambda calculus.
8This holds by the existence of function spaces on sets, which associate with function types.
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The assumption of a universal (single basic) type supports Partee’s conjectu-
re. The possibility of functional self-application further extends the scope of un-
typed single-type semantics to infinitives and gerunds (cf. the sentence Being fun
is fun, cf. (Chierchia and Turner, 1988, p. 293)). However, since the untyped
lambda calculus waives the distinction between functions and arguments, it fails
to provide a formal basis for syntactic categories. As a result, it is not able to ex-
plain distributional phenomena in natural language. Since models of this calcu-
lus are moreover rather removed from the familiar Montagovian models, they are
less suitable as a single-type semantics along the lines presented in Chapter 1.2.
9.5.2. Polymorphic Single-Type Semantics.The characterization of sin-
gle-type semantics as a model of the polymorphically typed lambda calculus, cf.
(Girard, 1972; Reynolds, 1974), preserves the merits of Montague’s formal se-
mantics. The polymorphically typed lambda calculus is an extension of the simp-
ly typed lambda calculus, cf. (Church, 1940), which allows the non-unique, i.e.
polymorphic, typing of terms.As a result, a single term can denote objects of di↵e-
rent types, and can be applied to di↵erently typed arguments. A polymorphic sin-
gle-type semantics will thus cover middle ground between the typed single-type
semantics from Parts I and III, and the untyped single-type semantics from the
previous subsection.
To obtain polymorphic types, we introduce a countable set of type variables
on whose members we define a new form of universal abstraction, ⇤. The abstrac-
tion operator ⇤ applies to terms and type variables to form a polymorphic func-
tion which takes types as arguments. The application of this function to a specific
type yields the result of replacing all free occurrences of the type variable in the
domain of the universal abstraction by that type.
The possibility of abstracting over a term’s types enables us to replace the fa-
mily of designated non-logical TY0 constants {).= (↵↵;o) | ↵ 2 0Type} from Chap-
ter 2.1 by the polymorphic constant ).= . However, since the polymorphically ty-
ped lambda calculus has significantly di↵erent properties from the presented sim-
ply typed lambda calculus, its adoption as a framework for single-type semantics
is not straightforwardly implemented. The formulation of a polymorphic single-
type semantics is left as a future project.
9.6. Future Work
We close this thesis by identifying further projects for future work. These projects
include the extension of our single-type semantics to the sentence-type interpre-
tation of definite and indefinite noun phrases (Sect. 9.6.1), the unification of the
semantic ontologies of larger fragments of natural language (Sect. 9.6.2), and the
identification of the minimal number of types which are required for the interpre-
tation of other linguistic fragments (Sect. 9.6.3).
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9.6.1. Assertoric Interpretation of (In-)Definites. Our introduction to
this dissertation has motivated Partee’s conjecture with reference to the sentence-
type interpretation of proper names. Notably, however, similar findings to the fin-
dings from (1) to (6) and (9) to (10) are also available for definite and indefinite
noun phrases (hereafter, DPs). These findings include the neutrality of transitive
verbs between a CP and a DP complement (cf. (11), (12)), the possibility of coor-
dinating a CP with a DP (cf. (35), in App.B.2.2), and the sentential interpretati-
on of DPs. The last-mentioned finding is illustrated in (25) and (26) (Merchant,
2008, pp. 10, 9), cf. (Stainton, 2006, p. 209):
(25) Context: Someone is about to take a seat on an empty chair. A person
who is witnessing this act quickly points towards the chair and interjec-
tingly utters (a).
a. [npan editor of Natural Language Semantics ]
b. This seat is reserved for [npan editor of Natural Language Semantics].
(26) Context: Someone is trying to recognize a tune. Another person leans
in on him and whistles (a).
a. [npthe song of mourning]
b. The melody you are hearing is [npthe song of mourning].
The provision of a basic-type interpretation of definite and indefinite noun phrases
constitutes an easy extension of the presented single-type semantics: To accommo-
date these phenomena, we only need to extend the TY32 language L2 via a (family
of Skolemized) choice operator(s) (Steedman, 2012), cf. (Winter, 2004; Krat-
zer, 1998), introduce single-type proxies for these operators (for the basic-type
translation of indefinite NPs), introduce a single-type proxy for the iota operator
(for the translation of definite NPs), define the former through the latter (along
the lines of Def. 8.2.2), and adapt our single-type translations of lexical items. The
introduction of single-type proxies for the iota and choice operators is required by
the fact that their types do not qualify as members of the single-type type system.
The resulting semantics will account for the truth-evaluability of definite and
indefinite NPs (cf. Prop. 1.3.i) and for their semantic equivalence to sentences in
a given context (cf. Prop. 1.3.ii).
9.6.2. Extension to Larger Fragments. Chapter 1 has limited the scope
of this dissertation to the semantic ontology from (Montague, 1970a). As a res-
ult, our unificatory project has been confined to a neutralization of the distinction
between individuals and propositions. It remains to investigate whether more re-
cently introduced types (including the types for primitive propositions, situations,
events, states, processes, registers, numbers, kinds, degrees, times, and intervals;
cf. Ch. 1.1.3) admit of a similar single-type treatment.
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For the case of situations, events, states, and processes, the answer is positive:
Chapter 4.2.4 has already demonstrated the possibility of replacing possible worl-
ds by situations in partial type theory. Kratzer (2011) has recently suggested the
treatment of events as a particular subclass of situations. This treatment is made
possible by the existence of ‘minimal’ situations, whose only true proposition is gi-
ven by the a rmation of the event’s culmination.9 The lifting of this proposition
to the type for propositional concepts (via the function from (9.1.2)), and the ad-
dition of an extra ‘event-representation’ argument to the STY31 translations of
verbs then allow the translation of the sentence Bill walks into the STY31 term
W
e.
walk (e, bill), where e is a variable over lifted events. The adaptation of the sem-
antic constraints for the interpretation of STY31 terms enables the expected defi-
nition of the above term (in (9.6.1)), where e is an event variable:
(9.6.1)  i j9e.walk (e, bill, j) ^  8p.(p(i) ^ abt (bill, p))⇣ p(j) 
The extension of our strong single-type semantics to states and processes is analo-
gously achieved, cf. (Parsons, 1990, Ch. 9).
The single-type treatment of registers, numbers, kinds, and degrees is sugges-
ted by the representability of these objects in the types (s s; t) (for registers and
numbers), ((s s; t) s s; t) (for kinds), and (((s s; t) s s; t) s s; t) (for degrees), cf. (Mu-
skens, 1996; Chierchia, 2010). The definition of the designator of their STY31
representations remains a project for future research. Related projects include the
formulation of a hyperintensional, (s, p)-based single-type semantics (with p the
type for primitive propositions), and the investigation of the possibility of exten-
ding the presented theory to temporal intervals and times.
We close our suggestions for future work with a more abstract methodological
project.
9.6.3. Reverse Formal Semantics.We have seen (in Ch. 5.3) that any sui-
table single-type semantics for the PTQ fragment relies on the assumption of a
multi-typed metatheory with distinct types e, s, t.10We have also seen (in Ch.D.1;
Ch. 7.2, 8.2) that puzzles involving intensionality can be solved in an {e, (s; t)}-
based semantics, and that the possibility of defining the translations of the senten-
ces from (1b) to (3b) and (7) requires an extension of the set of ‘classical’ Monta-
govian individuals with ‘propositional’ (i.e. abstract) individuals.
The above-mentioned insights constitute first steps towards the program of
‘reverse formal semantics’. This program – named in analogy with the correspon-
ding program in the foundations of mathematics (cf. Ch. 5.2.2), cf. (Friedman,
1975; Simpson, 2009) – attempts to identify theminimal formal semantics (with
9In Kratzer’s jargon: the existence of situations which exemplify the proposition associated with
the event.
10This section is based on discussions with Cleo Condoravdi, Sam Sanders, and Seth Yalcin.
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‘minimality’ defined w.r.t. the number and complexity of basic types) which inter-
pret certain fragments of natural language. Questions in reverse formal semantics
include the following:
(1) What minimal number of types is required for the interpretation of a
certain fragment of natural language (e.g. the PTQ fragment w/o inten-
sional nouns and verbs (1a), the PTQ fragment (1b), the extension of
the PTQ fragment with NP/CP complement-neutral verbs (1c))?
(2) What is the identity of the types in the smallest sets of types from (1a)
to (1c)? What are the objects in the types’ domains?
(3) Which equinumerous type-sets are equivalent (up to coding) to the sets
from (1) and (2) (s.t. they preserve the explanatory and modeling power
of a semantics with basic types from the original set)?
(4) By (1) to (3): Which existing formal semantics (for which fragments?)
can be reduced to which other semantics (for which other fragments)?
(5) Which types (if any) resist coding through the familiar types (s.t. they
require the jump from one to another, non-equivalent set of types)?
This dissertation has provided an answer for particular cases of questions (1), (2),
(4), and (5). In particular, it has shown that the interpretation of the PTQ frag-
ment requires a minimum of two metalevel types (cf. (1b)).We have identified the-
se types with the types for individuals (type e) and with functions from partial si-
tuations to truth-combinations (type (s; t)) (cf. (2b)). The possibility of avoiding
Partee’s temperature puzzle in this semantics suggests the possibility of reducing
Gallin’s formal semantics for the PTQ fragment (with types e, s, t) to (a variant)
of the formal semantics from (Montague, 1970a) (cf. (4)). The impossibility of
accommodating NP/CP complement-neutral verbs without an extension of Mon-
tague’s type-e domain suggests the impossibility of reducing a semantics for (1c)
to an {e, (s; t)}-based semantics (cf. (5)). A possible candidate for an equivalent of
the set {e, (s; t)} is the set {e, p} from Section 9.6.2 (cf. (3)).
We hope that the answers to other cases of the above questions will identify
new relations between existing theories of formal semantics, and that they will
further our insight into the type system of natural language.
APPENDIX A
Abbreviations and Conventions
A.1. List of Abbreviations
ADV verb phrase adverb
C complementizer
CP complement phrase



















ST the single-type correlate of the rule CT
STT Simple Theory of Types
STY31 the ‘strong’ (s s; t)-based logic
TV transitive verb
TY0 the ‘pure’ single-type logic
TY2 Gallin’s (1975) type logic
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TY32 a partial n-ary functional variant of TY2
VP verb phrase
WTY31 the ‘weak’ (s; t)-based logic








⇡ (s s; t)
man,woman, park,fish, pen, unicorn, problem, room (e s; t)
run,walk, talk,wait, arrive, E (e s; t)
find, lose, eat, love, date, remember, fear, destroy, hate, (e e s; t)
enter
believe, assert ((s; t) e s; t)
temp, price, rise, change (((s; t); e) s; t)
rapidly, slowly, voluntary, allegedly, try,wish ((e s; t) e s; t)
in, for (e (e s; t) e s; t)
seek, conceive (((e s; t) s; t) e s; t)
about (((e s; t) s; t) (e s; t) e s; t)
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Constant TY0 Type
B,C (↵1 . . .↵n; o)
⇠ ((↵1 . . .↵n; o)↵1 . . .↵n; o)
.̂ ,
.̂




).= , .=, 6 .=, !· , $· (↵↵; o)
,> ,,? , john,mary, bill,ninety, sherlock,moriarty, o
pat,partee,w
2· ,3· ,man,woman,park,fish,pen,unicorn, room, (o; o)
problem
run,walk, talk,wait,arrive,E (o; o)
find, lose, eat, love,date, remember, fear,destroy, (o o; o)
hate, enter, believe, assert
temp,price, rise, change ((o; o); o)
rapidly, slowly, voluntary,allegedly, try,wish ((o; o) o; o)
in, for (o (o; o) o; o)
seek, conceive (((o; o); o) o; o)
about (((o; o); o) (o; o) o; o)
A.2.2. Variables.
Variable TY32 Type Object
i, j, k, k1, . . . , kn s situation
x, x1, . . . , xn, y, z e individual
p, p1, . . . , pn, q, r (s; t) proposition
P, P1, . . . , Pn (e s; t) 1st-order intensional indiv. p’ty
T, T1, . . . , Tn ((s; t); e) proposition-to-individual-fct.
Q,Q1, . . . , Qn ((e s; t) s; t) 2nd-order intensional indiv. p’ty
L,L1, . . . , Ln ((((e s; t) s; t) s; t) s; t) 4th-order intensional indiv. p’ty
Variable TY0 Type Object
x,x1, . . . ,xn,y, z o entity
p,p1, . . . ,pn, q, r o entity
P,P1, . . . ,Pn (o; o) 1st-order property of entities
Q,Q1, . . . ,Qn ((o; o); o) 2
nd-order property of entities
L,L1, . . . ,Ln (((o; o); o) o; o)
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A.3. Glossary
conjoinable type a type of the form (↵1 . . .↵n; t)
entity an object of the type o; a member of the set O
extension an object which is not an intension
formula a term of the type t
index an object of the type s; a situation in the set W
individual an object of the type e; a member of the set A
intension a type-(↵1 . . .↵n 1 s; t) or -(s; (↵1 . . .↵n 1; t)) object
intensional formula a term of the type (s; t)
property an object of some type (↵1 . . .↵n; t),
where 2  n 2 N if ↵
n
= s and n   1 otherwise
proposition an object of the type (s; t)
propositional type a type of the form (↵1 . . .↵n 1 s; t)
(possible) situation a partial index w s.t., for some prop. p, w /2 p and w /2 ¬p
propositional concept an object of the type (s; (s; t)) (or (s s; t))
truth-combination an object of the type t; here, a member of the set 3
truth-value a classical type-t object; a member of the set 2
truth-fct’l connectives the logical constants ⇤,?,),=,¬,^, etc.
single-type connectives the non-logical constants ,? , ).= , .=,⇠, .̂ , etc.
(possible) world a total index w s.t., for all prop’s p, w 2 p or w 2 ¬p

APPENDIX B
Further Motivation for Partee’s Conjecture
This appendix surveys the original motivation for Partee’s conjecture, cf. (Partee,
2006, pp. 37–38), (in Sect. B.1) and extends the empirical motivation for a single-
type semantics from Section 1.2.1 (in Sect. B.2). The original motivation for Par-
tee’s conjecture lies in the existence of support for a syntactic analogue of Propo-
sition 1.2 (i.e. for Carstairs-McCarthy’s single-category hypothesis). The new em-
pirical motivation for Partee’s conjecture lies in the existence of further empirical
support for single-type semantics, and in a more detailed explanation of some of
the examples from Chapter 1.2.1.
B.1. Partee’s Original Motivation
In his monograph The Origins of Complex Language (1999), Andrew Carstairs-
McCarthy makes the following claim about natural language syntax:
Proposition B.1 (Single-Category Hypothesis). The syntactic distinction
between noun phrases and sentences is inessential for the generation of complex
modern languages. Their grammatical category system can be constructed from
one basic category.
To acknowledge its original proponent, we will sometimes refer to Proposition B.1
as Carstairs-McCarthy’s conjecture. This conjecture suggests the possibility of ob-
taining all grammatical categories from a single basic category (dubbed ‘X’), wh-
ich is neutral between the syntactic categories for noun phrases (NP), sentences (S),
and complement phrases (CP). From the category X, all other categories are ob-
tained via the rule CC:
(CC) If A and B are syntactic categories, then C (whose members are genera-
ted by the phrase structure rule C  ! A, A  ! BC, or A  ! CB) is a
category.
Since the new category X is neutral between the categories NP and S, non-basic
categories will display less distinctions than the familiar non-basic categories from
categorial syntax: For example, since complementizers (C) and sentence adverbs
(SAV) both merge with an expression of the category X to form an expression of
the category X, Carstairs-McCarthy’s single-category syntax will also neutralize
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the distinction between these two categories. The same holds of the distinction be-
tween transitive verbs (e.g. find) and sentence-complement verbs (believe).
Carstairs-McCarthy supports his hypothesis by citing four classes of support,
which are taken from evolutionary linguistics, the syntax of nominalization, lan-
guage acquisition, and pragmatics. We discuss each of them in turn:
B.1.1. Support from Syntactic Complexity. Carstairs-McCarthy’s prin-
cipal motivation for Proposition B.1 concerns the evolutionary contingency of the
distinction between sentences and noun phrases, and the resulting possibility of an
equally suitable single-category syntax. In particular, his argument for Propositi-
on B.1 identifies the ‘sentence/NP’-distinction as a byproduct of neural mechani-
sms which are associated with changes in the human vocal tract (Carstairs-Mc-
Carthy, 1999, pp. 121–129):
At the end of the Pliocene, the descent of his larynx enabled Homo erectus for
the first time to produce ‘longer’ (i.e. temporally extended) sounds. According to
Carstairs-McCarthy, this could have been achieved either through an expansion of
the existing vocabulary, or through the introduction of a speech-patterning mech-
anism. Since the internal structure of syllables constituted an existing instance of
the second alternative, its transfer to the new ‘higher’ linguistic level was the sim-
plest way of increasing the language’s expressive power. More complex expressi-
ons were then obtained by forming multi-word lexical strings in which noun phra-
ses and sentences mimicked the function of onsets and syllables, respectively:
(27) a. [konset[i:nucleus]rhyme]syllable :: [s[npBill][vp[ivwalks]]]
b. [konset[ænucleus tcoda]rhyme]syllable :: [s[npBill][vp[tvloves][npMary]]]
Like syllables constitute the smallest unit of organization for a sequence of speech
sounds, sentences constitute the smallest unit of organization for a sequence of
words. Like rhymes combine with an onset to form a syllable, verb phrases com-
bine with a noun phrase to form a sentence.
Carstairs-McCarthy motivates the contingency of the ‘sentence/noun phrase’-
distinction with reference to their development in analogy with syllable structure.
Note, however, that Carstairs-McCarthy’s evidence for Proposition B.1 does not
refute mainstream theories of syntax. Rather, it supports the equal suitability of
an alternative, single-category syntax for natural language. The possibility of such
a syntax is further supported by the easy possibility of converting sentences into
noun phrases (Sect. B.1.2), and by the ambiguity between an NP’s referential and
assertoric interpretation (Sect. B.1.3, B.1.4).
B.1.2. Evidence from Nominalization. To support the possibility of an
expressive single-category language, Carstairs-McCarthy assumes the hypotheti-
cal language Nominalized English, whose syntax contains only one basic category,
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NP. From this class of expressions, he obtains all familiar syntactic categories – ex-
cept for the category ‘sentence’ – as derived categories. Sentences like (28) are con-
verted into noun phrases (e.g. (28a)–(28c)) via a simple nominalization procedure
(Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999, p. 23).
(28) John saw a snake.
a. the snake that John saw
b. a snake that John saw
c. John, who saw a snake
Since noun phrases like (28a) to (28c) exhibit assertoric force, intransitive verbs
(walk) and sentence adverbs (e.g. necessarily) qualify as members of the same syn-
tactic category.
B.1.3. Evidence from Language Acquisition. Carstairs-McCarthy fur-
ther supports his hypothesis by showing that the ambiguity between an NP’s ref-
erential and assertoric reading (cf. (28a)–(28c), resp. (28)) is not idiosyncratic to
Nominalized English, but constitutes a widespread linguistic phenomenon.To this
aim, he cites recent research into primate communication systems (Cheney and
Seyfarth, 1990). This research has found that the language of Vervet monkeys –
which commands only a single-class lexicon – displays a significant illocutionary
variance. Thus, the one-word locution eagle from (29) can be interpreted as any of
the expressions from (29a)–(29d) (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999, pp. 21–22, 46):
(29) Eagle
a. an eagle (referential)
b. There’s an eagle over there. (assertoric)
c. The eagle constitutes a threat. (assertoric)
d. Hide from the eagle!/Take cover! (imperative)
B.1.4. Evidence from Pragmatics. Carstairs-McCarthy completes his
argument by noting that the ‘referential/assertoric’ ambiguity of noun phrases is
not restricted to the developmental domain, but constitutes a salient feature of
spoken adult language. To illustrate the assertoric function of noun phrases, he
lists a number of expressions (in (30)–(32)) which make the same assertion as their
sentential glosses (in square brackets) (Carstairs-McCarthy, 2005, p. 151):
(30) The arrival of the Queen of Sheba [The Queen of Sheba arrives]
(31) Victory for Dewey [Dewey wins]
(32) Lord and Lady Blenkinsop [Here are Lord and Lady Blenkinsop]
Carstairs-McCarthy supports the assertoric interpretation of items (30) to (32) by
showing that they have truth- (or satisfiability-)conditions, and that they can be
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regarded as true or false in a given situation, cf. (Carstairs-McCarthy, 2005,
p. 151). Thus, the use of (30) as a description of the arrival of the First Harlot or
of the departure of the Queen of Sheba is not only infelicitous, but false. The pre-
mature newspaper headline from (31) (when Dewey has, in fact, lost the presiden-
tial elections) asserts a similar falsity.
The above suggests the conceptual possibility of a single-category language
with the expressive power of our familiar natural languages.
Carstairs-McCarthy’s arguments from Sections B.1.2 and B.1.4 are directly
transferable to natural language semantics. In particular, his examples from (30)
to (32) complement Merchant’s motivation for Proposition 1.3 (cf. Ch. 1.2.1). Ex-
amples (28) and (28a) to (28c) support the semantic similarity between sentences
and indefinite NPs, cf. (Partee, 2006, p. 38). Under the (näıve) assumption of a
close relation between syntactic categories and semantic types, the support for
Proposition B.1 can thus be taken as a motivation for Proposition 1.2.
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B.2. New Motivation for Partee’s Conjecture
The introduction to this dissertation has motivated Partee’s conjecture by consid-
erations from lexical syntax, coordination, specification, and nonsentential speech.
The present section adds further examples of some of these phenomena and pro-
vides a more detailed explanation of some earlier examples.
B.2.1. More Motivation from Lexical Syntax. Examples (1) to (3) have
demonstrated the ability of single-type semantics to accommodate NP/CP comp-
lement-neutral verbs. This subsection identifies another NP/CP neutral form (i.e.
prepositions) and shows that our semantics can accommodate its neutrality.
Since single-type semantics interprets proper names and complement phrases
in the same semantic type, it accommodates the ambiguity of German prepositi-
onal phrases between the results of combining a preposition (e.g. vor, durch) with
an NP, and of combining a pro-preposition (e.g. davor, dadurch) with a CP.1 The
first possibility is witnessed by the phrases vor Moriarty [Engl.: ‘of Moriarty’] and
durch einen Pfeiler [Engl.: ‘through a beam’] in (33a), resp. (34a). The second pos-
sibility is witnessed by the phrases davor, dass Moriarty ihn zerstört [Engl.: ‘there-
of that Moriarty him destroys’, i.e. ‘of Moriarty destroying him’] and dadurch,
dass er einen Pfeiler aufstellt [Engl.: ‘there-through that he a beam puts up’, i.e.
‘by putting up a beam’] in (33b), resp. (34b).2 Below, ‘pro-’ and ‘gc’ are the la-
bels for pro-elements and for gerundial clauses, respectively. German-language ex-
amples are supplied with a literal English translation and an informal gloss:
(33) a. Sherlock hat Angst vor [npMoriarty].
[literal: Sherlock has fear of [npMoriarty].]
[ gloss: Sherlock is afraid of [npMoriarty].]
b. Sherlock hat Angst davor, [cpdass Moriarty ihn zerstört].
[literal: Sherlock has fear pro-of [cpthat Moriarty him destroys].]
[ gloss: Sherlock is afraid of [gcMoriarty destroying him].]
(34) a. Peter stützt das Dach durch [npeinen Pfeiler].
[literal: Peter supports the roof through [npa beam].]
b. Peter stützt das Dach dadurch, [cpdass er einen Pfeiler aufstellt].
[literal: Peter supports the roof pro-through [cpthat he a beam
xxxxxxl puts up].]
[ gloss: Peter is supporting the roof by [gcputting up a beam].]
1I owe this observation to Markus Werning.
2A similar phenomenon is observed in Dutch: cf. the sentences Sherlock is bang voor [npMoriarty]
(cf. (33a)) and Sherlock is ervoor bang [cpdat Moriarty hem vernietigt] (cf. (33b)), respectively Pie-
ter steunt het dak door (middel van) [npeen balk] (cf. (34a)) and Pieter steunt het dak [cpdoordat hij
en balk installeert] (cf. (34b)).
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Since Montague semantics interprets prepositions as expressions of the type he,hhe,
hs, tii, he, hs, tiiii, it succeeds in modeling (33a) and (34a). However, the senten-
ces (33b) and (34b) defy accommodation in traditional Montague semantics. This
is due to the fact that the pronominal character of da- prevents its interpretation
as a meaning-shifter of prepositional arguments (type-he, hhe, hs, tii,he, hs, tiiii-to-
hhs, ti, hhe, hs, tii, he, hs, tiiii). However, only this interpretation enables the com-
bination of the pro-prepositions davor and dadurch with a CP.
Since the first argument place of our new type of prepositions, ho, hho, oi, ho, oiii,
is neutral between names and complement phrases, single-type semantics can mo-
del both members of the pairs of sentences from (33) and (34).
The next section presents additional support for the semantic equivalence of
noun phrases and complement phrases (cf. (9)–(12)).
B.2.2. More Support for Name/Sentence Equivalences. Our investi-
gation of the interpretations of (9a) and (10a) in the contexts from (9) and (10)
has found that referential noun phrases can be related to complement phrases by
(mutual) semantic entailment. The obtaining of these relations is supported by
the intuitive redundancy of some NP/CP-coordinations, and by the intuitive con-
tradiction that results from denying (the sentence associated with) one of their
conjuncts.
Consider the NP/CP coordination from (5) (copied, for convenience, below)
and the results (in (35), (36)) of coordinating the complements of the di↵erent oc-
currences of the verb notice from (11) and of coordinating the di↵erent prepositi-
onal phrases from (34):
(5) Sherlock fears [npMoriarty] and [cpthat Moriarty will destroy him].
(35) Chris noticed [npthe problem] and [cpthat Mary hates Bill].
(36) Peter stützt das Dach durch [npeinen Pfeiler] und dadurch, [cpdass er ei-
nen Pfeiler aufstellt].
[gloss: Peter is supporting the roof through [npa beam] and by [gcputting
xxjup a beam].]
All three of the above sentences engender a feeling of redundancy. This feeling is
brought about by the fact that the CP in the second conjunct (in (5), the phrase
that Moriarty will destroy him) contains the information of (the sentential interpre-
tation of) the NP in the first conjunct (here, of the name Moriarty), such that the
CP semantically entails (the sentential interpretation of) the NP. Since, in (35)
and (36), the CP further does not contain any information which is not already en-
coded in (the sentential interpretation of) the relevant NP (s.t. the NP also sem-
antically entails the CP), the NP and CP from (35) and (36) are, in fact, seman-
tically equivalent.3
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For the above sentences, the obtaining of (mutual) semantic entailment rela-
tions between the CP and the sententially interpreted NP is supported by the pos-
sibility of replacing the common coordinating conjunctions and and und in (5),
(35), and (36) by the specifying conjunction viz. [Ger.: ‘nämlich’], cf. (Kraak and
Klooster, 1968; Koster, 2000). The resulting sentences (in (37)–(39)) express
that the complement of the second occurrence of the NP/CP neutral expression
specifies the complement of the first occurrence of the NP/CP neutral expression:
(37) Sherlock fears [npMoriarty], viz. [cpthat Moriarty will destroy him].
(38) Chris noticed [npthe problem], viz. [cpthat Mary hates Bill].
(39) Peter stützt das Dach durch [npeinen Pfeiler]; nämlich dadurch, [cpdass
er einen Pfeiler aufstellt].
[gloss: Peter is supporting the roof through [npa beam], viz. by [gcput-
xxjting up a beam].]
The obtaining of entailment relations between sentences (or complement phr-
ases) and the sentential interpretations of referential NPs is further supported by
the di culty of negating an NP’s sentential interpretation in the conjunct of a co-
ordinated NP/CP-structure, cf. (Elugardo and Stainton, 2005, p. 5). Specifi-
cally, once we have learned that Sherlock fears being destroyed by Moriarty, lear-
ning that he does, however, not fear Moriarty4 yields incompatible information
(cf. (40)). The coordination of the phrases from (11b) and (34b) with the results
of negating the content of the phrases from (11a) and (34a) (in (41a), resp. (42a)),
and the coordination of the phrases from (11a) and (34a) with the results of nega-
ting the content of the phrases from (41b) and (34b) yield similar results. The
contradictoriness of the coordinations from (41b) and (42b) again supports the
obtaining of amutual entailment relation between the relevant NP and CP. In (40)
to (42), negations are written in script font:
(40) ⇤ Sherlock doesn’t fear [Moriarty], but [cpthat Moriarty will destroy him].
(41) a. ⇤ Chris failed to notice [npthe problem], but noticed [cpthat Mary
hates Bill].
b. ⇤ Chris noticed [npthe problem], but failed to notice [cpthat Mary
hates Bill].
(42) a. ⇤ Peter stützt das Dach nicht durch [npeinen Pfeiler], sondern dadurch,
[cpdass er einen Pfeiler aufstellt].
3Note that, in contrast to the identification of the equivalences from (9) and (10), the identifi-
cation of the equivalences from (35) and (36) does not require a specification of the relevant situ-
ational context.
4Since the negation of proper names is typically not available in English, we negate instead the
first occurrence of the verb fears.
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[gloss: ⇤ Peter is not supporting the roof through [gca beam], but by
xxxxxj[gcputting up a beam].]
b. ⇤ Peter stützt das Dach durch [npeinen Pfeiler], aber nicht dadurch,
[cpdass er einen Pfeiler aufstellt].
[gloss: ⇤ Peter is supporting the roof through [gca beam], but not by
xxxxxj[gcputting up a beam].]




C.1. Derived Sequent Rules for TY0
On the basis of the sequent rules from Tables 2.1 and 2.2, and Notation 2.1.1, we
derive the rules for the TY0 stand-ins for verum, inequality, disjunction, implica-
tion, and biimplication, together with the De Morgan laws (DM1, DM2), the rules
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C.2. Proofs of Theorems




Proof. Assume that   `TY0  . We prove by induction on the height of the
proof that every line   )   is valid. For reasons of space, we limit ourselves to
the most interesting case,
V
R.
Assume that   )   (with   := {⌃,Vx.A}) is a conclusion of VR, such that
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x.A. But this violates the induction hypothesis. ⇤
Theorem 2.4 (Model existence). Let L and C be TY0 languages s.t. L \ C = ;,
where every set C
↵
is countably infinite. Assume that P is a sound provability pro-
perty w.r.t. L[ C, and that ⇧ is a sequent in L. If ⇧ /2 P, then ⇧ is refutable by
a countable TY0 model.
Our proof of Theorem 2.4 closely follows the one in (Muskens, 1999; 2007).
There, it is first shown that sequents which result from an unsuccessful attempt at
constructing a Gentzen-style proof from the bottom up (called Hintikka sequents)
are refutable. This fact is then used to establish the refutability of a large class of
sequents.
To facilitate the definition of Hintikka sequents, we represent sequents as pairs
{L:A,R:A} of signed TY0 terms, where the signs L (for ‘left’) and R (‘right’) in-
dicate the terms’ structural position in the sequent. For   and   as above, the se-
quent   )   is then represented by the set {L:A |A 2  } [ {R:A |A 2  }.
We hereafter abbreviate ‘  )  ’ as ‘⇧’. Hintikka sequents are then defined
as follows:
Definition C.2.1 (Hintikka sequents). A sequent ⇧ of the logic TY0 is a
Hintikka sequent if one of the following holds:
(i) {L:A,R:A} * ⇧ if A 2 T
o
;
(ii) L:,? /2 ⇧;
(iii) L: ( x.A)(B)(~C ) 2 ⇧ =) L:A{x := B}(~C ) 2 ⇧ for all closed ( x.A),
B, ~C of appropriate type, where ~C is a sequence of TY0 terms;
(iv) R: ( x.A)(B)(~C ) 2 ⇧ =) R:A{x := B}(~C ) 2 ⇧ for all closed ( x.A),
B, and ~C of appropriate type;
(v) L: (A ) B) 2 ⇧ =) L:B (~C ) 2 ⇧ or A (~C ) 2 ⇧ for all closed A, B,
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and ~C of appropriate type;
(vi) L: (A ) B) 2 ⇧ =) there are constants ~c of appropriate type s.t.
{L:A (~c),R:B (~c)} ✓ ⇧.
We call a Hintikka sequent ⇧ complete if L:A 2 ⇧ or R:A 2 ⇧ for every A 2 L.
We next establish the refutability of Hintikka sequents by countable TY0 mo-
dels:
Lemma 1 (Hintikka). Every Hintikka sequent ⇧ is refutable by a TY0 model.
If ⇧ is complete, it is refutable by a countable TY0 model.
Proof. Via the construction of a TY0 model MF refuting ⇧. By elementary
considerations, M
F
is countable if ⇧ is complete. We identify the interpretation of
TY0 terms with their equivalence classes under equality. Below, we further assu-
me that ~ is a nullary TY0 constant for the undefined entity. By induction on the
number of connectives in a TY0 term, we then establish that, for every A,




















It follows that the model M
F
refutes the Hintikka sequent ⇧. ⇤
Our proof of the model existence theorem for TY0 is based on the notion of
a provability property. The latter has the following definition:
Definition C.2.2 (Provability property). Let P be a set of sequents in the
language L. The property P is a provability property with respect to L if P is
closed under the sequent rules such that, if {⇧1, . . . ,⇧n} ✓ P and if ⇧1, . . . ,⇧n\⇧
is a sequent rule, then ⇧ 2 P.
A provability property in L is sound if no ⇧ 2 P is refuted by a TY0 model for L.
Theorem 2.4 establishes that sequents which are not members of a sound pro-
vability property in an extended language can be extended to Hintikka sequents
in that language, and are, thus, refutable.
Theorem 2.4 (Model existence). Let L and C be TY0 languages s.t. L \ C = ;,
where every set C
↵
is countably infinite. Assume that P is a sound provability pro-
perty with respect to L[C, and that ⇧ is a sequent in L. If ⇧ /2 P, then ⇧ is refu-
table by a countable TY0 model.
Proof. Via the construction of a Hintikka sequent ⇧⇤ such that ⇧ ✓ ⇧⇤.
Let #1, . . . ,#n, . . . be an enumeration of all signed sentences in L[C, and let ◆(#)
denote the index which the signed sentence # obtains in this enumeration. For
every natural number n, we define a sequent ⇧ by the following induction:
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/2 P for every n follows by a simple induction which uses Definition
C.2.2, together with the fact that
V
R is a sequent rule for TY0.




. We next establish that, for all finite sets {#
k1 , . . . ,#kn}
and for all k   max{k1, . . . , kn}, the following holds:
{#
k1 , . . . ,#kn} ✓ ⇧⇤ , ⇧k [ {#k1 , . . . ,#kn} /2 P .(C.2.1)
We then verify through the use of (C.2.1) that ⇧⇤ is a Hintikka sequent. Conse-
quently, ⇧⇤ is refutable by a general model for the logic TY0. We show that ⇧⇤
(and, hence, ⇧) is refutable by a countable TY0 model via a proof that ⇧⇤ is com-
plete. ⇤
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C.3. Definitions of Designated WTY31 and STY
3
1 Constants
This section derives the definitions of the ‘weak’ and the ‘strong’ single-type sta-
nd-ins for the remaining truth-functional connectives and quantifiers. To do this,
we use the definitions of the designated single-type constants ,? and ).= (cf. (C1),
(C2)), and the definitions of the TY0 stand-ins from Notation 2.1.1.
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The TY32 definitions of the ‘strong’ single-type constants from Notation 8.2.1
are derived below:
,>(C.3.5)
= (,? ).= ,? )
= ( i j.( k k1.?)(i, j) ) ( k k1.?)(i, j))
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 i8q.q(@)⇣ q(i) • (cf. (C0)) with the TY32 term from (8.2.2)








 8p. p(i) ^  9x. abt  x, [ k8q.q(@)⇣ q(k)]  ^ abt (x, p)   ⇣ p(j) 
=  i j.[8q.q(@)⇣ q(j)] ^  8p. p(i) ^  9x. abt  x, ⇥ k8q.((q(@) ^ q(k))_
 i j.((q(@) _ q(k)) ^ ( ~x.⇤))) = q(@)⇤  ^ abt (x, p)   ⇣ p(j) 
=  i j.[8q.q(@)⇣ q(j)] ^  8p. p(i) ^  9x. abt  x, q(@)  ^ abt (x, p)   ⇣ p(j) 
=  i j.[8q.q(@)⇣ q(j)] ^  8p. p(i) ^  9x.(E(x,@) ^ abt (x, p))  ⇣ p(j) 
=  i j8p. (p(@) ^ p(i)) ^ (9x.(E(x,@) ^ abt (x, p))) ⇣ p(j)
Above, the step from the fourth to the fifth line is justified by our definition of the
approximation predicate ⇣ from Notation 6.1.1 and by our axioms for the beha-
vior of the aboutness predicate abt from Chapter 6.1.

APPENDIX D
PTQ Translations and Definitions
D.1. Solving Partee’s Temperature Puzzle
This section shows the possibility of treating Partee’s ‘temperature puzzle’ in an
o-based single-type semantics. Partee’s puzzle regards the logical – but counterin-
tuitive – derivability of the translation of (45) from the conjunction of the transla-







(44) [The temperaturehs,ei] [riseshhs,ei,ti]
(45) [Ninetyhs,ei] [riseshhs,ei,ti]
Montague (1973) blocks this inference by interpreting intensional common
nouns (e.g. temperature) and intransitive verbs (e.g. rise) as functions over indi-
vidual concepts (i.e. as functions over functions from indices to individuals, type
hs, ei), and by restricting the interpretation of the verb is to a relation between the
extensions of two individual concepts at the current index @ (i.e. to a relation be-
tween individuals). Since (43) thus only asserts the identity of the individual ‘the
temperature at @’ and the number ninety, it blocks the substitution1 of the ‘in-
dividual concept’-denoting NP the temperature in (44) by the NP ninety.
However, since our single-type semantics does not command correlates of in-
dividual concepts, we cannot directly adopt the above strategy in the ‘pure’ sin-
gle-type semantics from Chapter 3. (Similar observations hold for the ‘mixed’ sin-
gle-type semantics from Chapters 7 and 8).
Our solution to the temperature puzzle in these semantics is a single-type va-
riant of the puzzle’s solution in semantics with the basic types e and hs, ti.2 This
solution involves an inversion of Montague’s strategy of “generalizing to the worst
case” (Partee, 1996, p. 34): Rather than interpreting all PTQ words as single-
1To make the di↵erent typing of the two occurrences of the NP ninety in (43) and (45) more
perspicuous, we have subscripted the di↵erent forms from (43) to (45) by their associated type.
2Since the fragment from (Montague, 1970a) does not contain intensional nouns or intransi-
tive verbs, it does not give a strategy for their accommodation in an {e, hs, ti}-based semantics.
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type correlates of functions over individual concepts (codable in the type hhs, ti, ei;
our type (o; o)), and obtaining their extensional equivalents through the use of
meaning postulates, we interpret them as single-type correlates of functions over
individuals (our type o). Only intensional common nouns (e.g. temperature, price)
and intensional intransitive verbs (rise, change) retain their interpretation in the
single-type correlates of functions over individual concepts (here, in the correlate,
((o; o); o), of the type hhs, ei, ti3). The application of translations of intensional
forms to the translations of other PTQ forms is then handled through the use of
type- (or meaning-)shifting.
In particular, to enable the application of the TY0 translations of determi-
ners (type ((o; o) (o; o); o)) to the translations of intensional common nouns (type
((o; o); o)), we introduce the function ext (for ‘extensionalization’). This function
sends single-type correlates of properties of individual concepts (coded in the ty-
pe hhhs, ti, ei, hs, tii) to the correlates of properties of individuals (type he, hs, tii).
Below, we will use the typing conventions on TY0 variables from Table 3.4:
Definition D.1.1. The function ext :=  Q x
W
P.Q (P) .̂ x
.
= P (w) sends
TY0 terms of the type ((o; o); o) to TY0 terms of the type (o; o).
The function ext enables the ‘extensionalization’ of the TY0 translation, temp, of
the noun temperature to the term  x
W
P. temp (P) .̂ x
.
= P (w). This term deno-
tes the property of being identical to the result of applying some type-(o; o) wit-
ness P of the property denoted by temp to the type-o correlate, w, of the current
index. As a result, the term  x
W
P. temp (P) .̂ x
.
= P (w) denotes the TY0 cor-
relate of the property of being the temperature at the current index.
The possibility of interpreting intensional common nouns in the type (o; o) en-
ables the TY0 translation of the logical form of the sentence The temperature is
ninety. This translation proceeds as follows:
1. [npninety] ninety(3.2.21)
2. [tvis]  Q x.Q( y.x .= y)
3. [vp[tvis][npninety]]  Q x.Q( y.x .= y) [lift(ninety)]
=  Q x.Q( y.x
.










4. [ntemperature] temp =  P.temp (P)
3This type can be coded in the type hhhs, ti, ei, hs, tii in an {e, hs, ti}-based semantics.











































P2. temp (P2) .̂ y
.
= P2(w)








P2. temp (P2) .̂ y
.
= P2(w)
















P. temp (P) .̂ y
.
= P (w)







P. temp (P) .̂ y
.
= P (w)
 $· x .= y  .̂ x .= ninety
To enable the application of the TY0 translations of intensional noun phrases
(e.g. the temperature; standardly, type ((o; o); o)) to the translations of intensional
intransitive verbs (type ((o; o); o)), we introduce the function int (for ‘intensionali-
zation’). This function sends the single-type correlates of generalized quantifiers
over individuals (type ((o; o); o)) to the correlates of generalized quantifiers over
individual concepts (type (((o; o); o); o)), and sends the single-type correlates of
properties of ordered pairs of sets of individuals (type ((o; o) (o; o); o)) to the corre-
lates of sets of ordered pairs of sets of individual concepts (type (((o; o); o) ((o; o); o);
o)). Below, we assume that c 2 {john,mary, bill,ninety, sherlock,moriarty,
pat,partee}:








































P1.(Q1(P1)$· P .= P1) .̂ Q (P)
The function int is an ‘e-to-hs, ei’-restricted variant of the intensionalization ope-
ration for extensional TY2 terms from (van Eijck and Unger, 2010, Ch. 8.4),
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cf. (Ben-Avi and Winter, 2007; de Groote and Kanazawa, 2013). The lat-
ter is a function that systematically replaces each occurrence of the types e and t
in the type of a linguistic expression by the types hs, ei and hs, ti, respectively. As
a result, the type for generalized quantifiers over individuals, hhe, ti, ti, will be re-
placed by the type hhhs, ei, hs, tii, hs, tii. The type for sets of ordered pairs of sets
of individuals, hhe, ti, hhe, ti, tii, will be replaced by the type hhhs, ei, hs, tii, hhhs, ei,
hs, tii, hs, tiii. These types code the types for generalized quantifiers over indivi-
dual concepts, hhhs, ei, ti, ti, and for sets of ordered pairs of sets of individual con-
cepts, hhhs, ei, ti, hhhs, ei, ti, tii.
The possibility of interpreting intensional NPs in the type (((o; o); o); o) enab-
les the TY0 translation of the logical form of the sentence The temperature rises:
1. [ivrises] rise =  P.rise (P)(3.2.6)
































P1.(temp (P1)$· P .= P1) .̂ rise (P)
The TY0 translation of the sentence A price rises is analogously obtained:
1. [ivrises] rise =  P.rise (P)(3.2.5)
2. [nprice] price =  P.price (P)
3. [deta]  P1 P
_
x.P1(x) .̂ P (x)
4. [np[deta][nprice]] int( P1 P
_
x.P1(x) .̂ P (x))[price]
=  Q1 Q
_
P.Q1(P) .̂ Q (P)[price]
=  Q
_
P.price (P) .̂ Q (P)
5. [s[np[deta][nprice]][ivrises]]  Q
_
P.price (P) .̂ Q (P)[rise]
=
_
P.price (P) .̂ rise (P)
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By using the complex function  x.int(lift(x)), we can translate the logical
form of the sentence Ninety rises as follows:
1. [npninety] ninety(D.1.1)
2. [ivrises] rise =  P.rise (P)




P.Q (P) .̂ P (w)
.
= ninety [ P1.rise (P1)]
=
_





P.rise (P) .̂ P (w)
.
= ninety
This completes our TY0 translation of the ‘ingredient sentences’ for Partee’s tem-
perature puzzle. The premise of the intuitively invalid inference from the conjunc-
tion of the logical forms from (3.2.21.7) and (3.2.6.5) to the form from (D.1.1.3) is









P2. temp (P2) .̂ y
.
= (P2)(w)






P1.(temp (P1)$· P .= P1) .̂ rise (P)









P2. temp (P2) .̂ y
.
= (P2)(w)





P1.(temp (P1)$· P .= P1) .̂ rise (P)
 
Notably, while the TY0 term from (D.1.2.2) attributes the property ‘rise’ to a ty-
pe-(o; o) object that has the property of being a temperature, the TY0 term from
(D.1.2.1) attributes the property ‘is ninety’ only to the result (type o) of applying
a temperature object to the TY0 correlate of the current index. In virtue of this
fact, the logical form from (D.1.1.3) does not follow from the form from (D.1.2.4)
by the rules of the logic TY0.
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D.2. ‘WEAK’ PTQ DEFINITIONS 233
D.2. ‘Weak’ PTQ Definitions
This section derives some definitions of the WTY31 translations of the logical sen-
tence forms from Chapter 7.2.2. In particular, the definition of the WTY31 trans-






y.(P1(y)$· x .= y) ^P (x)
(7.2.10)
=  P1 P i9x 8y.(P1(y, i) $ x = y) ^P (x, i)
2. [nman] man =  x i.man
 






y.(man (y)$· x .= y) ^P (x)
=  P1 P i9x 8y.(P1(y, i) $ x = y) ^P (x, i)
=  P i9x 8y. ⇥ z k.man  [◆x.z = ( j.E(x, j))], k ⇤
=  P i9x 8y. ⇥ z k.man  [◆x.z = ( j.E(x, j))], k ⇤(y, i) $ x = y ^
=  P i9x 8y.P (x, i)
=  P i9x 8y. man  [◆x.y = ( j.E(x, j))], i  $ x = y  ^P (x, i)
4. [vp[ivwalks]] walks =  x i.walk
 







y.(man (y)$· x .= y) ^walk (x)
=  P i9x 8y. man  [◆x.y = ( j.E(x, j))], i  $ x = y  ^P (x, i)
=  i9x 8y.⇥ z k.walk  [◆z.z = ( k1.E(z, k1))], k
 ⇤
=  i9x 8y. man  [◆x.y = ( j.E(x, j))], i  $ x = y ^
=  i9x 8y.⇥ z k.walk  [◆z.z = ( k1.E(z, k1))], k
 ⇤
(x, i)
=  i9x 8y. man  [◆x.y = ( j.E(x, j))], i  $ x = y ^
=  i9x 8y. walk  [◆z.x = ( k1.E(z, k1))], i
 
=  i9x8y.(man (y, i) $ x = y) ^ walk (x, i)
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The definition of the WTY31 translation of the logical form of the sentence A price
rises (cf. (3.2.5)) is given below:





 8z.P (z) = [ j.E(T (z), j)] ⇤, i 




 8z.P (z) = [ j.E(T (z), j)] ⇤, i 
3. [deta]  P1 P
_
x.P1(x) ^P (x) =  P1 P i9x.P1(x, i) ^P (x, i)
4. [np[deta][nprice]]  Q
_
P.price (P) ^Q (P)

















(P, i) ^Q (P, i)
=  Q i9P.price  ⇥◆T. 8z.P(z) = [ j.E(T (z), j)] ⇤, i  ^Q (P, i)
5. [s[np[deta][nprice]][ivrises]] 
_
P.price (P) ^ rise (P)

















=  i9P.price  ⇥◆T. 8z.P(z) = [ j.E(T (z), j)] ⇤, i ^
=  i9P.rise  ⇥◆T1.




=  i9T.price (T, i) ^ rise (T, i)
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The WTY31 translation of the logical form of the sentence John finds a unicorn (cf.
(3.2.7)) has the following definition:
1. [np[deta][nunicorn]]  P
_
x.unicorn (x) ^P (x)
(7.2.8)
=  P i9x.unicorn  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^P (x, i)


















 P i9x.unicorn  [◆x.x = (j.E(x, j))], i  ^P (x, i)⇤
=  y.
⇥


















=  y i9x.unicorn  [◆x.x = (j.E(x, j))], i ^
=  z i9x.find  [◆x.x = ( k.E(x, k))], [◆y.y = ( k.E(y, k))], i 
=  y i9x.unicorn (x, i) ^ find  x, [◆y.y = ( k.E(y, k))], i 
4. [npJohn] john =  i.E(john, i)
5. [s[npJohn][vp[tvfinds][np[deta][nunicorn]]]] 
_
x.unicorn (x) ^ find (x, john)
=  y i9x.unicorn (x, i) ^ find  x, ⇥◆y.y = ( k.E(y, k))⇤, i  [ j.E(john, j)]
=  i9x.unicorn (x, i) ^ find  x, ⇥◆y.[ j.E(john, j)] = ( k.E(y, k))⇤, i 
=  i9x.unicorn (x, i) ^ find (x, john, i)
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The definition of the WTY31 translation of the narrow-scope reading of the senten-
ce John seeks a unicorn (cf. (3.2.13)) is given below. In the definition, X abbrevi-
ates the TY32 term from Definition 7.2.2:
1. [np[deta][nunicorn]]  P
_
x.unicorn (x) ^P (x)
(7.2.17)
=  P i9x.unicorn  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^P (x, i)
2. [tvseeks] seek =  Q x.seek (Q,x)
=  Q x i.seek
 
[◆Q.(8P.( k.Q(P, k)) = ( k3.Q(X, k3)))],
=  Q x i.seek
 







y.unicorn (y) ^P (y)],x 
=  Q y i.seek
 
[◆Q.(8P.( k.Q(P, k)) = ( k3.Q(X, k3)))],
=  Q y i.seek
 



























 8P.  k9x.unicorn  [◆x.x = ( k5.E(x, k5))], k
 ^








[ P k9x.unicorn (x, k) ^ P (x, k)], [◆y.y = ( j.E(y, j))], i 






y.unicorn (y) ^P (y)], john 
=  y i.seek
 
[ P k9x.unicorn (x, k) ^ P (x, k)],
=  y i.seek
 





[ P k9x.unicorn (x, k) ^ P (x, k)],
=  i.seek
 ⇥






[ P j9x.unicorn (x, j) ^ P (x, j)], john, i 
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The WTY31 translation of the sentence’s wide-scope reading (cf. (3.2.14)) has the
following definition:




[◆Q.(8P.( k.Q(P, k)) = ( k3.Q(X, k3)))],
=  Q x i.seek
 
[◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i
 
2. t0  lift (x 0) =  P.P (x 0) =  P i.P (x 0, i)






[◆Q.(8P.( k.Q(P, k)) = ( k3.Q(X, k3)))],
=  Q x i.seek
 






























4. [s[npJohn][vp[tvseeks] t0]] seek
 
















































x.unicorn (x) ^P (x)





x.unicorn (x) ^ seek  [ P.P (x)], john 












=  i9x.unicorn  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^ ⇥ x 0 k4.







=  i9x.unicorn  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i ^




=  i9x.unicorn (x, i) ^ seek  [ P j.P (x, j)], john, i 
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TheWTY31 translation of the logical form of the sentence Bill is a man (cf. (3.2.20))
is defined as follows:
1. [np[deta][nman]]  P
_
x.man (x) ^P (x)
(7.2.24)
=  P i9x.man  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^P (x, i)
2. [is]  Q x.Q( y.x .= y) =  Q x.Q( y i.x (i) = y (i))
3. [vp[is][np[deta][nman]]]  y
_
x.man (x) ^ y .= x
=  Q z.Q( y k.z (k) = y (k))
=  z.
⇥
 P i9x.man  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^P (x, i)⇤
=  z.
⇥
 P i9x.man  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^P (x, i)⇤( y k.z (k) = y (k))
=  z i9x.man  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^ ( y k.z (k) = y (k))(x, i)
=  z i9x.man  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^ z (i) = x (i)
4. [s[npBill][vp[is][np[deta][nman]]]] man (bill)
=  z i9x.man  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^ z (i) = x (i) [ k.E(bill, k)]
=  i9x.man  [◆x.x = ( j.E(x, j))], i  ^ [ k.E(bill, k)](i) = x (i)
=  i9x.man (x, i) ^ E(bill, i) = E(x, i)
=  i9x.man (x, i) ^ bill = x
=  i.man (bill, i)
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D.3. ‘Strong’ PTQ Definitions
This section supplies (the derivations of) some definitions of the STY31 translati-
ons of the logical sentence forms from Chapter 8.2.2. In particular, the remaining
definitions of the forms from (3.2.2) to (3.2.27) are given below:
[s[np[detevery][nman]][vp[ivwalks]]] 
^
x.man (x)!· walk (x)(D.3.1)
=  i j8x. man (x, j) ! walk (x, j)  ^  8p. p(i) ^  9y.abt (y, p)^




x.unicorn (x) ^ find (x, john)
=  i j9x. unicorn (x, j) ^ find  [ P k. P (x, k)], john, j  ^
 i j9x. 8p.(p(i) ^ (abt (x, p) _ abt (john, p)))⇣ p(j) 
[s[[deta][nprice]][vp[rises]]] 
_
P.price (P) ^ rise (P)(D.3.3)
=  i j9T.(price (T, j) ^ rise (T, j)) ^  8p. p(i) ^  9x.abt(x, p)^






P1.(temp (P1)$· P .= P1) ^ rise (P)
=  i j9T 8T1.((temp (T1, j) $ T = T1) ^ rise (T, j))^
 i j9T 8T1.
 8p. p(i) ^  9x.abt(x, p) ^ abt x, [ k.(temp
 i j9T 8T1.







x.woman (x) ^  
^
y.man (y)!· love (y,x) 
=  i j9x. woman (x, j) ^ (8y.man (y, j) ! love (y, x, j)) ^
 i j9x. 8p. p(i) ^  9z.abt  z, [ k.woman (x, k)^







x.woman (x) ^ love (y,x) 
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=  i j8y. man (y, j) !  9x.woman (x, j) ^ love (y, x, j)  ^
 i j8y. 8p. p(i) ^  9z.abt z, [ k.man (y, k) !
 i j8y.(9x.woman (x, k) ^ love (y, x, k))]  ^ abt(z, p)  ⇣ p(j) 
[s[npBill][vp[is][np[deta][nman]]]] man (bill)(D.3.7)






y.(temp ( x1.y)$· x .= y) ^ x .= ninety
=  i j9x8y.   9T.temp (T, i) ^ y = T (w)  $ x = y  ^ x = ninety ^
 i j9x8y. 8p. p(i) ^  9y.abt (y, p) ^ abt  y, [ k.  9T.temp (T, k)^
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxy = T (w)
  $ x = y  ^ x = ninety]  ⇣ p(j)  
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(Sigrid Beck and Hans-Martin Gärtner, eds.), Vol. 20, Berlin, 2009.
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Summary
This dissertation is a contribution to the (onto-)logical foundations of natural lan-
guage semantics. In particular, it provides a formal semantics for a canonical frag-
ment of English which constructs the referents of the fragment’s expressions from
a single basic type of object (rather than from two or more basic types, as is stan-
dard in Montague semantics). The possibility of such a single-type semantics has
been conjectured by Partee (2006) to account for recent findings in language de-
velopment. The presented semantics supports Partee’s conjecture and accommo-
dates its empirical motivation. The development of this semantics answers a num-
ber of questions about the salience of the Montagovian type system, the robust-
ness of semantic theories with respect to their basic-type choice, and their clas-
sification according to their objects’ informational strength.
To give the idea of a single-type semantics intuitive content, the first part of
this dissertation presents the simplest single-type semantics which supports Par-
tee’s conjecture. This semantics is a version of Henkin’s Theory of Propositional
Types that interprets all expressions from the fragment into constructions out of
the basic type o. As a result of the neutrality of the type o between Montague’s
basic types for individuals (type e) and propositions (type hs, ti), proper names
(traditionally, expressions of the type e) and sentences (traditionally, expressions
of the type hs, ti) will both receive an interpretation in this type. However, as a re-
sult of the basic type’s primitiveness, the theory lacks a truth-definition and fails
to instantiate some semantic consequences of Partee’s conjecture (e.g. the existen-
ce of equivalence relations between names and sentences). Thus, our o-based se-
mantics disqualifies as a suitable single-type semantics for the fragment.
The remainder of the dissertation develops a single-type theory which accom-
modates the consequences of Partee’s conjecture. To this aim, Part II identifies
two suitable Montague types which analyze the type o from Part I. Part III de-
fines the associated semantics of these two types.
Specifically, to find the ‘best’ single-type candidate, Part II introduces a set of
semantic requirements (including algebraicity and partiality) which ensure the ty-
pe’s suitability as a single semantic basis for the fragment. The application of the-
se requirements to the set of Montague types identifies the types hs, ti (for propo-
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sitions) and hs, hs, tii (for propositional concepts) as the best-suited candidates.
The latter are shown to have desirable meta-properties. Thus, they are equivalent
(up to coding) to their representations in higher-rank types, and are associated
with di↵erently informative semantic theories. As a result of the former, the pro-
vision of a single-type semantics is independent of a particular basic-type choice.
As a result of the latter, single-type theories are classified by a natural ordering
relation.
Part III provides a detailed presentation of our hs, ti- and hs, hs, tii-based sin-
gle-type semantics, in which we distinguish two classes (‘weak’ and ‘strong’). Since
propositional concepts represent individuals via functions from indices to the in-
tersection of all true propositions about the individuals at those indices, we des-
cribe our hs, hs, tii-based single-type semantics as a strong single-type semantics.
The semantics of the type hs, ti, which only represents individuals via the set of
indices in which they exist, is described as a weak single-type semantics.We adapt
all relevant concepts of the o-based logic from Part I to constructions out of the
type hs, ti, resp. hs, hs, tii and formulate a set of semantic constraints for non-logi-
cal single-type constants. Such constraints ensure the interpretation of proper na-
mes and sentences into objects of the form from Part II. We show that these con-
straints enable the identification of equivalence relations between proper names
and sentences.
The conclusion locates the dissertation in the wider context of formal seman-
tics. In particular, it presents three precursors of single-type semantics (i.e. Krat-
zer-style Situation Semantics, Zalta’s Abstract Object Theory, and Chierchia and
Turner’s Property Theory), sketches alternative approaches to the provision of a
single-type semantics, and identifies new areas for future work. Specifically, the re-
presentational strategies of the single-type semantics from Part III formalize Kra-
tzer’s situation-theoretic interpretation of names, and improve upon the property-
theoretic type system of Chierchia and Turner. Future work includes the provision
of a type-shifting account of nonsentential assertion (along the lines of Part III),
an extension of our single-type semantics to definite and indefinite noun phrases,
and the use of this semantics in the unification of the semantic ontologies of larger
fragments of natural language.
Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift is een bijdrage tot de (onto-)logische grondslagen van de seman-
tiek van natuurlijke taal. In het bijzonder ontwikkelt de thesis een formele seman-
tiek voor een fragment van het hedendaags Engels, waarin de betekenissen van lin-
güıstische uitdrukkingen opgebouwd worden uit één basistype. (De klassieke for-
mele semantiek, cf. (Montague, 1970a; 1973), onderstelt ten minste twee ver-
schillende basistypes). De mogelijkheid voor een dergelijke enkele-type-semantiek
[Engels single-type semantics] werd in 2006 door Barbara Partee voorgestelt om
recente observaties in de taalontwikkeling te modelleren. De semantiek die in dit
werk beschreven wordt, bewijst Partee’s vermoeden, en biedt een kader voor de ge-
noemde empirische feiten. De ontwikkeling van een enkele-type-semantiek beant-
woordt een aantal vragen in verband met de rol van Montague’s type-systeem, de
robuustheid van semantische theoriën wat betreft de keuze van basistypes, en hun
(zelf-)classificatie volgens de informatie-inhoud van hun objecten.
Om de lezer een intüıtief idee te geven van de enkele-type-semantiek, beschou-
wen we in het eerste deel van dit proefschrift de eenvoudigste enkele-type-seman-
tiek die Partee’s vermoeden bevestigt. Deze semantiek is een versie van Henkin’s
Theorie der Propositionele Types, die alle uitdrukkingen uit het fragment als con-
structies uit de basistype o vertaalt. Als gevolg van de neutraliteit van het type o
tussen Montague’s basistypes voor individuen (type e) en proposities (type hs, ti)
verkrijgen zowel eigennamen (normalerwijze type e) als zinnen (normalerwijze ty-
pe hs, ti) een interpretatie in dit type. Echter, als gevolg van het primitieve karak-
ter van de basistype o heeft de theorie geen waarheidsdefinitie, en valideert som-
mige semantische gevolgen van Partee’s vermoeden (bijv. het bestaan van equiva-
lentie-relaties tussen eigennamen en zinnen) niet. Het weze duidelijk dat deze ‘pri-
mitieve aanpak’ niet resulteert in een bruikbare enkele-type-semantiek en een fun-
damentele verfijning noopt zich. Het leeuwendeel van dit werk bestaat erin deze
verfijning van naaldje tot draadje te beschrijven in Delen II en III.
Aldus, in Delen II en III van dit proefschrift wordt een enkele-type-semantiek
ontwikkelt die de semantische gevolgen van Partee’s vermoeden valideert. In Deel II
identificeren we twee geschikte Montague-types die de rol van de type o uit Deel I
spelen, en in Deel III beschrijven we een semantiek gebaseerd op deze types.
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Om de beste kandidaat voor het basistype te identificeren, introduceren we in
Deel II een reeks van semantische eigenschappen (waaronder algebraiciteit en par-
tialiteit) die de geschiktheid van het basistype garanderen.De toepassing van deze
criteria op de verzameling van Montague-types identificeert de types hs, ti (voor
proposities) en hs, hs, tii (voor propositionele concepten [Engels propositional con-
cepts]) als de beste enkele-type-kandidaten.Deze laatste hebben uiterst wenselijke
meta-eigenschappen: Zo zijn de genoemde basistypes equivalent met hun represen-
taties in hogere-rang types (op wat codering na), en zijn geassocieerd met seman-
tische theoriën met verschillende informatieve inhoud. Als gevolg van deze eigen-
schappen is de enkele-type-semantiek onafhankelijk van de specifieke keuze van
een (rijk genoeg) basisobject.Ook geeft deze observatie aanleding tot een classifica-
tie van alle mogelijke enkele-type-semantieken volgens een natuurlijke orderings-
relatie gebaseerd op de complexiteit van het basistype.
In Deel III bevindt zich een gedetailleerde beschrijving van de hs, ti- en
hs, hs, tii-gebaseerde enkele-type-semantieken waarin we twee categorieën (‘sterk’
en ‘zwak’) onderscheiden. Aangezien propositionele concepten individuen e voor-
stellen als functies van indices naar de doorsnede van alle ware proposities over
deze individuen in deze indices, spreken we in het geval van de basistype hs, hs, tii
van een sterke enkele-type-semantiek. Omdat het type hs, ti individuen enkel via
de verzameling van indices vorstelt waar ze bestaan, spreken we in het geval van
de type hs, ti van een zwakke enkele-type-semantiek. Daarnaast gaan we dieper in
op de vertaling van alle relevante concepten uit de o-gebaseerde logica uit Deel I
naar constructies uit de types hs, ti en hs, hs, tii. Ten laatste bespreken we de speci-
ficatie van een collectie van semantische randvoorwaarden voor de niet-logische
enkele-type-constanten.Deze randvoorwaarden verzekeren de interpretatie van ei-
gennamen en zinnen naar objecten zoals ge-introduceerd in Deel II, en maken de
identificatie van equivalentie-relaties tussen eigennamen en zinnen mogelijk.
In de conclusie wordt dit proefschrift geduid in de ruimere context van de for-
mele semantiek.We presenteren verbindingen met drie voorgangers van de enkele-
type-semantiek (i.e. Kratzer’s Situatiesemantiek, Zalta’s Abstracte-Objectenthe-
orie en Chierchia en Turner’s Eigenschappentheorie), schetsen alternatieve formu-
leringen van de enkele-type-semantiek, en identificeren nieuwe vruchtbare gebie-
den voor toekomstig onderzoek. We merken op dat de representationele strategie-
ën van de enkele-type semantiek aanleiding geven tot een formalisatie van Krat-
zer’s situatie-theoretische interpretatie van eigennamen, en tot een verbetering
van het eigenschap-theoretische type-systeem van Chierchia en Turner. Toekoms-
tig werk omvat de behandeling van type-schakeling voor niet-zinsconstructies (als
in Deel III), een uitbreiding van de beschreven enkele-type-semantiek naar defini-
ete en niet-definiete NPs, en het gebruik ervan in de unificatie van ontologieën van
grotere delen van de natuurlijke taal.
Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation liefert einen Beitrag zu den (onto-)logischen Grundlagen der
natürlichsprachigen Semantik. Im Besonderen präsentiert die Arbeit eine formale
Semantik für ein Standard-Fragment des Englischen, die die Bezugsgegenstände
sprachlicher Ausdrücke aus nur einem Basistyp konstruiert. (In der klassischen
formalen Semantik, siehe (Montague, 1970a; 1973), werden gewöhnlich min-
destens zwei Basistypen angenommen). Die Möglichkeit einer solchen ein-getypten
Semantik [Engl. single-type semantics ] wurde 2006 von Partee vorgeschlagen, um
neue Forschungsergebnisse aus der Sprachentwicklung zu modellieren. Die neue
Semantik stützt Partees Hypothese und trägt ihrer empirischen Motivation Rech-
nung. Die Entwicklung der Semantik beantwortet eine Reihe von Fragen über die
Motivation des Montagovischen Typensystems, die Robustheit von semantischen
Theorien in Bezug auf ihre Typenwahl, und ihre Klassifizierung entsprechend des
Informationsgehaltes ihrer Gegenstände.
Um dem Leser den Einstieg in die ein-getypte Semantik zu erleichtern, präsen-
tiert der erste Teil der Dissertation die einfachste ein-getypte Semantik, die Par-
tees Hypothese stützt. Letztere ist eine Variante von Henkins Theorie Propositio-
naler Typen, die alle Ausdrücke des Fragments als Konstruktionen aus dem Basis-
typ o interpretiert. Aufgrund der Neutralität des Typs o zwischen Montagues Ba-
sistypen für Individuen (Typ e) und Aussagen (Typ hs, ti) werden Eigennamen
(traditionell, Ausdrücke des Typs e) und Aussagesätze (traditionell, Ausdrücke
des Typs hs, ti) beide in diesem Typ interpretiert. Infolge der Primitivität des Ba-
sistyps o verfügt die Theorie indes über keine einfache Wahrheitsdefinition, und
vermag einige semantische Konsequenzen von Partees Hypothese (z.B. die Exis-
tenz von Äquivalenzbeziehungen zwischen Eigennamen und Sätzen) nicht zu in-
stanziieren. Somit scheitert die o -basierte Semantik als eine geeignete ein-getypte
Semantik.
Der Rest der Dissertation entwickelt eine ein-getypte Theorie, die die Konse-
quenzen von Partees Hypothese erfasst. Hierzu identifiziert Teil II zwei geeignete
Montague-Typen, die den Typ o aus Teil I interpretieren. Teil III definiert die Se-
mantik dieser beiden Typen.
Um den ‘besten’ Kandidaten für den Basistyp einer ein-getypten Semantik
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zu finden, führt Teil II eine Menge von semantischen Voraussetzungen ein, die die
Eignung des Typs als eine semantische Basis für das Sprachfragment gewährleis-
ten. Die Anwendung dieser Voraussetzungen auf die Menge von Montague-Typen
identifiziert die Typen hs, ti (für Aussagen) und hs, hs, tii (für Aussagenkonzepte
[Engl. propositional concepts ]) als die bestgeeigneten Kandidaten. Letztere haben
wünschenswerte Metaeigenschaften. So sind sie mit ihren Repräsentationen in hö-
hergeordneten Typen bis zur Codierung äquivalent und werden mit verschieden
informativen semantischen Theorien verbunden. Aufgrund der ersten Eigenschaft
ist die Formulierung einer ein-getypten Semantik von der Wahl des Basistyps un-
abhängig. Aufgrund der zweiten Eigenschaft werden ein-getypte Theorien durch
eine natürliche Ordnungsrelation klassifiziert.
Teil III liefert eine ausführliche Darstellung der hs, ti- und der hs, hs, tii-ba-
sierten ein-getypten Semantiken, in der wir zwei verschiedene Klassen (‘stark’ und
‘schwach’) unterscheiden.Da Aussagenkonzepte Individuen durch Funktionen von
Indizes (möglichen Situationen) zum Durchschnitt aller wahren Aussagen über die
Individuen in diesen Indizes repräsentieren, beschreiben wir die hs, hs, tii-basier-
te ein-getypte Semantik als eine starke ein-getypte Semantik. Die Semantik des
Typs hs, ti, die Individuen nur durch die Menge der Indizes repräsentiert, in de-
nen sie existieren, wird als eine schwache ein-getypte Semantik beschrieben. Wir
adaptieren alle relevanten Konzepte aus der o -basierten Logik von Teil I an Kon-
struktionen aus dem Typ hs, ti bzw. hs, hs, tii und formulieren eine Klasse von se-
mantischen Einschränkungen für nicht-logische ein-getypte Konstanten. Solche
Einschränkungen gewährleisten die Interpretation von Eigennamen und Sätzen in
Gegenstände der Form von Teil II. Wir zeigen, dass unsere Definitionen die Iden-
tifizierung von Äquivalenzbeziehungen zwischen Eigennamen und Sätzen ermögli-
chen.
Das Schlusskapitel stellt die vorliegende Dissertation in den weiteren Kontext
der formalen Semantik. Insbesondere präsentiert es drei Vorläufer der ein-getyp-
ten Semantik (d.s. Kratzers Situationen-Semantik, Zaltas Theorie Abstrakter Ge-
genstände und Chierchia und Turners Eigenschaftstheorie), skizziert alternative
Ansätze für eine ein-getypte Semantik und identifiziert zukünftige Arbeitsberei-
che. Insbesondere formalisieren die Repräsentationsstrategien der ein-getypten
Semantik aus Teil III Kratzers Situationen-theoretische Interpretation von Eigen-
namen und verbessern das eigenschaftstheoretische Typensystem von Chierchia
und Turner. Zukünftige Arbeit wird sich auf typenschaltende Ansätze nicht-sen-
tentieller Behauptung (analog zu Teil III), die Erweiterung unserer ein-getypten
Semantik auf definite und indefinite Nominalphrasen und ihre Verwendung in der
Vereinheitlichung größerer Sprachfragmente konzentrieren.
Abstract
In (Montague, 1970a), Montague defines a formal theory of linguistic meaning
which interprets a small fragment of English through the use of two basic types of
objects: individuals and propositions. In this dissertation, we develop a compara-
ble semantics which only uses one basic type of object (hence, single-type seman-
tics).4 Such a semantics has been conjectured by Partee (2006) as a ‘minimality
test’ for the Montagovian type system, which captures the lowest ontological re-
quirements on any successful semantics for Montague’s fragment. The resulting se-
mantics unifies the semantic ontology of the fragment and yields insight into the
apparatus of types in formal semantics.
To give the idea of a single-type semantics intuitive content, the first part of
this dissertation identifies a simple single-type semantics whose basic type is neu-
tral between individuals and propositions. However, as a result of the type’s pri-
mitiveness, the theory lacks a number of core semantic notions (like truth and (cer-
tain cases of) equivalence). To compensate for this shortcoming, Part II identifies
two Montague types which analyze the basic type from Part I. Part III defines the
single-type semantics which are associated with these two types. These semantics
are models of subsystems of a variant of Montague’s Intensional Logic. Their in-
terpretation of Montague’s fragment identifies the constraints on any ‘usable’ sin-
gle-type theory.
The semantics from Part III are shown to fit squarely with Kratzer-style Situ-
ation Semantics and to improve upon the property-theoretic type system of Chi-
erchia and Turner.
Keywords Single-type hypothesis, Montague semantics, Natural language meta-
physics, Type theory, Unification.
4This abstract is intended for formal semanticists, logicians, and philosophers of linguistics. The
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